Thought insertion: Abnormal sense of thought agency or thought endorsement?

The standard approach to the core phenomenology of thought insertion characterizes it in terms of a normal sense of thought ownership coupled with an abnormal sense of thought agency. Recently, Fernández (2010) has argued that there are crucial problems with this approach and has proposed instead that what goes wrong fundamentally in such a phenomenology is a sense of thought commitment, characterized in terms of thought endorsement. In this paper, we argue that even though Fernández raises new issues that enrich the topic, his proposal cannot rival the version of the standard approach we shall defend.

Metáforas Convencionais & Atribuição de Crenças

The article deals with a particular methodological problem: the interpretation of assertions containing conventional metaphors. Seeking inspiration in the cognitive sciences, seeks to provide some conceptual distinctions in order to make more efficacious the interpretative exercise of allocation dc beliefs is intrfnsceco the ethnographic work.

The Importance of Religious Displays for Belief Acquisition and Secularization

Both the sociology and the cognitive science of religion seek to explain the acquisition of religious beliefs. In this article, I offer an account of the acquisition and distribution of religious beliefs using the findings of both fields. In the process, I seek to illustrate the potential of interdisciplinary dialogue for improving our understanding of religion and its absence. More specifically, I present a prima facie case—based on existing work in the social and cognitive sciences, exploratory online surveys, and participant observation—that witnessing actions attesting to religious claims is one of the most crucial variables determining whether or not an individual will explicitly believe such claims. Further, I argue that the connection between action and belief can help produce an improved account of secularization and non-theism, defined here as the lack of explicit belief in the existence of non-physical agents.