Multi-Party Negotiation When Agents Have Subjective Estimates of Bargaining Powers

This paper presents a method for generating Pareto-optimal solutions in multi-party negotiations. In this iterative method, decision makers (DMs) formulate proposals that yield a minimum payoff to their opponents. Each proposal belongs to the efficient frontier, DMs try to adjust to a common one. In this setting, each DM is supposed to have a given bargaining power. More precisely each DM is supposed to have a subjective estimate of the power of the different parties. We study the convergence of the method, and provide examples where there is no possible agreement resulting from it.

Semiclassical treatment of Wannier's theory when the exponent diverges

We consider a non-standard application of the Wannier model. A physical example is the single ionization of a hydrogenic beryllium ion with a fully stripped beryllium ion, where the ratio of the charge of the third particle to the charges of the escaping particles is 1/4; we investigate the single ionization by an electron of an atom comprising an electron and a nucleus of charge 1/4. An infinite exponent is obtained suggesting that this process is not tractable within the Wannier model. A modified version of Crothers' uniform semiclassical wavefunction for the outgoing particles has been adopted, since the Wannier exponents and are infinite for an effective charge of Z = 1/4. We use Bessel functions to describe the Peterkop functions u and u and derive a new turning point ?. Since u is well behaved at infinity, there exists only the singularity in u at infinity, thus we employ a one- (rather than two-) dimensional change of dependent variable, ensuring that a uniform solution is obtained that avoids semiclassical breakdown on the Wannier ridge. The regularized final-state asymptotic wavefunction is employed, along with a continuum-distorted-wave approximation for the initial-state wavefunction to obtain total cross sections on an absolute scale. © 2006 IOP Publishing Ltd.