'The Aftermath of the Annan Plan Referendums' Cross-Voting Moderation for Cyprus

This article examines recent developments in the Cyprus negotiations and suggests a number of changes to the proposed electoral system. Specifically, cross-voting and other electoral methods that encourage coalition-building across ethnic communities might add significantly to the functionality of the Annan Plan. Combined with other innovative mechanisms already in the plan, cross-voting could force political parties to seriously take into account the interests and concerns of the two Cypriot communities, an element that is currently missing from both the Turkish Cypriot (TC) and Greek Cypriot (GC) political systems. Special conditions on the island, as well as the way most political parties operated in the critical pre-April 2004 referendum period, suggest the need for this amendment. Although this study respects the consociational logic of the Annan Plan, it supplements consociationalism with elements that foster integration and inter-dependence between the two communities and their voters. The article also reviews the postreferendum developments in Cyprus which might have worrisome future implications, not only for its two communities, but also for EU enlargement in general. Cyprus both holds one of the keys to Turkey's entrance into the EU and is a litmus test for the Euro-Atlantic nexus and its capacity to pacify and integrate ethnically divided societies in Europe and elsewhere.

Perceptions and reality: Economic voting at the 2004 European Parliament elections

One of the most influential explanations of voting behaviour is based on economic factors: when the economy is doing well, voters reward the incumbent government and when the economy is doing badly, voters punish the incumbent. This reward-punishment model is thought to be particularly appropriate at second order contests such as European Parliament elections. Yet operationalising this economic voting model using citizens' perceptions of economic performance may suffer from endogeneity problems if citizens' perceptions are in fact a function of their party preferences rather than being a cause of their party preferences. Thus, this article models a 'strict' version of economic voting in which they purge citizens' economic perceptions of partisan effects and only use as a predictor of voting that portion of citizens' economic perceptions that is caused by the real world economy. Using data on voting at the 2004 European Parliament elections for 23 European Union electorates, the article finds some, but limited, evidence for economic voting that is dependent on both voter sophistication and clarity of responsibility for the economy within any country. First, only politically sophisticated voters' subjective economic assessments are in fact grounded in economic reality. Second, the portion of subjective economic assessments that is a function of the real world economy is a significant predictor of voting only in single party government contexts where there can be a clear attribution of responsibility. For coalition government contexts, the article finds essentially no impact of the real economy via economic perceptions on vote choice, at least at European Parliament elections.

Hillary Clinton's Race: Did She Match the Presidential Prototype?

The present research addresses how voters’ perceptions of Hillary Clinton’s warmth and competence influenced decisions to vote for her in the 2008 Democratic primary. We apply research on gender stereotypes and perceptions of women leaders to demonstrate that voters perceived Clinton as highly competent but relatively less warm. Further, this research examines how perceptions of Clinton’s warmth and competence contributed to decisions to vote for her. Results suggest that perceptions of Clinton’s warmth and competence differentially predicted voting behavior for voters strongly and less strongly identified with their political party. This research provides a descriptive analysis of how voters’ beliefs about leaders can be colored by gender, and how such beliefs contribute to electing women candidates.

SOCIAL-CLASS, CLASS ORIGINS AND POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP IN THE REPUBLIC-OF-IRELAND

As Laver (1992) notes, people who write about Irish politics frequently describe Ireland as a rather peculiar place. One aspect of this peculiarity is that voters in the Republic of Ireland do not behave like their European counterparts. In particular, Irish voting patterns appear to be only weakly structured by social class. Recent contributions to the debate employing a more sophisticated categorisation of classes have led to some qualification of the 'politics without social bases' description, but still lead to the broad conclusion that any relationship which does exist between social divisions, on the one hand, and party preference, on the other, is, at most, quite marginal. In this paper we draw on data from the 1990 European Values Study to re-examine this issue. We apply a variety of models to the data, including logit regression and diagonal reference models (Sobel 1981, 1984) to explore the complex fashion in which class and political preferences are related in Ireland. We argue that the relationship between such preferences and social divisions are, in fact, greater than has been hitherto thought. In particular, we show the importance of taking into account not only social class but also class origins and class mobility in understanding the nature of political partisanship in the Republic of Ireland.

Consensus in organizations:Hunting for the social choice conundrum in APA elections

According to the axiomatic literature on consensus methods, the best collective choice by one method of preference aggregation can easily be the worst by another. Are award committees, electorates, managers, online retailers, and web-based recommender systems stuck with an impossibility of rational preference aggregation? We investigate this social choice conundrum for seven social choice methods: Condorcet, Borda, Plurality, Antiplurality, the Single Transferable Vote, Coombs, and Plurality Runoff. We rely on Monte Carlo simulations for theoretical results and on twelve ballot datasets from American Psychological Association (APA) presidential elections for empirical results. Each of these elections provides partial rankings of five candidates from about 13,000 to about 20,000 voters. APA preferences are neither domain-restricted nor generated by an Impartial Culture. We find virtually no trace of a Condorcet paradox. In direct contrast with the classical social choice conundrum, competing consensus methods agree remarkably well, especially on the overall best and worst options. The agreement is also robust under perturbations of the preference prole via resampling, even in relatively small pseudosamples. We also explore prescriptive implications of our findings.

Bicameralism in the Republic of Ireland: The Seanad Abolition Referendum

Whether or not a legislature is uni- or bi-cameral has been found to have important consequences. Ireland's 1937 constitution provided for a directly elected lower chamber (Dáil Éireann) and an indirectly elected upper chamber (Seanad Éireann). With the appointment to government in 2011 of two political parties with a common electoral commitment to abolish bicameralism, the subsequent coalition agreement included a promise to hold a referendum offering voters the option to move to a unicameral parliamentary system. On 4 October 2013, the electorate voted to retain the upper chamber, albeit by a narrow majority of 51.7 per cent, on a turnout of 39.17 per cent. The outcome was arguably surprising, given that opinion polls signalled a plurality of voters favoured abolition, and there was a general public antipathy towards political institutions in the midst of a major economic crisis. Public opinion research suggests that a combination of factors explained voting behaviour, including a lack of interest amongst those who did not vote. A cost savings argument was a significant factor for those favouring abolition, while concerns over government control of the legislative process appear to have been most prominent in the minds of those who voted to retain the upper chamber.

Parties, cleavages, and issue evolution: The case of the religious-secular cleavage in Chile

Several recent articles have reached different conclusions regarding the impact of the religious–secular cleavage in Chile. The resolution of this debate has important consequences for the understanding of cleavages. Studies subscribing to the view that parties have considerable agency in the maintenance of cleavages have found that religiosity no longer affects vote choice, while studies rooted in a sociological perspective argue that religiosity still matters. We show that the reason for the discrepant results is because a partisan realignment is underway, whereby religious voters are gradually shifting their loyalties from the parties of the left to the parties of the right, matching a division that has taken place at the elite level. These results are consistent with an issue evolution perspective, which provides a clearer articulation of how cleavages form than either the agency or the sociological approaches.

Party agency and the religious-secular cleavage in post-Communist countries: The case of Romania

Research focusing on several post-communist countries has found evidence of social cleavage effects on political behaviour similar to those found in Western Europe. In some post-communist countries, however, social cleavage effects appear far weaker (if at all). To understand why this is the case, I perform a case study of Romania, focusing on the religious–secular cleavage. Drawing upon research that emphasises the role of parties in forming cleavages, I argue that the reason for the absence of social cleavage effects is due to party competition for the same group of voters by parties from opposing ends of the ideological spectrum. By shifting their positions, some parties have prevented the appearance of cleavages by shaping individuals' perceptions of the parties and, in doing so, have even altered individuals' own left–right self-placements.

What’s information got to do with it? Third-party voting in plurality systems

Although strategic voting theory predicts that the number of parties will not exceed two in single-member district plurality systems, the observed number of parties often does. Previous research suggests that the reason why people vote for third parties is that they possess inaccurate information about the parties’ relative chances of winning. However, research has yet to determine whether third-party voting persists under conditions of accurate information. In this article, we examine whether possessing accurate information prevents individuals from voting for third-placed parties in the 2005 and 2010 British elections. We find that possessing accurate information does not prevent most individuals from voting for third-placed parties and that many voters possess reasonably accurate information regarding the viability of the parties in their constituencies. These findings suggest that arguments emphasizing levels of voter information as a major explanation for why multiparty systems often emerge in plurality systems are exaggerated.

Explaining the multiparty systems of Western Europe prior to the adoption of proportional representation

The literature has difficulty explaining why the number of parties in majoritarian electoral systems often exceeds the two-party predictions associated with Duverger’s Law. To understand why this is the case, I examine several party systems in Western Europe before the adoption of proportional representation. Drawing from the social cleavage approach, I argue that the emergence of multiparty systems was because of the development of the class cleavage, which provided a base of voters sizeable enough to support third parties. However, in countries where the class cleavage became the largest cleavage, the class divide displaced other cleavages and the number of parties began to converge on two. The results show that the effect of the class cleavage was nonlinear, producing the greatest party system fragmentation in countries where class cleavages were present – but not dominant – and smaller in countries where class cleavages were either dominant or non-existent.

Emotions and voting in EU referendums

There is an emerging scholarship on the emotional bases of political opinion and behaviour and, in particular, the contrasting implications of two distinct negative emotions - anger and anxiety. I apply the insights in this literature to the previously unresearched realm of the emotional bases of voting in EU referendums. I hypothesise that anxious voters rely on substantive EU issues and angry voters rely on second-order factors relating to domestic politics (partisanship and satisfaction with government). Focusing on the case of Irish voting in the Fiscal Compact referendum, and using data from a representative sample of voters, I find support for the hypotheses and discuss the implications of the findings for our understanding of the emotional conditionality of EU referendum voting. 

The Northern Ireland Assembly Election 2011

Following the first full term of regional government in the province since 1972, the Northern Ireland Assembly election held on 5 May 2011 saw the continuation of several trends. Foremost, the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Féin bolstered further their positions as leaders of their respective communities, with the Social Democratic and Labour Party and Ulster Unionist Party losing yet more ground. Building on their decision to enter power-sharing government together in 2007, the two largest parties framed themselves as the progressive choice for voters. As this was the first Assembly election since St Andrews (2006), much of the campaign dialogue centred on the prospect of a Sinn Féin First Minister, a concern highlighted by both unionist parties. The campaign also focused on ‘normal’ socio-economic political issues and possible institutional reform. The absence of inter-party conflict led to the campaign being perceived as the most mundane in living memory, with fears of a record low turnout realised.

The Promise of Peace:Revisiting the Northern Irish Model

The Northern Ireland peace process is often eulogized as a successful model of conflict transformation. Although the process exhibited many of the problems that beset other societies seeking to move from conflict to a negotiated peace (including disagreements over the functioning of institutions and the meanings of cultural symbols, unresolved issues relating to the effects of political violence on victims and survivors and society at large; and the residual presence of violent and political ‘spoiler’ groups), the resilience of political dialogue has proven remarkable.
This collection revisits the promise of ‘a truly historic opportunity for a new beginning’ a decade and a half on from the signing of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The book will bring together academics from across a number of disciplines, including management and organizational behaviour, law, politics, sociology, archaeology and literature.

The different contributions aim to assess what impact it has made in the legal, policy, and institutional areas it specifically targeted: political reform, human rights and equality provision, working through legacies of the past (including police reform, prisoner release and victims' rights) and the building of new relationships within the island of Ireland and between Ireland and Britain. With the emergence of first-time voters who had no direct experience of the violence the book explores what the Agreement offers for future generations.

The book is the culmination of a 12-month research project sponsored by the British Academy and Leverhulme that addressed the following aspects of the peace process:
Peace walls: The euphemistically named peace walls remain one of the most visible reminders of Northern Ireland’s divisions and they are famously the only material manifestations of the conflict that have grown in number and extent since the 1998 Agreement. They were originally placed between antagonistic neighbouring communities – often at their request – at times of heightened tensions. Research under this theme explored the lack of ongoing engagement with their continuing presences, evolving meanings and impact on the communities that reside beside them needs to be overtly addressed.
Cultural division: Cultural differences have often been seen as lying at the heart of the ‘Irish problem’. Despite this, art and artists have increasingly been seen as having the potential to develop new discourses. Research explored the following questions: What role can the arts play in re-imagining the spaces opened up by the promises of the 1998 Agreement? What implication does the confrontation with the legacies of conflict have for artistic practices? What impact do the arts have on constructions of identity, on narratives of history, and on electoral politics?
Institutional transformation: This strand of research explored the significance of the process of organizational change which followed the establishment of the 1998 on political and other public policy institutions such as the police and prison services. It suggested that the experience and lessons learned from such periods of transition have much to contribute to how Northern Ireland begins to address political polarization in other areas of public service infrastructure, chiefly around the sectarian monoliths of education and housing.
Working through the past: ‘Legacy’ issues have gained increasing prominence since 1998: issues to do with public symbolism (particularly relating to the flying of flags and parading), defining victimhood, securing victims’ rights, recovery of the ‘disappeared’, reintegrating ex- prisoners back into society, and the possibilities for truth recovery and reconciliation have all acquired salient and emotive force. Although the 1998 Agreement promised to ‘honour the dead’ through a ‘new beginning’, it is increasingly unclear as to whether an agreed narrative about the past is possible – or even worthwhile pursuing. Research under this theme looked at the complex relationship between memory, commemoration and violence; how commemorative events are performed, organized, policed and represented. It also addressed the fraught issue of how to come to terms with Northern Ireland’s divided and bloodied past.

The editors are in the process of guiding contributors to adapt their papers, which were presented to a series of workshops on the above themes, to the purposes of the book. In particular, the contributors will be guided to focus on the related aims of assessing the extent of change that has occurred and providing an assessment of what remains to be done. To that end, contributors are asked to engage directly with the questions that close the ‘Introduction’, namely: To what extent has the ‘promise’ of the 1998 Agreement been fulfilled? To what extent has the 1998 Agreement given rise to forms of exclusion? To what extent has the 1998 Agreement shaped new forms of debate, dispute and engagement? In the absence of that guidance having been sent out yet, the outlines below are, for the time being, the abstracts of their original papers.