A smart load appliance application using a single compressor fridge-freezer to support grid operations

This paper describes a fridge-freezer smart load model, which responds to external signals from the wholesale electricity market to support grid operations while switching the fridge-freezer on and off to maintain optimum operations for the owner. The key parameters of the model are the appliance dimensions, thermal mass, the fridge and freezer thermal time constants and the compressor power consumption. The model demonstrates that control strategies help to minimise load at times when the grid is under stress from high demand, and shift some load to a lower wholesale price or when there is excess renewable power. Three control strategies are proposed, based on peak shaving and valley filling, price signals and wind availability.

An aggregated fridge-freezer peak shaving and valley filling control strategy for enhanced grid operations

The need for fast response demand side participation (DSP) has never been greater due to increased wind power penetration. White domestic goods suppliers are currently developing a `smart' chip for a range of domestic appliances (e.g. refrigeration units, tumble dryers and storage heaters) to support the home as a DSP unit in future power systems. This paper presents an aggregated population-based model of a single compressor fridge-freezer. Two scenarios (i.e. energy efficiency class and size) for valley filling and peak shaving are examined to quantify and value DSP savings in 2020. The analysis shows potential peak reductions of 40 MW to 55 MW are achievable in the Single wholesale Electricity Market of Ireland (i.e. the test system), and valley demand increases of up to 30 MW. The study also shows the importance of the control strategy start time and the staggering of the devices to obtain the desired filling or shaving effect.

Secure Communications in Smart Grid: Networking and Protocols

The key attributes of a smarter power grid include: pervasive interconnection of smart devices; extensive data generation and collection; and rapid reaction to events across a widely dispersed physical infrastructure. Modern telecommunications technologies are being deployed across power systems to support these monitoring and control capabilities. To enable interoperability, several new communications protocols and standards have been developed over the past 10 to 20 years. These continue to be refined, even as new systems are rolled out.

This new hyper-connected communications infrastructure provides an environment rich in sub-systems and physical devices that are attractive to cyber-attackers. Indeed, as smarter grid operations become dependent on interconnectivity, the communications network itself becomes a target. Consequently, we examine cyber-attacks that specifically target communications, particularly state-of-the-art standards and protocols. We further explore approaches and technologies that aim to protect critical communications networks against intrusions, and to monitor for, and detect, intrusions that infiltrate Smart Grid systems.

Implementation Experiences from Smart Grid Security Applications and Outlook on Future Research

Experiences from smart grid cyber-security incidents in the past decade have raised questions on the applicability and effectiveness of security measures and protection mechanisms applied to the grid. In this chapter we focus on the security measures applied under real circumstances in today’s smart grid systems. Beginning from real world example implementations, we first review cyber-security facts that affected the electrical grid, from US blackout incidents, to the Dragonfly cyber-espionage campaign currently focusing on US and European energy firms. Provided a real world setting, we give information related to energy management of a smart grid looking also in the optimization techniques that power control engineers perform into the grid components. We examine the application of various security tools in smart grid systems, such as intrusion detection systems, smart meter authentication and key management using Physical Unclonable Functions, security analytics and resilient control algorithms. Furthermore we present evaluation use cases of security tools applied on smart grid infrastructure test-beds that could be proved important prior to their application in the real grid, describing a smart grid intrusion detection system application and security analytics results. Anticipated experimental results from the use-cases and conclusions about the successful transitions of security measures to real world smart grid operations will be presented at the end of this chapter.

Loss-of-Mains Protection System by Application of Phasor Measurement Unit Technology with Experimentally Assessed Threshold Settings

Loss-of-mains protection is an important component of the protection systems of embedded generation. The role of loss-of-mains is to disconnect the embedded generator from the utility grid in the event that connection to utility dispatched generation is lost. This is necessary for a number of reasons, including the safety of personnel during fault restoration and the protection of plant against out-of-synchronism reclosure to the mains supply. The incumbent methods of loss-of-mains protection were designed when the installed capacity of embedded generation was low, and known problems with nuisance tripping of the devices were considered acceptable because of the insignificant consequence to system operation. With the dramatic increase in the installed capacity of embedded generation over the last decade, the limitations of current islanding detection methods are no longer acceptable. This study describes a new method of loss-of-mains protection based on phasor measurement unit (PMU) technology, specifically using a low cost PMU device of the authors' design which has been developed for distribution network applications. The proposed method addresses the limitations of the incumbent methods, providing a solution that is free of nuisance tripping and has a zero non-detection zone. This system has been tested experimentally and is shown to be practical, feasible and effective. Threshold settings for the new method are recommended based on data acquired from both the Great Britain and Ireland power systems.

Coordinated control of DFIG’s rotor and grid side converters during network unbalance

This paper proposes a coordinated control of the rotor and grid side converters (RSC & GSC) of doubly-fed induction generator (DFIG) based wind generation systems under unbalanced voltage conditions. System behaviors and operations of the RSC and GSC under unbalanced voltage are illustrated. To provide enhanced operation, the RSC is controlled to eliminate the torque oscillations at double supply frequency under unbalanced stator supply. The oscillation of the stator output active power is then cancelled by the active power output from the GSC, to ensure constant active power output from the overall DFIG generation system. To provide the required positive and negative sequence currents control for the RSC and GSC, a current control strategy containing a main controller and an auxiliary controller is analyzed. The main controller is implemented in the positive (dq)+ frame without involving positive/negative sequence decomposition whereas the auxiliary controller is implemented in the negative sequence (dq)? frame with negative sequence current extracted. Simulation results using EMTDC/PSCAD are presented for a 2MW DFIG wind generation system to validate the proposed control scheme and to show the enhanced system operation during unbalanced voltage supply.

Managing grid computations: An ORC-based approach

In this paper a model of grid computation that supports both heterogeneity and dynamicity is presented. The model presupposes that user sites contain software components awaiting execution on the grid. User sites and grid sites interact by means of managers which control dynamic behaviour. The orchestration language ORC [9,10] offers an abstract means of specifying operations for resource acquisition and execution monitoring while allowing for the possibility of non-responsive hardware. It is demonstrated that ORC is sufficiently expressive to model typical kinds of grid interactions.

Adding metadata to Orc to support reasoning about grid programs

Following earlier work demonstrating the utility of Orc as a means of specifying and reasoning about grid applications we propose the enhancement of such specifications with metadata that provide a means to extend an Orc specification with implementation oriented information. We argue that such specifications provide a useful refinement step in allowing reasoning about implementation related issues ahead of actual implementation or even prototyping. As examples, we demonstrate how such extended specifications can be used for investigating security related issues and for evaluating the cost of handling grid resource faults. The approach emphasises a semi-formal style of reasoning that makes maximum use of programmer domain knowledge and experience.

Tracking smart grid hackers

The next-generation smart grid will rely highly on telecommunications infrastructure for data transfer between various systems. Anywhere we have data transfer in a system is a potential security threat. When we consider the possibility of smart grid data being at the heart of our critical systems infrastructure it is imperative that we do all we can to ensure the confidentiality, availability and integrity of the data. A discussion on security itself is outside the scope of this paper, but if we assume the network to be as secure as possible we must consider what we can do to detect when that security fails, or when the attacks comes from the inside of the network. One way to do this is to setup a hacker-trap, or honeypot. A honeypot is a device or service on a network which appears legitimate, but is in-fact a trap setup to catch breech attempts. This paper identifies the different types of honeypot and describes where each may be used. The authors have setup a test honeypot system which has been live for some time. The test system has been setup to emulate a device on a utility network. The system has had many hits, which are described in detail by the authors. Finally, the authors discuss how larger-scale systems in utilities may benefit from honeypot placement.