What now for the contact hypothesis? Towards a new research agenda

This article begins with a review of recent research on the Contact Hypothesis. It will be shown that the literature in this area has become essentially closed and self-referential where the core political and theoretical premises that underpin the Hypothesis have been taken for granted and the debates have therefore become restricted simply to how best to measure the influence of inter-group contact. One of the key reasons for this is the lack of critical engagement with the Contact Hypothesis from those of a more structuralist and/or ‘radical’ perspective. This may be because the individualistic focus of the Hypothesis is seen from such a perspective as largely irrelevant to addressing racial and ethnic divisions and/or because it may be felt that to engage with the concept is to give it undue legitimacy. It will be argued in this article, however, that the wholesale dismissal of the Contact Hypothesis is a little premature. Just as recent research on racial and ethnic divisions has drawn attention to the way in which such divisions exist at a number of layers within the social formation – from the structural, political and ideological through to the sub-cultural, interactional and biographical – so must any initiatives aimed at addressing these divisions be similarly ‘multi-layered’ in their approach. However, it will be argued that for research to help inform specific strategies at the interactional level, there needs to be a significant change in the way that inter-group contact, and the Contact Hypothesis more generally, is studied. The article will ‘model out’ one potentially fruitful way in which such research can develop through the use of an ethnographic case study involving a cross-community scheme arranged for Protestant and Catholic children in Northern Ireland.

Trusting Groups in Coalition Formation using Social Distance

In environments where distributed team formation is key, and defections are possible, the use of trust as social capital allows social norms to be defied and compared. An agent can use this information, when invited to join a group or collation, to decide whether or not its utility will be increased by joining. In this work a social network approach is used to define and reason about the relationships contained in the agent community. Previous baseline work is extended with two decision making mechanisms. These are compared by simulating an abstract grid-like environment, and preliminary results are reported.

Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation

We define a finite-horizon repeated network formation game with consent and study the differences induced by two levels of individual rationality. Perfectly rational players will remain unconnected at the equilibrium, while nonempty equilibrium networks may form when players are assumed to behave as finite automata of limited complexity. We provide structural properties of the sequences of networks which are likely to form in Nash and subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the repeated game. For instance, players can form totally different connected networks at each period or the sequence of networks can exhibit a total order relationship.

Influence of social status on the welfare of sows in static and dynamic groups

Forty-eight Large White x Landrace multiparous sows were mixed into twelve groups of four animals after their piglets were weaned. These groups were defined as static, with no animals being added to or removed from the groups after their formation. Aggressive and submissive behaviours were recorded continuously for 9 h after the sows were mixed, and the sows were assigned high or low social status on the basis of their relative aggressiveness and success in aggressive interactions. After five weeks, each static group was mixed into a dynamic group of 40+/-2 sows for an 11-week period. Three static groups (ie 12 animals) at a time were added to the dynamic group at three-week intervals; the same number of animals was removed at these time-points in order to maintain the group number at 40+/-2. Injury levels increased significantly with the transition from static groups to the dynamic group (P

Network formation under mutual consent and costly communication

We consider two different approaches to describe the formation of social networks under mutual consent and costly communication. First, we consider a network-based approach; in particular Jackson–Wolinsky’s concept of pairwise stability. Next, we discuss a non-cooperative game-theoretic approach, through a refinement of the Nash equilibria of Myerson’s consent game. This refinement, denoted as monadic stability, describes myopically forward looking behavior of the players. We show through an equivalence that the class of monadically stable networks is a strict subset of the class of pairwise stable networks that can be characterized fully by modifications of the properties defining pairwise stability.

Community Cohesion and Social Inclusion: Unravelling a Complex Relationship

In a global context of an emphasis on identity politics and a ‘cultural turn’ in social analysis, deep concern has been expressed about multiethnic Britain becoming a broken society with many ‘sleepwalking’ into segregation and separatism. Given the close correspondence between areas of acute ethnic segregation and those of multiple deprivation, intercommunal tensions have included disputes about the equitable allocation of scarce urban resources across ethnicity. This creates the possibility that urban programmes may inadvertently accentuate intercommunal tension and confound efforts to synchronise cohesion and inclusion agendas. Following recent debates about the implications of increased diversity, influenced by arguments that multiculturalism has encouraged ‘parallel lives’, an emergent policy framework emphasises more proactive integration to promote ‘common belonging’. Criticism of this agenda includes its confusion between community and social cohesion, and its disproportionate focus on cultural aspects such as identity formation and recognition, relative to structural issues of income and class. In exploring this contested terrain in Britain, the article suggests that the longer-term debate about segregation, deprivation and community differentials in Northern Ireland can offer useful insight for Britain’s policy discourse.

Ambiguity, social opinion and the use of common property resources

In this paper we argue that ambiguity, combined with social opinion formation, can be used as the foundation of a game-theoretic equilibrium concept that transcends the standard Nash equilibrium concept, applied to a model of the tragedy of the commons. Our approach sheds light on the international environmental crisis and the relevant ongoing international negotiations. We conclude that social opinion formation in most cases has a significant impact on equilibrium common property resource usage.

Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games

In this paper we examine the properties of stable coalitions under sequential and simultaneous bargaining by competing labor unions. We do this using the Nash bargaining solution and various notions of stability, namely, Nash, coalitional, contractual and core stability. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,

Single mating in orchid bees (Euglossa, Apinae): implications for mate choice and social evolution

Neotropical orchid bees (Euglossini) are conspicuously different from other corbiculate bees (Apinae) in their lack of advanced sociality and in male use of acquired odors (fragrances) as pheromone-analogues. In both contexts, orchid bee mating systems, in particular the number of males a female mates with, are of great interest but are currently unknown. To assess female mating frequency in the genus Euglossa, we obtained nests from three species in Mexico and Panama and genotyped mothers and their brood at microsatellite DNA loci. In 26 out of 29 nests, genotypes of female brood were fully consistent with being descended from a singly mated mother. In nests with more than one adult female present, those adult females were frequently related, with genotypes being consistent with full sister-sister (r = 0.75) or mother-daughter (r = 0.5) relationships. Thus, our genetic data support the notions of female philopatry and nest-reuse in the genus Euglossa. Theoretically, single mating should promote the evolution of eusociality by maximizing the relatedness among individuals in a nest. However, in Euglossini this genetic incentive has not led to the formation of eusocial colonies as in other corbiculate bees, presumably due to differing ecological or physiological selective regimes. Finally, monandry in orchid bees is in agreement with the theory that females select a single best mate based on the male fragrance phenotype, which may contain information on male age, cognitive ability, and competitive strength.

Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent

We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. These so-called “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts, in particular strong link deletion proofness.