Organised Criminals as 'Agents of Obligation': The Case of Ireland

Relying on Brown’s (2005a, b) thesis that contemporary shifts in penal policy are best understood as a reprisal of colonial rationality, so that offenders become ‘non-citizens’ or ‘agents of obligation’, this article argues that this framework finds support in developments in Irish criminal justice policy. Recent legislation aimed at offenders suspected of involvement in ‘organised crime’ is examined through this lens. These offenders have found themselves reconstituted as ‘agents of obligation’ with duties to furnish information about their property and movements, report to the police concerning their location and, importantly, refrain from criminal activity or face extraordinary sanctions. It is therefore argued that this paradigm is a useful heuristic device through which to understand recent developments in Irish criminal justice and elsewhere. In light of the trends observed in Ireland, certain refinements and extensions to Brown’s argument are put forward for consideration.

The obligation to provide information where valid consent is not needed

Accounts of consent in medical ethics typically assume that consent plays the same role irrespective of the type of treatment. In this paper I argue that this assumption is false. Because of this, obligations to provide information to patients that stem from the need for consent to be valid will not apply to all types of treatment. This does not mean that there are no reasons to provide such information. The second part of the paper maps out what these reasons are and argues that they are grounded in the obligation of beneficence and a duty to warn, not in considerations of respect for autonomy.