Dispelling the Myth of the Naive Investor during the British Railway Mania, 1845–46

Anecdotal evidence from the British Railway Mania and other historical financial bubbles suggests that many investors during such episodes are naive, thus contributing to the asset price boom. Using extensive investor records, we find that very few investors during the Railway Mania can be categorized as such. Although some interpretations of the Mania suggest that naive investors were expropriated by railway insiders, our evidence is inconsistent with this view as railway insiders contributed substantial amounts of capital, and their investments performed no better than those made by other experienced investors.

Does Gender Matter? Women Business Angels and the Supply of Entrepreneurial Finance

There is a substantial literature on the relationship between gender and access to finance. However, most studies have been concerned with access to debt finance. More recently, the focus of this research has broadened to examine women and venture capital. This article extends the focus further by examining the role of women in the business angel market, which is more important than the formal venture capital market in terms of both the number of ventures supported and total capital flows. Based on a detailed analysis of business angels in the U.K., the study concludes that women investors who are active in the market differ from their male counterparts in only limited respects. Future research into women business angels, and the possible existence of gender differences, needs to be based on more fully elaborated standpoint epistemologies that focus on the experience of the woman angel investor per se, and center on the examination of the role of homophily, social capital, networking, and competition in investment behavior.

International order flows: Explaining equity and exchange rate returns

Macroeconomic models of equity and exchange rate returns perform poorly at high frequencies. The proportion of daily returns that these models explain is essentially zero. Instead of relying on macroeconomic determinants, we model equity price and exchange rate behavior based on a concept from microstructure – order flow. The international order flows are derived from belief changes of different investor groups in a two-country setting. We obtain a structural relationship between equity returns, exchange rate returns and their relationship to home and foreign equity market order flow. To test the model we construct daily aggregate order flow data from 800 million equity trades in the U.S. and France from 1999 to 2003. Almost 60% of the daily returns in the S&P100 index are explained jointly by exchange rate returns and aggregate order flows in both markets. As predicted by the model, daily exchange rate returns and order flow into the French market have significant incremental explanatory power for the daily S&P returns. The model implications are also validated for intraday returns.

Determinants of long-distance investing by business angels in the UK

The business angel market is usually identified as a local market, and the proximity of an investment has been shown to be key in the angel's investment preferences and an important filter at the screening stage of the investment decision. This is generally explained by the personal and localized networks used to identify potential investments, the hands-on involvement of the investor and the desire to minimize risk. However, a significant minority of investments are long distance. This paper is based on data from 373 investments made by 109 UK business angels. We classify the location of investments into three groups: local investments ( those made within the same county or in adjacent counties); intermediate investments ( those made in counties adjacent to the 'local' counties); and long-distance investments ( those made beyond this range). Using ordered logit analysis the paper develops and tests a number of hypotheses that relate long-distance investment to investment characteristics and investor characteristics. The paper concludes by drawing out the implications for entrepreneurs seeking business angel finance in investment-deficient regions, business angel networks seeking to match investors to entrepreneurs and firms ( which are normally their primary clients), and for policy-makers responsible for local and regional economic development.

Long-term return reversals-Value and growth or tax? UK evidence

This paper examines (i) whether value-growth characteristics have more power than past performance in predicting return reversals; and (ii) whether typical rational behaviour such as incentives to delay paying capital gain taxes can better explain long-term reversals than past performance. We find that value-growth characteristics generally provide better explanations for long-term stock returns than past performance. The evidence also shows that winners identified by capital gains dominate past performance winners in predicting reversals in the cross-sectional comparison. However, in the time-series analysis, when returns on capital gain winners are adjusted by the Fama and French (1996) risk factors, the predictive power of capital gain winners disappears. Our results show that capital gain winners are heavily featured as growth stocks. Return reversals in capital gain winners potentially reflect market price corrections for growth stocks. We conclude that investors’ incentives to delay paying capital gain taxes cannot fully rationalise long-term reversals in the UK market. Our results also imply that the long-term return pattern potentially reflects a mixture of investor rational and irrational behaviour.

Deriving the Railway Mania

This article argues that the promotion boom which occurred in the railway industry during the mid 1840s was amplified by the issue of derivative-like assets, which let investors take highly leveraged positions in the shares of new railway companies. The partially paid shares which the new railway companies issued allowed investors to obtain exposure to an asset by paying only a small initial deposit. The consequence of this arrangement was that investor returns were substantially amplified, and many schemes could be financed simultaneously. However, when investors were required to make further payments it put a negative downward pressure on prices.

Optimal Time Series Momentum

We develop a continuous-time asset price model to capture the timeseries momentum documented recently. The underlying stochastic delay differentialsystem facilitates the analysis of effects of different time horizons used bymomentum trading. By studying an optimal asset allocation problem, we find thatthe performance of time series momentum strategy can be significantly improvedby combining with market fundamentals and timing opportunity with respect tomarket trend and volatility. Furthermore, the results also hold for different timehorizons, the out-of-sample tests and with short-sale constraints. The outperformanceof the optimal strategy is immune to market states, investor sentiment andmarket volatility.

Time-Varying Liquidity and Momentum Profits

A basic intuition is that arbitrage is easier when markets are most liquid. Surprisingly, we find that momentum profits are markedly larger in liquid market states. This finding is not explained by variation in liquidity risk, time-varying exposure to risk factors, or changes in macroeconomic condition, cross-sectional return dispersion, and investor sentiment. The predictive performance of aggregate market illiquidity for momentum profits uniformly exceed that of market return and market volatility states. While momentum strategies are unconditionally unprofitable in US, Japan, and Eurozone countries in the last decade, they are substantial following liquid market states.

Mining Money: the generative capacities of scientific and legal knowledge practices in the making of resource economies

In 1997 a scandal associated with Bre-X, a junior mining firm, and its prospecting activities in Indonesia, exposed to public scrutiny the ways in which mineral exploration firms acquire, assess and report on scientific claims about the natural environment. At stake here was not just how investors understood the provisional nature of scientific knowledge, but also evidence of fraud. Contemporaneous mining scandals not only included the salting of cores, but also unreliable proprietary sample preparation and assay methods, mis-representations of visual field estimates as drilling results and ‘overly optimistic’ geological reports. This paper reports on initiatives taken in the wake of these scandals and prompted by the Mining Standards Task Force (TSE/OSC 1999). For regulators, mandated to increase investor confidence in Canada’s leading role within the global mining industry, efforts focused first and foremost upon identifying and removing sources of error and wilfulness within the production and circulation of scientific knowledge claims. A common goal cross-cutting these initiatives was ‘a faithful representation of nature’ (Daston and Galison 2010), however, as the paper argues, this was manifest in an assemblage of practices governed by distinct and rival regulative visions of science and the making of markets in claims about ‘nature’. These ‘practices of fidelity’, it is argued, can be consequential in shaping the spatial and temporal dynamics of the marketization of nature.

Scaling Up Market Anomalies

This paper implements momentum among a host of market anomalies. Our investment universe consists of the 15 top (long-leg) and 15 bottom (short-leg) anomaly portfolios. The proposed active strategy buys (sells short) a subset of the top (bottom) anomaly portfolios based on past one-month return. The evidence shows statistically strong and economically meaningful persistence in anomaly payoffs. Our strategy consistently outperforms a naive benchmark that equal weights anomalies and yields an abnormal monthly return ranging between 1.27% and 1.47%. The persistence is robust to the post-2000 period, and various other considerations, and is stronger following episodes of high investor sentiment.