Hiring Incentives and Labour Force Participation in Italy

A long-standing economic tradition maintains that labour supply reacts to market tightness; its sensitivity to job quality has received less attention. If firms hire workers with both temporary and open-ended contracts, does participation increase when more permanent jobs are available? We investigate this relationship within a policy evaluation framework; in particular, we examine how labour supply reacted in Italy to a recent subsidy in favour of open-ended contracts. This subsidy increased labour force participation by 1.4% in 2001 and 2.1% in 2002. This increase was concentrated on males aged 35-54, with a low or at most a secondary schooling level.

Looking for free riding: Energy efficiency incentives and Italian homeowners

We examine the effect of energy efficiency incentives on household energy efficiency home improvements. Starting in February 2007, Italian homeowners have been able to avail themselves of tax credits on the purchase and installation costs of certain types of energy efficiency renovations. We examine two such renovations—door/window replacements and heating system replacements—using multi-year cross-section data from the Italian Consumer Expenditure Survey and focusing on a narrow period around the introduction of the tax credits. Our regressions control for dwelling and household characteristics and economy-wide factors likely to influence the replacement rates. The effects of the policy are different for the two types of renovations. With window replacements, the policy is generally associated with a 30 % or stronger increase in the renovation rates and number of renovations. In the simplest econometric models, the effect is not statistically significant, but the results get stronger when we allow for heterogeneous effects across the country. With heating system replacements, simpler models suggest that the tax credits policy had no effect whatsoever or that free riding was rampant, i.e., people are now accepting subsidies for replacements that they would have done anyway. Further examination suggests a strong degree of heterogeneity in the effects across warmer and colder parts of the country, and effects in the colder areas that are even more pronounced than those for window replacements. These results should, however, be interpreted with caution due to the low rates of renovations, which imply that the effects are estimated relatively imprecisely.

The incentives of a resource owner: Evidence from a private oyster fishery

European flat oyster Ostrea edulis fisheries were once abundant around the UK coastline. The sole remaining productive O. edulis fishery in Scotland is in Loch Ryan. This fishery has been privately owned and managed by a single family since 1701. Economic theory predicts that ownership, whether public or private, is a necessary condition for rational fishery management. In this paper, a series of four leases and a licence are examined, covering an 85-year period over the 20th and 21st century, to examine whether the management of the Loch Ryan fishery conforms to the expected norms of rational management. The leases show that, over this period, the owners appear more willing to expend resources on regulating tenant behaviour, supporting the conclusion that successive generations of owners developed an evolving sense of what "rational management" might require. The results of this study could inform the management of other fisheries - both public and private - by emphasising the importance of learning from experience.

Incentives and rewards: what do adult populations truly want? Insights from the physical activity loyalty (PAL) scheme

Background
Trials depend on good recruitment and retention, but efforts to improve these have had varying success. This may be due to inadequate understanding of what participants would value in return for taking part. An opportunity arose in one trial to investigate the incentives that might help recruit and retain participants to another.

Aim
To determine what adults value as an incentive for involvement in a trial.

Methods
In the PAL Scheme, employees used a ‘loyalty card’ to monitor their physical activity over 12 weeks. The incentive group (n=199) collected points and received rewards for physical activity (1 minute = 1 point, max: 30 pts/day). A comparator group (n=207) self-monitored their physical activity only. Points could be redeemed as retail vouchers. 17 different incentives were available, from 75 pts (£2.50, a sandwich) to 1800 pts (£60, 1 month gym membership).

Results
148 of the 199 intervention participants used their card at least once, earning a mean of 374 pts. 121 earned sufficient to collect a reward and 76 redeemed points for vouchers but only 48 exchanged the vouchers for rewards. The most popular reward was not that of highest monetary value: two cinema tickets (300 pts, £10).

Conclusions
The value that participants place on a reward might be more important than its monetary value. Some might appreciate receiving the voucher, without spending it. In choosing incentives to boost trial participation, it may help to allow people to choose from a variety of rewards, rather than reimbursing in money.

Greek-Turkish Dilemmas and the Cyprus-EU Accession Process

This article compares the processes of foreign policymaking in Greece and Turkey in order to examine why the incentives and pressures of the enlargement process have failed until now to initiate a settlement in the Cyprus bicommunal negotiations. While most studies on the Cyprus problem have focused on the two communities of the island, little at-tention has been paid to the policies of the two â??motherlandsâ??, namely Greece and Turkey. Yet their leverage on the two Cypriot communities and their conflicting expectations with regard to an enlarged Europe in the Eastern Mediterranean constitute a complex security puzzle. The Republic of Cyprus stands as a champion candidate member for the next enlargement, amid fears of Turkish reprisals and hopes for a po-litical settlement on the island. With the benefits of settlement overwhelming the benefits of any other alternative, it is paradoxical that the parties seem to be about to fail to reach a last-minute, mutually beneficial compromise. I try to resolve this paradox by supplementing rational choice theory with cognitivist theories of international relations. While rational choice predicts a direct relationship between external environment and foreign policy shifts, the case of Cyprus suggests that this relationship is actually indirect. Without understanding how the external environment is framed in the domestic political discourse of Greece and Turkey, it is impossible to demonstrate how outside pressure and incentives affect foreign policy shifts.

Demographic Change, Social Security Systems, and Savings

Abstract In theory, improvements in healthy life expectancy should generate increases in the average age of retirement, with little effect on savings rates. In many countries, however, retirement incentives in social security programs prevent retirement ages from keeping pace with changes in life expectancy, leading to an increased need for life-cycle savings. Analyzing a cross-country panel of macroeconomic data, we find that increased longevity raises aggregate savings rates in countries with universal pension coverage and retirement incentives, though the effect disappears in countries with pay-as-you-go systems and high replacement rates.

Transparency Proposals for European Sovereign Bond Markets

The debate over the possible extension of transparency regulation in Europe to include sovereign bonds has opened up a number of other issues in need of serious consideration. One such issue is the appropriateness of the entire infrastructure supporting the trading of European sovereign bonds. In recent years sovereign issuers have supported the development of an electronic inter-dealer market but have remained unconcerned with the opacity of dealer-to-customer trading. The degree of segmentation in this market is high relative to what exists in nearly all other financial markets. This paper explores why European sovereign bond markets have developed in such a segmented way and considers how this structure could be altered to improve transparency without adversely affecting liquidity, efficiency or the benefits enjoyed by primary dealers and issuers. It is suggested that the structure of the market could be improved greatly if the largest and most active investors were permitted access to the inter-dealer electronic trading platforms. This would solve a number of market imperfections and increase the proportion of market activity that is conducted in a transparent way. The paper argues that sovereign issuers in Europe have the means to provide incentives that would influence dealers to support reduced segmentation. Some practical examples of how this could be achieved are provided and the potential benefits are outlined.