Employment regulation, game theory, and the lacuna in employee participation in liberal economies

Employee participation is a vital ingredient of what the International Labour Organization (ILO) calls ‘representation security’. This article provides theoretical and empirical insights relating to social policy impact of worker participation, specifically the European Information and Consultation Directive (ICD) for employee voice rights. While existing research on the ICD offers important empirical insights, there is a need for further theoretical analysis to examine the potential effectiveness of the regulations in liberal market economies (LMEs). Drawing on data from 16 case studies, the article uses game theory and the prisoner's dilemma framework to explain why national implementing legislation is largely ineffective in diffusing mutual gains cooperation in two LMEs: UK and the Republic of Ireland. Three theoretical (metaphorical) propositions advance understanding of the policy impact of national information & consultation regulations in LMEs.

Web Services and Incerta Spiriti: A Game Theoretic Approach to Uncertainty

A web-service is a remote computational facility which is made available for general use by means of the internet. An orchestration is a multi-threaded computation which invokes remote services. In this paper game theory is used to analyse the behaviour of orchestration evaluations when underlying web-services are unreliable. Uncertainty profiles are proposed as a means of defining bounds on the number of service failures that can be expected during an orchestration evaluation. An uncertainty profile describes a strategic situation that can be analyzed using a zero-sum angel-daemon game with two competing players: an angel a whose objective is to minimize damage to an orchestration and a daemon d who acts in a destructive fashion. An uncertainty profile is assessed using the value of its angel daemon game. It is shown that uncertainty profiles form a partial order which is monotonic with respect to assessment.

An Ambiguity Aversion Framework of Security Game under Ambiguities

Security is a critical concern around the world. Since resources for security are always limited, lots of interest have arisen in using game theory to handle security resource allocation problems. However, most of the existing work does not address adequately how a defender chooses his optimal strategy in a game with absent, inaccurate, uncertain, and even ambiguous strategy profiles' payoffs. To address this issue, we propose a general framework of security games under ambiguities based on Dempster-Shafer theory and the ambiguity aversion principle of minimax regret. Then, we reveal some properties of this framework. Also, we present two methods to reduce the influence of complete ignorance. Our investigation shows that this new framework is better in handling security resource allocation problems under ambiguities.

A Game-Theoretic Approach for Threats Detection and Intervention in Surveillance

Threat prevention with limited security resources is a challenging problem. An optimal strategy is to eectively predict attackers' targets (or goals) based on current available information, and use such predictions to prevent (or disrupt) their planned attacks. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic framework to address this challenge which encompasses the following three elements. First, we design a method to analyze an attacker's types in order to determine the most plausible type of an attacker. Second, we propose an approach to predict possible targets of an attack and the course of actions that the attackers may take even when the attackers' types are ambiguous. Third, a game-theoretic based strategy is developed to determine the best protection actions for defenders (security resources).

Improvisation, Indeterminacy and Game-Mediated Participation in Network Music Performance

This chapter focuses on the relationship between improvisation and indeterminacy. We discuss the two practices by referring to play theory and game studies and situate it in recent network music performance. We will develop a parallel with game theory in which indeterminacy is seen as a way of articulating situations where structural decisions are left to the discernment of the performers and discuss improvisation as a method of play. The improvisation-indeterminacy relationship is discussed in the context of network music performance, which employs digital networks in the exchange of data between performers and hence relies on topological structures with varying degrees of openness and flexibility. Artists such as Max Neuhaus and The League of Automatic Music Composers initiated the development of a multitude of practices and technologies exploring the network as an environment for music making. Even though the technologies behind “the network” have shifted dramatically since Neuhaus’ use of radio in the 1960’s, a preoccupation with distribution and sharing of artistic agency has remained at the centre of networked practices. Gollo Föllmer, after undertaking an extensive review of network music initiatives, produced a typology that comprises categories as diverse as remix lists, sound toys, real/virtual space installations and network performances. For Föllmer, “the term ‘Net music’ comprises all formal and stylistic kinds of music upon which the specifics of electronic networks leave considerable traces, whereby the electronic networks strongly influence the process of musical production, the musical aesthetic, or the way music is received” (2005: 185).

Analysing orchestrations with risk profiles and angel-daemon games

In this paper game theory is used to analyse the effect of a number of service failures during the execution of a grid orchestration. A service failure may be catastrophic in that it causes an entire orchestration to fail. Alternatively, a grid manager may utilise alternative services in the case of failure, allowing an orchestration to recover, A risk profile provides a means of modelling situations in a way that is neither overly optimistic nor overly pessimistic. Risk profiles are analysed using angel and daemon games. A risk profile can be assigned a valuation through an analysis of the structure of its associated Nash equilibria. Some structural properties of valuation functions, that show their validity as a measure for risk, are given. Two main cases are considered, the assessment of Orc expressions and the arrangement of a meeting using reputations.

Imperfect assessment and limited information preclude optimal strategies in male-male fights in the orb-weaving spider Metellina mengei

Agonistic behaviour between male orb-web spiders Metellina mengei competing for access to female webs was examined in field experiments to test the major predictions of game theory. Winners of fights were significantly larger than losers, particularly with respect to the length of the first pair of legs, which are sexually dimorphic in this species and used extensively in agonistic encounters. The size of the winning male had no influence on contest intensity or duration, and neither did relative size. However, fight intensity and duration were both positively correlated with the size of the losing male. Resident males won significantly more contests than intruders. Winning intruders were significantly larger than winning residents and it was these winning intruders that tended to produce the longer fights. Female weight and hence reproductive value had a marked influence on fight intensity and duration of fights won by the intruder but not those won by the resident. This indicates that only the resident obtains information about the female. These data are discussed with reference to the discrepancy with theory and a failure of some contestants to obtain information on resource value and relative contestant size necessary to optimize fight strategy.