‘Reason’ and ‘tickle’ as pragmatic constructs in the discourse of advertising

This paper explores certain pragmatic features of advertising discourse. It focuses on and expands upon a binary distinction between types of advertising discourse which was proposed initially by Bernstein (1974) and which has been touched upon more recently by other commentators such as Cook (1992). This is the distinction between reason advertisements (those which suggest a motive or reason for purchase) and tickle advertisements (those which appeal to humour, emotion and mood). It will be argued that Bernstein's distinction can be accommodated relatively systematically within contemporary frameworks of language and discourse. Drawing on a range of work in pragmatics and in systemic-functional linguistics, this paper takes some tentative steps towards the development of a theoretical model with accounts for this particular communicative-cognitive dimension of advertising discourse.

An Analysis of Advertising Wars

Comparative advertising by one brand against another showcases its merits versus the demerits of the other. In a two-stage game with finitely many firms, firms decide first how much to advertise against whom. In the second stage, given the advertising configuration, firms compete as Cournot oligopolists. In the symmetric case, equilibrium advertising constitutes a clear welfare loss. In the asymmetric case, depending on parameter values, a variety of outcomes are possible in equilibrium. An a priori disadvantaged firm (in terms of advertising costs or advertising effectiveness) may advertise more. Advertising can affect firms that are not advertisers or targets themselves.