Courts and Consociations: Human Rights versus Power-sharing

Consociations are power-sharing arrangements, increasingly used to manage ethno-nationalist, ethno-linguistic, and ethno-religious conflicts. Current examples include Belgium, Bosnia, Northern Ireland, Burundi, and Iraq. Despite their growing popularity, they have begun to be challenged before human rights courts as being incompatible with human rights norms, particularly equality and non-discrimination.

Courts and Consociations examines the use of power-sharing agreements, their legitimacy, and their compatibility with human rights law. Key questions include to what extent, if any, consociations conflict with the liberal individualist preferences of international human rights institutions, and to what extent consociational power-sharing may be justified to preserve peace and the integrity of political settlements.

In three critical cases, the European Court of Human Rights has considered equality challenges to important consociational practices, twice in Belgium and then in Sejdic and Finci v Bosnia regarding the constitution established for Bosnia Herzegovina under the Dayton Agreement. The Court's decision in Sejdic and Finci has significantly altered the approach it previously took to judicial review of consociational arrangements in Belgium. This book accounts for this change and assess its implications. The problematic aspects of the current state of law are demonstrated. Future negotiators in places riven by potential or actual bloody ethnic conflicts may now have less flexibility in reaching a workable settlement, which may unintentionally contribute to sustaining such conflicts and make it more likely that negotiators will consider excluding regional and international courts from reviewing these political settlements.

Courts and Consociations:How human rights courts may destabilize power-sharing settlements

We consider the use of consociational arrangements to manage ethno-nationalist, ethno-linguistic, and ethno-religious conflicts, and their compatibility with non-discrimination and equality norms. Key questions include to what extent, if any, consociations conflict with the dictates of global justice and the liberal individualist preferences of international human rights institutions, and to what extent consociational power-sharing may be justified to preserve peace and the integrity of political settlements. In three critical cases, the European Court of Human Rights has considered equality challenges to important consociational practices, twice in Belgium and, most recently, in Sejdic and Finci, concerning the constitutional arrangements established for Bosnia Herzegovina under the Dayton Agreement. The Court’s recent decision in Sejdic and Finci has significantly altered the approach it previously took to judicial review of consociational arrangements in the Belgian cases. We seek to account for this change and assess its implications. We identify problematic aspects of the judgment and conclude that, although the Court’s decision indicates one possible trajectory of human rights courts’ reactions to consociations, this would be an unfortunate development because it leaves future negotiators in places riven by potential or manifest bloody ethnic conflicts with considerably less flexibility in reaching a settlement. That in turn may unintentionally contribute to sustaining such conflicts and make it more likely that advisors to negotiators will advise them to exclude regional and international courts from having standing in the management of political settlements.

Just a piece of cloth? German courts and employees with headscarves

On 10 October 2002, and on 24 September 2003, the German Federal Labour Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court each delivered a decision on the consequences of wearing a headscarf for employees. Both courts appeared to protect the individual rights of the woman in question. The Federal Labour Court invalidated the dismissal of a salesperson based on the wearing of a headscarf; the Federal Constitutional Court held that a school teacher must not be denied employment on grounds of wearing a headscarf. However, both courts also left some room for manoeuvre in favour of clothing policies or laicism principles which could be used to justify head-scarf bans. This note discussed the potential and drawback of these cases, especially as regards intersectional inequalities along the lines of gender, religion and ethnicity.

‘Making Older People Equal: Reforming the Law on Access to Education and Other Services’

Age-based discrimination in the supply of goods and services (including educational services) has only very recently been outlawed in the United Kingdom by the Equality Act 2010, the relevant sections of which have not yet been brought into force. This paper critically considers the Act and its implications, as well as the current proposal for an EU Directive on Goods and Services.The greatest immediate potential of the Equality Act lies in the general prohibition against age discrimination and the scope of the exceptions to it. The paper argues that exceptions permitting service providers to discriminate against older people (i.e. negative exceptions) should be very specifically set out in the reforming legislation.There should be no general defence to a claim of age discrimination based around the concept of ‘reasonableness’, which would not be consistently interpreted by courts and tribunals in a way that steers clear of traditional ageist assumptions and stereotyping.The paper argues that service providers should be permitted to discriminate in favour of older people (i.e. make positive exceptions) if the reason for doing do so satisfi es legislative criteria which are designed, amongst other things, to meet the particular needs of older persons or to promote social inclusion. Under this proposal, preferential treatment such as age-related concessionary fees for adult education courses and programmes would be lawful.

Article 6 ECHR, Civil Rights and the Enduring Role of the Common Law

This article examines the role that the common law has played in Human Rights Act 1998 case law on the protection of 'civil rights' within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR. Focusing on Article 6 ECHR's 'disclosure' and 'full jurisdiction' requirements, it highlights an increasingly nuanced relationship between the ECHR and common law in cases under and outside the Human Rights Act 1998. Although the general pattern within the case law has been one of domestic court fidelity to the ECHR - something that is wholly consistent with section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 - the article notes areas in which the courts have been reluctant to adapt common law principles, as well as instances of common law protections exceeding those available under Article 6 ECHR. The article suggests that such lines of reasoning reveal a robustness within the common law that brings a multi-dimensional quality to the Human Rights Act 1998. It also suggests that such robustness can be analysed with reference to 'common law constitutionalism' and a corresponding imagery of 'dialogue' between the domestic courts and European Court of Human Rights.

Sovereignty, Article 4(2) TEU and the Respect of National Identities: Swinging the Balance of Power in Favour of the Member States?

The question of whether and to what extent sovereignty has been transferred to the European Union (EU) from its Member States remains a central debate within the EU and is interlinked with issues such as Kompetenz-Kompetenz, direct effect and primacy. Central to any claim to sovereignty is the principle of primacy, which requires that Member States uphold EU law over national law where there is a conflict. However, limitations to primacy can traditionally be found in national jurisprudence and the Maastricht Treaty introduced a possible EU limitation with the requirement that the EU respect national identities of Member States. The Lisbon Treaty provided only minimal further support to the principle of primacy whilst simultaneously developing the provision on national identities, now found within Article 4(2) TEU. There are indications from the literature, national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice of the EU that the provision is gathering strength as a legal tool and is likely to have a wider scope than the text might indicate. In its new role, Article 4(2) TEU bolsters the Member States’ claim to sovereignty and the possibility to uphold aspects crucial to them in conflict with EU law and the principle of primacy. Consequently, it is central to the relationship between the constitutional courts of the Member States and the CJEU, and where the final elements of control remain in ‘hard cases’. However, it does so as part of EU law, thereby facilitating the evasion of direct fundamental conflicts and reflecting the concept of constitutional pluralism.

Reasoning Rights: Comparative judicial engagement

This edited book is about comparative reasoning in human rights cases, exploring the questions: How is it that notionally universal norms are reasoned by courts in such dramatically different ways? What is the shape of this reasoning? What techniques are common across the transnational jurisprudence? What techniques are diverse? With contributions by a team of world-leading human rights scholars, the book moves beyond simply addressing the institutional questions concerning courts and human rights, which too often dominate discussions of this kind. Instead, it seeks a deeper examination of the similarities and divergence in the content of reasons being developed by different courts when addressing comparable human rights questions. These differences, while partly influenced by institutional issues, cannot be attributable to them alone. The book explores the diverse and rich underlying spectrum of human rights reasoning, as a distinctive and particular form of legal reasoning, evident in the case studies across the selected jurisdictions. It is a fascinating study for all those interested in human rights law and legal reasoning.

Why do national court judges refer to human rights treaties?: A comparative international law analysis of CEDAW

An analysis was conducted of 325 national judicial decisions across 55 jurisdictions, in which CEDAW was referred to in the reported decision. Despite predictions to the contrary based on previous scholarship, significant variations between courts in their interpretation of CEDAW occurred relatively infrequently, courts referred relatively seldom to interpretations of CEDAW by other national courts, and there was little evidence of transnational dialogic approaches to judging. An analysis of these results suggests that domestic judges invoking CEDAW act primarily as domestic actors who use international law in order to advance domestic goals, rather than acting primarily as agents of the international community in applying CEDAW domestically, or contributing to the transnational shaping of international law to suit national interests. The Article suggests an understanding of the domestic implementation of a human rights treaty as not only law, but a unique kind of law that performs a particular function, in light of its quality as something akin to hard and soft law simultaneously.

Recent Developments in the Law of Torts in Northern Ireland Annual Conference of the Irish Association of Law Teachers

This paper reviews decisions from the Northern Ireland and England and Wales High Courts and Courts of Appeal as well as the UK Supreme Court relating to tort and principally to the tort of negligence in the past 12 months or so.

In structure, the paper will be presented in four parts. First, three preliminary points relating to contemporary features of the NI civil courts: personal litigants – Devine v McAteer [2012] NICA 30 (7 September 2012); pre-action protocols – Monaghan v Graham [2013] NIQB 53 (3 May 2013); and the rise of alternative dispute resolution. On the last named issue, the recent decision of PGF II SA v OMFS Company 1 Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1288 (23 October 2013) on unreasonable refusal to mediate, will be discussed.

Second, the paper moves to consider the law of negligence generally and case law from the NI High Court reiterating Lord Hoffmann’s view in Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2004] 1 AC 46 that no duty of care arises from obvious risks of injury. In this, reference will be made to the application of the above “Hoffmann principle” in West Sussex County Council v Pierce [2013] EWCA Civ 1230 (16 October 2013), which concerned an accident sustained by a child at school. A similar set of facts was presented recently to the UK Supreme Court in Woodland v Essex County Council [2013] UKSC 66 (23 October 2013). The decision there, on non-delegable duties of care, will have a significant impact for schools in the provision of extracurricular activities.

Third, I will review a NI case of note on the duty of care of solicitors in the context of professional negligence in the context of conflicting advice by counsel.

Fourth, I will examine a series of cases on employer liability and including issues such as the duty of care towards the volunteer worker; tort and safety at work principles generally; and, more specifically, the duty of care of the employer towards an employee who suffers psychiatric illness as a result of stress and/or harassment at work. On the issue of workplace stress, the NI courts have made extensive reference to the Hale LJ principles found in the Court of Appeal decision of Hatton v Sutherland [2002] 1 All ER 1 and applied to those who have suffered trauma in reporting on or policing “the troubles” in Northern Ireland. On the issue of statutory harassment at work, the paper will also mention the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Hayes v Willoughby [2013] UKSC 17 (20 March 2013).

Professional Negligence, Solicitors: Recent Case Law, 2014

In preparation for this talk I have reviewed cases of interest in the High Courts and Courts of Appeal of England and Wales and Northern Ireland from the past two years or so on professional negligence and liability and principally relating to solicitors.

There are six topics of interest: the general duty of care demanded of solicitors in the carrying out of their professional obligations; whether there is a specific duty on a solicitor to warn or advise a client of any implied risk in, say, a commercial transaction; what is the scope of the duty on a solicitor to explain the content of or clauses in a legal document; a recent case of interest applying the White v Jones principle to a disappointed beneficiary seeking to make a claim against a solicitor who negligently prepared a will; the practical, limitation issue of how to pinpoint in a professional negligence claim when the damage was first sustained by the claimant; and finally some case law here and in England and Wales on the (costs) implications for solicitors relating to any failure to adhere to case management protocols or related court directions.