Corporate Ownership, Control, and Firm Performance in Victorian Britain

Scholars have long debated whether ownership structure matters for firm performance. The standard view with respect to Victorian Britain is that family-controlled companies had a detrimental effect on operating profit and shareholder value. Here, we examine this view using a hand-collected corporate ownership dataset. Our main finding is that it was not necessarily the broad structure of corporate ownership that mattered for performance, but whether family blockholders had a governance role. Large active blockholders tended to increase operating performance, implying that they reduced managerial agency problems. In contrast, we find that directors who were independent of large family owners were more likely to increase shareholder value.

Corporate Governance in Canadian and US Credit Unions

This report, a collaborative effort between the Filene Research Institute and the Credit Union Central of Canada, with participation from the Desjardins Group, follows on two recent governance projects: Tracking the Relationship Between Credit Union Governance and Performance and a three-part series by Professor Robert Hoel about how boards can add more value. Beyond these, the academic literature of corporate governance is well developed, so this study includes an in-depth review of financial institution governance research and calls out the differences between credit unions and other firms. Also, because surveys can only go so far in teasing out insights, the authors followed up with a dozen interviews with credit unions of all sizes across all three major North American credit union systems.

Because the report is survey-based, large swaths of the findings compare major and minor details of different (and often not-so-different) approaches to governance in the three systems and among differently sized credit unions. From those comparisons, some interesting differences emerge. For example, as a federated system, Desjardins excels at some aspects of board development and system governance in ways that the more atomized US and Canadian credit union systems do not.

Managerial failure in mid-Victorian Britain?: Corporate expansion during a promotion boom

This article examines the mid-1840s expansion of the British railway network, which was associated with a large deterioration in shareholder value. Using a counterfactual approach and new data on railway competition, we argue that the expansion of the railway companies, and their subsequent decline in financial performance, was not due to managerial failure. Rather, the promotion of new routes by established railways and mergers with other companies was part of a managerial strategy to maintain incumbent positions, and may have been preferable to not expanding whilst their competitors did.