Consociationalism and the evolution of political cleavages in Northern Ireland, 1989-2004

Political cleavages are often understood as deriving from either deep-rooted social divisions or institutional incentives. Contemporary Northern Ireland provides a test of the mutability of apparently entrenched cleavages to institutional change. Research undertaken before the ceasefire in the 1990s found noticeable asymmetries in the patterns of cleavage within the unionist and nationalist blocs. Within the unionist bloc, economic 'left-right' issues formed the main ideological division between the two major unionist parties. This contrasted with an ethno-national source of ideological division between the two nationalist parties. The emergence of a consociational form of government structure since then has demonstrated the ability of institutional incentives to swiftly reform some aspects of party competition however. As evidence of this, we show that between 1989 and 2004 there was little change in the sources of support for Sinn F�©in relative to the SDLP, but the influence of left-right ideology within the unionist bloc was negated as the influence of ethno-nationalism dramatically increased.

Consociationalism and its critics: Evidence from the historic Northern Ireland Assembly Election of 2007:

Critics of consociational power-sharing institutional arrangements in deeply divided societies argue that such arrangements solidify the underlying conflict cleavage and render it all-important for party competition and voter behaviour. I find evidence to the contrary in the case of voter behaviour at the historic 2007 Assembly election in Northern Ireland. At least in the unionist bloc, I find the effective disappearance of the ethno-national conflict cleavage as a determinant of voter choice. This suggests that consociational arrangements have led to both inclusion and moderation, rather than polarisation and ‘ethnic outbidding’

Consociationalism, regional integration and vote choice

Consociational institutional arrangements in deeply divided societies are often criticised for cementing the underlying conflict cleavage, encouraging the continued dominance of conflict-based party competition and voter behaviour and prohibiting the emergence of 'normal' (that is, non-conflict-based) dimensions of political competition. However, drawing on evidence from a post-election survey at the 2009 Northern Ireland election to the European Parliament, I find that EU issues determined intra-bloc vote choice (at least in the nationalist community). This suggests that there is potential for regional integration projects, such as the EU, to contribute to the normalisation of politics in a consociational system by acting as the source of an externally generated dimension of political competition. © 2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

'The Aftermath of the Annan Plan Referendums' Cross-Voting Moderation for Cyprus

This article examines recent developments in the Cyprus negotiations and suggests a number of changes to the proposed electoral system. Specifically, cross-voting and other electoral methods that encourage coalition-building across ethnic communities might add significantly to the functionality of the Annan Plan. Combined with other innovative mechanisms already in the plan, cross-voting could force political parties to seriously take into account the interests and concerns of the two Cypriot communities, an element that is currently missing from both the Turkish Cypriot (TC) and Greek Cypriot (GC) political systems. Special conditions on the island, as well as the way most political parties operated in the critical pre-April 2004 referendum period, suggest the need for this amendment. Although this study respects the consociational logic of the Annan Plan, it supplements consociationalism with elements that foster integration and inter-dependence between the two communities and their voters. The article also reviews the postreferendum developments in Cyprus which might have worrisome future implications, not only for its two communities, but also for EU enlargement in general. Cyprus both holds one of the keys to Turkey's entrance into the EU and is a litmus test for the Euro-Atlantic nexus and its capacity to pacify and integrate ethnically divided societies in Europe and elsewhere.

Northern Ireland: The Politics of Constraint

The article surveys the interrupted experience of devolution in Northern Ireland since 1999 and draws a number of comparisons between the first devolved Assembly and Executive and their successors elected in 2007. It underlines the significance of the changed political, electoral and paramilitary context in the period leading up to the 2007 Assembly election which, together with a number of procedural changes effected by the 2006 St Andrews Agreement, enabled the restoration of power-sharing devolution to occur. Against the background of its legislative and policy record and the wider altered state of Northern Ireland, it concludes that the contrived consociational model of governance can work, up to a point, but perhaps as much because of the politics of constraint than consociationalism's much vaunted promise to reflect and engender the politics of accommodation.

Deliberative Democracy in Northern Ireland: Opportunities and challenges for consensus in a consociational system

The 1998 Multiparty Agreement established a consociational system that contains within it an explicit dualism: unionist/nationalist, north and south of Ireland, and British and Irish. But although this formula has facilitated relatively stable and devolved governance, it is based on a distorted representation of a society in which there are much more complex divisions and, indeed, many common problems. Citizen-led efforts towards deliberative democracy since the 1980s have demonstrated both the will and the capacity for alternative, consensual political expressions. This chapter examines the challenges and opportunities facing these citizen-led initiatives in a political environment which, despite the significant decline in violence and terror, seems stubbornly resistant to the idea of broadening the various means of democratic participation.

Potentially Voting across the Divide in Deeply Divided Places: Ethnic Catch-All Voting in Consociational Northern Ireland

I elaborate a model of cross-bloc party support in deeply divided places. The model expects that the variation in the level of electoral support that citizens in Community A have for parties in Community B is a function of citizens' evaluations of the relative ability of parties in Community B to represent the interests of all communities. This 'ethnic catch-all' model of cross-bloc party support is tested in the context of consociational Northern Ireland, using data from a representative survey conducted directly after the 2010 Westminster general election. The findings are asymmetric: the model explains Protestant support for nationalist parties but not Catholic support for unionist parties. The findings, and their implications, are discussed.

Recognising difference while promoting cohesion: the role of collaborative networks in education

The chapter outlines various approaches taken to the challenge of divided societies through education systems and links this to debates on political approaches to conflict resolution in Northern Ireland. The education debate has structural and affective components, while the political debate revolves around the privileging of identity or commonality. Applying the principle of recognition and the importance of tolerance is seen to provide a range of policy options, but the evidence of education interventions in Northern Ireland does not highlight any one policy option as the most effective, nor did the end of the violent conflict produce a new consensus on a way forward. The chapter argues that a key additional element to effective practice might be provided through the promotion of shared education through collaborative networks of schools which allows for the continued operation of separate schools while promoting an integrated experience for pupils and teachers.