Taking the Next Step? Achieving another Bill of Rights

The aim of this article is to explore the recent Bill of Rights debate in the UK. This is deliberately located in the UK’s complex ‘national question’ because of the obsessive focus on achieving a proper grounding for human rights. A new form of national human rights protectionism appears to be emerging and merits careful consideration. The article suggests that it is better to acknowledge and accept the existence of a plurality of nationalisms in the UK in these discussions and understand how an essentially ‘British nationalist’ discourse sounds and works in that overall context. The concern is that the Bill of Rights debate is becoming an inadequate surrogate for the more challenging constitutional conversations that are required, and human rights discourse thus invested with expectations of national renewal that it can never meet and does not have the internal resources to resolve. If the process does go forward it may be better to prepare the ground for a deeper and wider constitutional dialogue across these islands than stumble clumsily and divisively into this territory simply via ‘another’ UK Bill of Rights.

Bills of Rights:A Comparative Perspective

Bills of rights are currently a much debated topic in various jurisdictions throughout the world. Almost all democratic nations, with the exception of Australia, now have a bill of rights. These take a variety of forms, ranging from constitutionally entrenched bills of rights, such as those of the United States and South Africa, to non-binding statements of rights. Falling between these approaches are non-entrenched, statutory bills of rights. As regards the latter, a model which has become increasingly popular is that of bills of rights based on interpretative obligations, whereby duties are placed upon courts to interpret national legislation in accordance with human rights standards. The aim of this book is to provide a comparative analysis of the bills of rights of a number of jurisdictions which have chosen to adopt such an approach. The jurisdictions considered are New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the Australian Capital Territory and the Australian state of Victoria.

There have been very few books published to date which contain a detailed comparative analysis of the bills of rights which this book addresses. The book adopts a unique thematic approach, whereby six aspects of the bills of rights in question have been selected for comparative analysis and a chapter is allocated to each aspect. This approach serves to facilitate the comparative discussion and emphasise the centrality of the comparative methodology.

Repeal the HRA and Rely on the Common Law?

This piece contemplates whether the common law could fill the gaps in human rights protection if the UK's Human Rights Act 1998 were to be repealed. It looks at how the common law protected human rights before the Act came into force, what difference the Act has made, how the common law has become side-lined as a result, how in recent cases it has begun to play a more central role, and what more more needs to be done to develop it in ways which ensure that if the Human Rights Act were to be repealed it would not be particularly missed.

Article 6 ECHR, Civil Rights and the Enduring Role of the Common Law

This article examines the role that the common law has played in Human Rights Act 1998 case law on the protection of 'civil rights' within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR. Focusing on Article 6 ECHR's 'disclosure' and 'full jurisdiction' requirements, it highlights an increasingly nuanced relationship between the ECHR and common law in cases under and outside the Human Rights Act 1998. Although the general pattern within the case law has been one of domestic court fidelity to the ECHR - something that is wholly consistent with section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 - the article notes areas in which the courts have been reluctant to adapt common law principles, as well as instances of common law protections exceeding those available under Article 6 ECHR. The article suggests that such lines of reasoning reveal a robustness within the common law that brings a multi-dimensional quality to the Human Rights Act 1998. It also suggests that such robustness can be analysed with reference to 'common law constitutionalism' and a corresponding imagery of 'dialogue' between the domestic courts and European Court of Human Rights.