Coalitional Games and Contracts Based on Individual Deviations

We study what coalitions form and how the members of each coalition split the coalition value in coalitional games in which only individual deviations are allowed. In this context we employ three stability notions: individual, contractual, and compensational stability. These notions differ in terms of the underlying contractual assumptions. We characterize the coalitional games in which individually stable outcomes exist by means of the top-partition property. Furthermore, we show that any coalition structure of maximum social worth is both contractually and compensationally stable.

Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games

In this paper we examine the properties of stable coalitions under sequential and simultaneous bargaining by competing labor unions. We do this using the Nash bargaining solution and various notions of stability, namely, Nash, coalitional, contractual and core stability. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,

Unconscious Vigilance: Worldview Defense without Adaptations for Terror, Coalition or Uncertainty Management

Individuals subtly reminded of death, coalitional challenges, or feelings of uncertainty display exaggerated preferences for affirmations and against criticisms of their cultural in-groups. Terror management, coalitional psychology, and uncertainty management theories postulate this “worldview defense” effectas the output of mechanisms evolved either to allay the fear of death, foster social support, or reduce anxiety by increasing adherence to cultural values. In 4 studies, we report evidence for an alternative perspective. We argue that worldview defense owes to unconscious vigilance, a state of accentuatedreactivity to affective targets (which need not relate to cultural worldviews) that follows detection of subtle alarm cues (which need not pertain to death, coalitional challenges, or uncertainty). In Studies 1 and 2, death-primed participants produced exaggerated ratings of worldview-neutral affective targets. In Studies 3 and 4, subliminal threat manipulations unrelated to death, coalitional challenges, or uncertaintyevoked worldview defense. These results are discussed as they inform evolutionary interpretations of worldview defense and future investigations of the influence of unconscious alarm on judgment.

Network Topology, Higher Orders of Stability and Efficiency

Stable networks of order r where r is a natural number refer to those networks that are immune to coalitional deviation of size r or less. In this paper, we introduce stability of a finite order and examine its relation with efficient networks under anonymous and component additive value functions and the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule. In particular, we examine shapes of networks or network architectures that would resolve the conflict between stability and efficiency in the sense that if stable networks assume those shapes they would be efficient and if efficient networks assume those shapes, they would be stable with minimal further restrictions on value functions.