A normative approach to the criminalisation of cartel activity

Although cartel behaviour is almost universally (and rightly) condemned, it is not clear why cartel participants deserve the full wrath of the criminal law and its associated punishment. To fill this void, I develop a normative (or principled) justification for the criminalisation of conduct characteristic of ‘hard core’ cartels. The paper opens with a brief consideration of the rhetoric commonly used to denounce cartel activity, eg that it ‘steals from’ or ‘robs’ consumers. To put the discussion in context, a brief definition of ‘hard core’ cartel behaviour is provided and the harms associated with this activity are identified. These are: welfare losses in the form of appropriation (from consumer to producer) of consumer surplus, the creation of deadweight loss to the economy, the creation of productive inefficiency (hindering innovation of both products and processes), and the creation of so-called X-inefficiency. As not all activities which cause harm ought to be criminalised, a theory as to why certain harms in a liberal society can be criminalised is developed. It is based on JS Mill's harm to others principle (as refined by Feinberg) and on a choice of social institutions using Rawls's ‘veil of ignorance.’ The theory is centred on the value of individual choice in securing one's own well-being, with the market as an indispensable instrument for this. But as applied to the harm associated with cartel conduct, this theory shows that none of the earlier mentioned problems associated with this activity provide sufficient justification for criminalisation. However, as the harm from hard core cartel activity strikes at an important institution which permits an individual's ability to secure their own well-being in a liberal society, criminalisation of hard core cartel behaviour can have its normative justification on this basis.

How high (and far) can you go? On setting fines in cartel cases involving vertically-integrated undertakings and foreign sales

Any Nearer to Victory in the Fifty Years War?:Assessing the European Commission’s Leadership, Weapons and Strategies towards combating Cartels

Some 50 years after its creation EU competition policy remains firmly entrenched as one of the most developed examples of supranational governance within the European Union. Although there has been a marked increase in interest among political scientists in competition policy in recent years there are still gaps in terms of overall coverage. One area that has been largely overlooked centres on cartels. Cartel policy has emerged as a highly salient issue and main priority of the Commission's competition policy since the late 1990s. Certainly, the recent restructuring of the EU cartel enforcement regime, the imposition of ever higher fines and a determined EU Competition Commissioner have fuelled growing media attention while new notices and regulations increasingly occupy the interests and minds of practitioners. The European Commission has constantly extended its activities on the competition policy front and its increasingly aggressive strategies to combat cartels provides political scientists with a fascinating case study of governance in action and illustrates the ways – such as leniency programmes, higher fines, enhanced and better equipped resources as well as internal reorganisation in which the European regulator is pursuing such conspiracies. This article traces the evolution and development of EU cartel policy since its inception and assesses the Commission's strategies and considers just to what extent the European Commission is winning its war against business cartelisation.

'Today’s Softness is Tomorrow’s Nightmare’::Intensifying the Fight against Cartels in Brussels and Bonn

The pursuit of hard-core cartel activity represents the core aspect of modern antitrust. Since the late 1990s, increased recognition of dangers posed by cartelization has led European competition regulators to initiate organizational changes and to modernize procedures and practice to combat cartels. However, has policy toward hard-core cartels softened in a harsher economic environment from late 2008? This article provides a comparative examination of the approach towards cartels by the European Commission and, at the national level, by the German Bundeskartellamt. It argues that, on current evidence, any doubts about how far the heightened anti-cartel drive could be sustained in the economic downturn post 2008 should be put aside. While some adjustments to fines have been made to take into account inability to pay in exceptional circumstances, no special provisions have been introduced to allow crisis cartels and it appears that the legislation continues to be interpreted strictly by the competition authorities as before.

Export Cartels: Is it Legal to Target your Neighbour? Analysis in Light of Recent Case Law

Despite the growing sophistication of antitrust regimes around the world, export cartels benefit from special treatment: they are almost universally tolerated, if not encouraged in the countries of origin. Economists do not offer an unambiguous policy recommendation on how to deal with them in part due to the lack of empirical data. This article discusses arguments for and against export cartels and it identifies the existing gaps in the present regulatory framework. The theoretical part is followed by an analysis of the recent case law: a US cartel challenged with different outcomes in India and South Africa, as well as Chinese export cartels pursued in the USA. The Chinese cases are particularly topical as the conduct at stake, apart from being subject to private antitrust actions before US courts, was also challenged within the WTO dispute settlement framework, pointing out to the existing interface between trade and competition. While the recent developments prove that unaddressed issues tend not to vanish, the new South-North dimension has the potential of placing export cartels again on the international agenda. Pragmatic thinking suggests looking for the solution within the WTO framework.

UK: general - UK enforcement.

Reports that the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) began operations in "shadow form" on October 1, 2013 prior to it taking over the mandates of the Competition Commission and the Office of Fair Trading in April 2014. Outlines the CMA's draft guidance, issued for consultation on September 17, 2013, on prosecutions for the cartel offence. Presents links to other CMA communications.

Partial Cooperation in Strategic Decision Situations

We consider a normal form game in which there is a single exogenously given coalition of cooperating players that can write a binding agreement on pre-selected actions. These collective actions typically represent a certain number of dimensions in the players’ strategy space. The actions represented by the other dimensions of the strategy space remain under the complete, individual control of the players.
We consider a standard extension of the Nash equilibrium concept denoted as a partial cooperative equilibrium as well as an equilibrium concept in which the coalition of cooperators has a leadership position. Existence results are developed for these new equilibrium concepts. We identify conditions on these partial cooperative games under which the various equilibrium concepts are equivalent.
We apply this game theoretic framework to existing models of multi-market oligopolies and international pollution abatement. In a multi-market oligopoly typically a merger paradox emerges in the partial cooperative equilibrium, which vanishes if the cartel of collaborators exploits its leadership position. Our application to international pollution abatement treaties shows that cooperation by a sufficiently large group of countries results in a Pareto improvement over the standard tragedy of the commons outcome described by the Nash equilibrium.