A contingent valuation of the 2012 London Olympic games - A regional perspective

Major sporting events such as the Olympics are usually assessed in terms of economic impacts. Recently, policy makers have begun to place greater emphasis on possible intangible effects (such as civic pride, legacy of sporting facilities) associated with such events. To date, little work has been carried out on quantifying these effects in a meaningful way. This study uses contingent valuation methodology to assess the value of the proposed 2012 London Olympic Games. The survey is carried out on the provincial city of Bath, approximately 2 hours west of London. Conducting the survey outside of London is justified on the basis that the organizers of London 2012 have emphasized the value of the event to the United Kingdom as a whole. The results suggest that positive intangible effects are associated with the event and residents outside of London are willing to pay toward funding.

Analysing orchestrations with risk profiles and angel-daemon games

In this paper game theory is used to analyse the effect of a number of service failures during the execution of a grid orchestration. A service failure may be catastrophic in that it causes an entire orchestration to fail. Alternatively, a grid manager may utilise alternative services in the case of failure, allowing an orchestration to recover, A risk profile provides a means of modelling situations in a way that is neither overly optimistic nor overly pessimistic. Risk profiles are analysed using angel and daemon games. A risk profile can be assigned a valuation through an analysis of the structure of its associated Nash equilibria. Some structural properties of valuation functions, that show their validity as a measure for risk, are given. Two main cases are considered, the assessment of Orc expressions and the arrangement of a meeting using reputations.

The suppression of q card selections: Evidence for deductive inference in Wason's Selection Task

The results of three experiments investigating the role of deductive inference in Wason's selection task are reported. In Experiment 1, participants received either a standard one-rule problem or a task containing a second rule, which specified an alternative antecedent. Both groups of participants were asked to select those cards that they considered were necessary to test whether the rule common to both problems was true or false. The results showed a significant suppression of q card selections in the two-rule condition. In addition there was weak evidence for both decreased p selection and increased not-q selection. In Experiment 2 we again manipulated number of rules and found suppression of q card selections only. Finally, in Experiment 3 we compared one- and two-rule conditions with a two-rule condition where the second rule specified two alternative antecedents in the form of a disjunction. The q card selections were suppressed in both of the two-rule conditions but there was no effect of whether the second rule contained one or two alternative antecedents. We argue that our results support the claim that people make inferences about the unseen side of the cards when engaging with the indicative selection task.

A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability

A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current bargaining sets. For the class of monotonic proper simple games, the outcomes in the bargaining set are characterized. Furthermore, it is shown that the bargaining set of any homogeneous weighted majority game contains an outcome for which the underlying coalition structure consists of a minimal winning coalition and its complement.

Coalitional Games and Contracts Based on Individual Deviations

We study what coalitions form and how the members of each coalition split the coalition value in coalitional games in which only individual deviations are allowed. In this context we employ three stability notions: individual, contractual, and compensational stability. These notions differ in terms of the underlying contractual assumptions. We characterize the coalitional games in which individually stable outcomes exist by means of the top-partition property. Furthermore, we show that any coalition structure of maximum social worth is both contractually and compensationally stable.