Global Systemic Risk and International Regulatory Coordination: Squaring Sovereignty and Financial Stability

In recent years much attention has been given to systemic risk and maintaining financial stability. Much of the focus, rightly, has been on market failures and the role of regulation in addressing them. This article looks at the role of domestic policies and government actions as sources of global instability. The global financial system is built upon global markets controlled by national financial and macroeconomic policies. In this context, regulatory asymmetries, diverging policy preferences, and government failures add a further dimension to global systemic risk not present at the national level.
Systemic risk is a result of the interplay between two independent variables: an underlying trigger event, in this analysis a domestic policy measure, and a transmission channel. The solution to systemic risk requires tackling one of these variables. In a domestic setting, the centralization of regulatory power into one single authority makes it easier to balance the delicate equilibrium between enhancing efficiency and reducing instability. However, in a global financial system in which national financial policies serve to maximize economic welfare, regulators will be confronted with difficult policy and legal tradeoffs.
We investigate the role that financial regulation plays in addressing domestic policy failures and in controlling the danger of global financial interdependence. To do so we analyse global financial interconnectedness, and explain its role in transmitting instability; we investigate the political economy dynamics at the origin of regulatory asymmetries and government failures; and we discuss the limits of regulation.

Banking in Crisis: The Rise and Fall of British Banking Stability, 1800 to the Present

Can the lessons of the past help us to prevent another banking collapse in the future? This is the first book to tell the story of the rise and fall of British banking stability in the past two centuries, and it sheds new light on why banking systems crash and the factors underpinning banking stability. John Turner shows that there were only two major banking crises in Britain during this time: the crisis of 1825–6 and the Great Crash of 2007–8. Although there were episodic bouts of instability in the interim, the banking system was crisis-free. Why was the British banking system stable for such a long time and why did the British banking system implode in 2008? In answering these questions, the book explores the long-run evolution of bank regulation, the role of the Bank of England, bank rescues and the need to hold shareholders to account.

Capital Markets Union and ending short-termism: lessons from the European Commission's public consultation

The European Commission’s initiative to establish a Capital Markets Union is in sharp conflict with the more radical goals of downsizing significantly certain financial activities and firms that have become too-big-to-fail and too-big-to-govern and of ending or at least drastically limiting extreme speculation and short-termism in finance and the real economy in order to increase financial stability. The recent public consultation on the Commission’s Green Paper Building a Capital Markets Union gives evidence of how weak such demands are compared to calls for deeper capital markets with more ‘shadow banking’ and rebuilding (sound) securitisation. The consultation is an example of how framing the problem and the refined better regulation agenda influence post-crisis financial reregulation and help to marginalize more radical ideas demanding a return to a more traditional banking model and transforming finance back to serving the real economy.

International Coordination in Cross-Border Bank Bail-ins: Problems and Prospects

Bail-in is quickly becoming a predominant approach to banking resolution. The EU Bank Recovery Resolution Directive and the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s single point of entry strategy envisage creditors’ recapitalisations
to resolve a failing financial institution. However, this legislation focuses on the domestic aspects of bail-in, leaving the question of how it is applied
to a cross-border banking group open. Cross-border banking resolution has been historically subject to coordination failures, which have resulted in disorderly resolutions with dangerous systemic effects. The goal of this article is to assess whether bail-in is subject to the same coordination problems that affect other resolution tools, and to discuss the logic of international legal cooperation in bail-in policies. We demonstrate that, in spite of the evident benefit in terms of fiscal sustainability, bail-in suffers from complex coordination problems which, if not addressed, might lead to regulatory arbitrage and lengthy court battles, and, ultimately, may disrupt resolutions. We argue that only a binding legal regime can address those problems. In doing so, we discuss the recent Financial Stability
Board’s proposal on cross-border recognition of resolution action, and the role of international law in promoting cooperation in banking resolution.

Economic Stability and Economic Governance in the Euro Area:What the European Crisis Can Teach on the Limits of Economic Integration

The recent European economic crisis has dramatically exposed the failures of
the various institutional mechanisms in place to maintain economic stability
in Europe, and has unveiled the difficulty in achieving international coordination
on fiscal and financial stability policies. Drawing on the European
experience, this article analyzes the concept of economic stability in international
law and highlights the peculiar problems connected to its maintenance
or promotion. First, we demonstrate that policies that safeguard and
protect economic stability are largely regulated and managed at the national
level, due to their inextricable relationship with the exercise of national political
power. Until recently, more limited levels of pan-European integration
did not make the coordination of economic stability policies seem necessary.
However, a much deeper level of economic integration makes it very difficult
to tackle an international economic crisis through national responses. If EU
Member states wish to maintain and deepen economic integration, they
must accept an erosion of sovereignty over their economic stability policies.
This will not only deprive states of a fundamental anchor of political power,
but also create a challenge for the maintenance of democratic control over
economic policies. Second, this article argues that soft law approaches are
likely ineffective in enforcing the regulatory disciplines required to ensure
economic stability.

Does Basel Compliance Matter for Bank Performance?

The global financial crisis underscored the importance of regulation and supervision to a well-functioning banking system that efficiently channels financial resources into investment. In this paper, we contribute to the ongoing policy debate by assessing whether compliance with international regulatory standards and protocols enhances bank operating efficiency. We focus specifically on the adoption of international capital standards and the Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision (BCP). The relationship between bank efficiency and regulatory compliance is investigated using the Simar and Wilson (2007. J. Econ. 136 (1), 31) double bootstrapping approach on an international sample of publicly listed banks. Our results indicate that overall BCP compliance, or indeed compliance with any of its individual chapters,has no association with bank efficiency.

This Time is Different: Causes and Consequences of British Banking Instability over the Long Run

This paper addresses three questions: (1) How severe were the episodes of banking instability
experienced by the UK over the past two centuries? (2) What have been the macroeconomic
indicators of UK banking instability? and (3) What have been the consequences of UK banking
instability for the cost of credit? Using a unique dataset of bank share prices from 1830 to 2010
to assess the stability of the UK banking system, we find that banking instability has grown more
severe since the 1970s. We also find that interest rates, inflation, lending growth, and equity
prices are consistent macroeconomic indicators of UK banking instability over the long run.
Furthermore, utilising a unique dataset of corporate-bond yields for the period 1860 to 2010, we
find that there is a significant long-run relationship between banking instability and the creditrisk
premium faced by businesses.

Regulatory regime change in Turkish banks:Reactive or proactive?

This paper examines the positive contributions made toward restructuring the regulatory framework of Turkey's banking and financial sectors prior to and post the 2000–2001 financial crisis. Drawing on a framework initially developed by Onis and Senses, 2007 and Onis and Senses, 2009 and further referred to by Onis, 2009 and Onis, 2010 it argues that financial reforms undertaken by the Turkish government would not have been successful without the strong support of domestic coalitions. While the external pressures put on the Turkish government from the International Monetary Fund, The World Bank and the European Union for financial reforms were necessary to kick start the reforms as a reactive process, these pressures on their own may have served only the interests of financial business elites at the expense of the broader stakeholders. Empirical data for the study was collected from documentary analysis of key financial institutions and interviews with twenty major Turkish regulatory agents and other stakeholders. The paper then discusses how the perceptions of these stakeholders are embodied into, and have influenced, regulatory regime change in Turkey from a reactive state to a more proactive one.

The Multiple Facets of ETF Investing: A World-Wide Analysis

The global ETF industry provides more complicated investment vehicles than low-cost index trackers. Instead, we find that the real investments of ETFs that do not fully replicate their benchmarks may deviate from their benchmarks to leverage informational advantages (which leads to a surprising stock-selection ability), to benefit from the securities lending market, to support ETF-affiliated banks’ stock prices, and to help affiliated OEFs through cross-trading. These effects are more prevalent in ETFs domiciled in Europe. Market awareness of such additional risk is reflected in ETF outflows. These results have important normative implications for consumer protection and financial stability.

Movement of Capital and Trade in Services:Distinguishing Myth from Reality Regarding the GATS and the Liberalization of the Capital Account

This article will analyze the interplay between capital movements and trade
in services as structured in World Trade Organization (WTO) law, and it will
assess the implications of the capital account liberalization for the freedom of
WTO Members to pursue their economic policies. Although the movement
of capital is largely confined to the domain of international financial or monetary
policy, it is regulated by WTO law due to its role in the process of
financial services liberalization, which generally requires liberalized capital
flows. From a legal perspective, the interplay between capital movements
and trade in services requires striking a delicate balance between the right
of market access and the parallel right of economic stability. Indeed, a liberalized
regime for capital movements could pose serious stability problems
during times of crisis. For this reason, it is necessary that Members are able
to derogate from their obligations and adopt emergency measures.
Regulating the movement of capital in the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) requires stretching the regulatory oversight of WTO law
over different aspects of international economic policy. Indeed, capital movements are a fundamental component of the balance of payments and have a
major role in shaping monetary, fiscal, and financial policies. This article will
analyze how the discipline provided by the GATS on capital movements will
affect not only trade in services, but also the Members’ policy space on
monetary and fiscal policy. The article will conclude that while the GATS offers enough policy space for the maintenance of financial stability, it does
not fully take into consideration the need of Members to control capital
movements in order to conduct monetary policies.