Business Intelligence and Multi-market Competition

We consider a multi-market framework where a set of firms compete on two oligopolistic markets. The cost of production of each firm allows for spillovers across markets, ensuring that output decisions for both markets have to be made jointly. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can establish links gathering business intelligence about other firms. A link formed by a firm generates two types of externalities for competitors and consumers. We characterize the business intelligence equilibrium networks and networks that maximize social welfare. By contrast with single market competition, we show that in multi-market competition there exist situations where intelligence gathering activities are underdeveloped with regard to social welfare and should be tolerated, if not encouraged, by public authorities.

Remanufacturer-Manufacturer Collaborative Model in the Smae Channel

This paper adds to the growing literature of market competition related to the remanufacturer by analyzing the model where the remanufacturer and the manufacturer collaborate with each other in the same channel. This paper investigates a single-period deterministic model which keeps the analysis simple so as to obtain sharper insights. The results characterize the optimal remanufacturing and pricing strategies for the remanufacturer and the manufacturer in the collaborative model

ASIP: developments, challenges and trends

Application Specific Instruction Set Processor (ASIP) becomes an attractive substitute for ASIC as transistor density, logic complexity and market competition boost. Similar to ASIC, ASIP is based on customized and tailored architectures. In this way, ASIP delivers high performances with low overheads on cost and power whilst taking the advantages of high flexibility and fast time-to-market as a processor-based solution. To demonstrate this effective solution for embedded applications, this paper performs an overall investigation on ASIP's developments, challenges, trends in terms of architectures and design methodologies.

The 1996 ‘Muslim holiday’ affair. Religious competition and state mediation in contemporary Mozambique

Political commentators often cast religious con? ict as the result of the numerical growth and political rise of a single faith. When Islam is involved, arguments about religious fundamentalism are quick to surface and often stand as an explanation in their own right. Yet, as useful as this type of explanation may be, it usually fails to address properly, if at all, two sets of important issues. It avoids, Ž rst, the question of the rise of other religions and their contribution to tensions and con? icts. Second, it reduces the role of the State to a reactive one. The State becomes an object of contest or conquest, or it is simply ignored. Adopting a different approach, this article investigates a controversy that took place in Mozambique in 1996 around the ‘ofŽ cialisation’ of two Islamic holidays. It looks at the role played by religious competition and state mediation. The article shows that the State’s abandonment of religious regulation – the establishment of a free ‘religious market’ – fostered religious competition that created tensions between faiths. It suggests that strife ensued because deregulation was almost absolute: the State did not take a clear stand in religious matters and faith organisations started to believe that the State was becoming, or could become, confessional. The conclusion discusses theoretical implications for the understanding of religious strife as well as Church and State relations. It also draws some implications for the case of Mozambique more speciŽ cally, implications which should have relevance for countries such as Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe where problems of a similar nature have arisen.

Asymmetric information without common priors: an indirect evolutionary analysis of quantity competition

The common prior assumption justifies private beliefs as posterior probabilities when updating a common prior based on individual information. We dispose of the common prior assumption for a homogeneous oligopoly market with uncertain costs and firms entertaining arbitrary priors about other firms' cost-type. We show that true prior beliefs can not be evolutionarily stable when truly expected profit measures (reproductive) success.

EU Social and Labour Rights and EU Internal Market Law: Study for the EMPL Committee

EU Social and Labour Rights have developed incrementally, originally through a set of legislative initiatives creating selective employment rights, followed by a non-binding Charter of Social Rights. Only in 2009, social and labour rights became legally binding through the Charter of Fundamental Rights for the European Union (CFREU). By contrast, the EU Internal Market - an area without frontiers where goods, persons, services and capital can circulate freely – has been enshrined in legally enforceable Treaty provisions from 1958. These comprise the economic freedoms guaranteeing said free circulation and a system ensuring that competition is not distorted within the Internal Market (Protocol 27 to the Treaty of Lisbon). Tensions between Internal Market law and social and labour rights have been observed in analyses of EU case law and legislation. This study explores responses by socio-economic and political actors at national and EU levels to such tensions, focusing on collective labour rights, rights to fair working conditions and rights to social security and social assistance (Articles 12, 28, 31, 34 Charter of Fundamental Rights for the European Union). On the basis of the current Treaties and the CFREU, the constitutionally conditioned Internal Market emerges as a way to overcome the perception that social and labour rights limit Internal Market law, or vice versa. On this basis, alternative responses to perceived tensions are proposed, focused on posting of workers, furthering fair employment conditions through public procurement and enabling effective collective bargaining and industrial action in the Internal Market.