How Does Justice Sound? Enunciative Modalities, Law’s Logos and Woman’s Voice

In the throes of her mimetic exposure of the lie of phallocratic discursive unity in 'Speculum of the Other Woman', Irigaray paused on the impossibility of woman’s voice and remarked that ‘it [was] still better to speak only in riddles, allusions, hints, parables.’ Even if asked to clarify a few points. Even if people plead that they just don’t understand. After all, she said, ‘they never have understood.’ (Irigaray 1985, 143).

That the law has never understood a uniquely feminine narrative is hardly controversial, but that this erasure continues to have real and substantive consequences for justice is a reality that feminists have been compelled to remain vigilant in exposing. How does the authority of the word compound law’s exclusionary matrix? How does law remain impervious to woman’s voice and how might it hear woman’s voice? Is there capacity for a dialogic engagement between woman, parler femme, and law?

This paper will explore these questions with particular reference to the experience of women testifying to trauma during the rape trial. It will argue that a logically linked historical genealogy can be traced through which law has come to posit itself as an originary discourse by which thinking is very much conflated with being, or in other terms, law is conflated with justice. This has consequences both for women’s capacity to speak or represent the harm of rape to law, but also for law’s ability to ‘hear’ woman’s voice and objectively adjudicate in cases of rape. It will suggest that justice requires law acknowledge the presence of two distinct and different subjects and that this must be done not only at the symbolic level but also at the level of the parole, syntax and discourse.

Research Protocol: A Randomized Controlled Trial of Functional Family Therapy: An Early Intervention Foundation (EIF) Partnership between Croydon Council and Queen's University Belfast

The paper presents a protocol for ‘A Randomized Controlled Trial of Functional Family Therapy (FFT): An Early Intervention Foundation (EIF) Partnership between Croydon Council and Queen's University Belfast’. The protocol describes a trial that uses FFT as an alternative intervention to current use of the youth justice system and local authority care with the aim of reducing crime/recidivism in young people referred to Croydon Council. The trial will take place over a period of 36 months and will involve up to 154 families. Croydon Council will employ a team of five Functional Family Therapists who will work with families to promote effective outcomes. The Centre for Effective Education at Queen’s University Belfast will act as independent evaluators of outcomes for families and young people. The work is supported from the United Kingdom Economic & Social Research Council/Early Intervention Foundation Grant Number ES/M006921/1.

Sporting Justice: An Arbitrator's Perspective

Drawing on my experience of a number of sports dispute resolution tribunals in the UK and Ireland (such as Sports Resolutions UK; Just Sport Ireland; the Football Association of Ireland’s Disciplinary Panel and the Gaelic Athletic Association’s Dispute Resolution Authority) I intend to use this paper to review the legal arguments typically made in sports-related arbitrations. These points of interest can be summarised as a series of three questions: the fairness question; the liability question; the penalty question.

In answer to the fairness question, the aim is to give a brief outline on best practice in establishing a "fair" sports disciplinary tribunal. The answer, I believe, is always twofold in nature: first, and to paraphrase Lord Steyn in R v Secretary of State For The Home Department, Ex Parte Daly [2001] UKHL 26 at [28] "in law, context is everything" – translated into the present matter, this means that in sports disciplinary cases, the more serious the charges against the individual (in terms of reputational damage, economic impact and/or length of sanction); the more tightly wrapped the procedural safeguards surrounding any subsequent disciplinary hearing must be. A fair disciplinary system will be discussed in the context of the principles laid down in Article 8 of the World Anti-Doping Code which, in effect, acts as sport’s Article 6 of the ECHR on a right to a fair trial.

Following on from the above, in the 60 or so sports arbitrations that I have heard, there are two further points of interest. First, the claim before the arbitral panel will often be framed in an argument that, for various reasons of substantive and procedural irregularity, the sanction imposed on the appellant should be quashed ("the liability"). Second, and in alternative, that the sanction imposed was wholly disproportionate ("the penalty").

The liability issue usually breaks down into two further questions. First, what is the nature of the legal duty upon a sports body in exercising its disciplinary remit? Second, to what extent does a de novo hearing on appeal cure any apparent defects in a hearing of first instance? The first issue often results in an arbitral panel debating the contra preferentum approach to the interpretation of a contested rule i.e., the sports body’s rules in question are so ambiguous that they should be interpreted in a manner to the detriment of the rule maker and in favour of the appellant. On the second matter, it now appears to be a general principle of sports law, administrative law and even human rights law that even if a violation of the principles of natural justice takes place at the first instance stage of a disciplinary process, they may be cured on de novo appeal. Authority for this approach can be found at the Court of Arbitration for Sport and in particular in CAS 2009/A/1920 FK Pobeda, Aleksandar Zabrcanec, Nikolce Zdraveski v UEFA at para 87.

The question on proportionality asks what, aside from precedent found within the decisions of the sports body in question, are the general legal principles against which a sanction by a sports disciplinary body can be benchmarked in order to ascertain whether it is disproportionate in length or even irrational in nature?

On the matter of (dis)proportionality of sanction, the debate is usually guided by the authority in Bradley v the Jockey Club [2004] EWHC 2164 (QB) and affirmed at [2005] EWCA Civ 1056. The Bradley principles on proportionality of sports-specific sanctions, recently cited with approval at the Court of Arbitration for Sport, will be examined in this presentation.

Finally, an interesting application of many of the above principles (and others such as the appropriate standard of proof in sports disciplinary procedures) can be made to recent match-fixing or corruption related hearings held by the British Horse Racing Authority, the integrity units of snooker and tennis, and at the Court of Arbitration for Sport.

Complementarity’s monopoly on justice in Uganda: the International Criminal Court, victims and Thomas Kwoyelo

Complementarity has been extolled as the pioneering way for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to navigate the difficulties of state sovereignty when investigating and prosecuting international crimes. Victims have often been held up to justify and legitimise the work of the ICC and states complementing the Court through domestic processes. This article examines how Uganda has developed its laws, legal procedure, and accountability for international crimes over the past decade. This has culminated in the trial of Thomas Kwoyelo, which after five years of proceedings, has yet to move to the trial phase, due to the issue of an amnesty. While there has been a profusion of provisions to allow victims to participate, avail of protection measures and reparations, in practice very little has changed for them. This article highlights the dangers of complementarity being the sole solution to protracted conflicts, in particular the realisation of victims’ rights.

Multicenter Randomized Controlled Trial of Withdrawal of Inhaled Corticosteroids in Cystic Fibrosis

Rationale: Lung inflammation and injury is critical in cystic fibrosis. An ideal antiinflammatory agent has not been identified but inhaled corticosteroids are widely used despite lack of evidence.

Objectives: To test the safety of withdrawal of inhaled corticosteroids with the hypothesis this would not be associated with an earlier onset of acute chest exacerbations.

Methods: Multicenter randomized double-blind placebo-controlled trial in 18 pediatric and adult UK centers. Eligibility criteria included age > 6.0 yr, FEV1 ? 40% predicted, and corticosteroid use > 3 mo. During the 2-mo run-in period, all patients received fluticasone; they then took either fluticasone or placebo for 6 mo.

Measurements and Main Results: Fluticasone group: n = 84, median age 14.6 yr, mean (SD) FEV1 76% (18); placebo group: n = 87, median age 15.8 yr, mean (SD) FEV1 76% (18). There was no difference in time to first exacerbation (primary outcome) with hazard ratio (95% confidence interval) of 1.07 (0.68 to 1.70) for fluticasone versus placebo. There was no effect of age, atopy, corticosteroid dose, FEV1, or Pseudomonas aeruginosa status. There was no change in lung function or differences in antibiotic or rescue bronchodilator use. Fewer patients in the fluticasone group withdrew from the study due to lung-related adverse events (9 vs. 15%); with a relative risk (95% confidence interval) of 0.59 (0.23–1.48) fluticasone versus placebo.

Conclusions: In this study population (applicable to 40% of patients with cystic fibrosis in the UK), it appears safe to consider stopping inhaled corticosteroids. Potential advantages will be to reduce the drug burden on patients, reduce adverse effects, and make financial savings.