Absent Witnesses and the U.K. Supreme Court: Judicial Deference as Judicial Dialogue?

This article analyses the position of absent witness evidence under the UK Criminal Justice Act 2003 after significant European and domestic case law on the topic. It argues that flexibility in the hearsay regime under the 2003 Act and a permissive approach by appellate courts has increased the potential for fair trial violations in recent years. Moreover, the UK Supreme Court decision in R v Horncastle preserves domestic courts’ authority to determine the meaning of European rights and selectively defer to Parliament. This area of the law demonstrates the scope that the domestic system retains for divergence from European standards.

The First Year of the UK's Supreme Court

This article reviews the judgments issued by the UK Supreme Court during the first year of its existence (October 2009 - September 2010) and assesses how the modus operandi of the new court differs from that of its predecessor, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords.

A Human Rights Triumph? Dictatorship-Era Crimes and the Chilean Supreme Court

This article assesses the dramatic shift in Chilean Supreme Court jurisprudence toward accountability for crimes committed during the dictatorship and sets it within the context of judicial reform and political change. Chile's experience has been identified as emblematic of delayed justice, but an examination of key case law identifies the narrow scope and instability of Supreme Court decision-making. The Court has been uncharacteristically assertive in its application of human rights norms yet vulnerable to external influences. The Chilean example underscores the need for political leadership to address past violations in post-conflict societies. Political inertia impeded justice claims and, as a result, change required significant judicial innovation.

Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court

After setting the scene by explaining the constraints which are placed on the Justices of the UK Supreme Court, this book considers how human rights are conceptualized by the Court in general and how in particular the procedural questions thrown up by the Human Rights Act have been dealt with so far. It then examines on a right-by-right basis the Justices' position on all the European Convention rights and some additional international human rights standards incorporated into UK law.

The European Convention on Human Rights and the United Kingdom's Supreme Court

This article reviews the attitudes displayed by the UK's Supreme Court towards claims based on human rights law.

Activism and Restraint within the UK Supreme Court

This article provides evidence for the extent to which the UK Supreme Court as a body - and Supreme Court Justices as individuals - have displayed an activist or restrained attitude to their decision-making role. Taking October 2009 as the starting point (when the UKSC came into existence) the article surveys the degree to which the Court and individual Justices have (1) departed from precedents, (2) interpreted legislation in unanticipated ways, (3) rejected the government's position on matters of social, economic or foreign policy, and (4) developed the common law. The article concludes that, while the Supreme Court as a whole remains as conservative as the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords which preceded it (with the possible exception of its approach to immigration law), there are notable differences between the attitudes of individual Justices, one or two of whom appear to be straining at the leash.

A steady ship: A quiet year for the United Kingdom Supreme Court

This piece reviews the decisions issued by the UK's Supreme Court during 2014, comparing the output with the previous year's and highlighting some particularly important cases.

Reigning Supreme: Events at the UK Supreme Court in 2015

This short article provides statistics on the number of decisions issued by the UK Supreme Court during 2015 and highlights some of the most interesting of them.

Supreme confidence

An overview of the decisions taken by the UK Supreme Court in 2012

‘The Judiciary and Political Change in Africa: Developing Transitional Jurisprudence in Nigeria’

At a time of increased evaluations of law, human rights, and the rise of judicial power all over the globe, the work of most African judiciaries and the principles of the jurisprudence they espouse in promoting social justice remain an unlikely focus of comparative legal scholarship. This ought not to be so in view of the considerable activities of the courts on the continent in the dawn of the third wave of democratization. This article explores the work of the Nigerian Supreme Court in the political transition to democracy since 1999. Utilizing insights from the work of Ruti Teitel, it attempts to outline some of the major constitutional and extraconstitutional principles adopted by the Court in mediating intergovernmental contestations in the turbulent transition away from almost three decades of authoritarian military rule. It emerges that the task of fostering social transformation through the “weakest” branch seriously tasks the institutional integrity of the judiciary.

'Robes on Tight Ropes: The Judicialisation of Politics in Nigeria'

This account of judicialised politics in the Nigerian transition experience examines the regulation of the judiciary of the political space, through the resolution of intergovernmental contestations in a dysfunctional federation. It analyses the judicialisation of elite power disputes which have resonance for due process and the rule of law in particular and governance in general. A study of the role of the judiciary in stabilising the country, itself a pivot in the West Africa region in particular and Africa in general, is important. This is especially in view of its classification as a ‘weak state,’ despite its enormous human and natural resources. The analyses here suggest the Supreme Court has taken a strategic position in the task of democratic institutional building and the reinstitution of the rule of law in the country. This strategic measure has received the acclaim of the public. However, the account also discloses that the judiciary, in the course of its numerous interventions, has been drawn into overly political disputes that overreach its jurisprudential preferences. Of even more significance, it demonstrates that the judiciary is itself still challenged by institutional dysfunctions constituting part of the legacies of the authoritarian era. The situation leads back to the need for closer scrutiny of the judicial function in transitional societies.

So mechanical or routine: The not original in Feist

The United States Supreme Court case of 1991, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., continues to be highly significant for property in data and databases, but remains poorly understood. The approach taken in this article contrasts with previous studies. It focuses upon the “not original” rather than the original. The delineation of the absence of a modicum of creativity in selection, coordination, and arrangement of data as a component of the not original forms a pivotal point in the Supreme Court decision. The author also aims at elucidation rather than critique, using close textual exegesis of the Supreme Court decision. The results of the exegesis are translated into a more formal logical form to enhance clarity and rigor.


The insufficiently creative is initially characterized as “so mechanical or routine.” Mechanical and routine are understood in their ordinary discourse senses, as a conjunction or as connected by AND, and as the central clause. Subsequent clauses amplify the senses of mechanical and routine without disturbing their conjunction.


The delineation of the absence of a modicum of creativity can be correlated with classic conceptions of computability. The insufficiently creative can then be understood as a routine selection, coordination, or arrangement produced by an automatic mechanical procedure or algorithm. An understanding of a modicum of creativity and of copyright law is also indicated.


The value of the exegesis and interpretation is identified as its final simplicity, clarity, comprehensiveness, and potential practical utility.

The absence of creativity in Feist and the computational process

The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1991 in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co. affirmed originality as a constitutional requirement for copyright. Originality has a specific sense and is constituted by a minimal degree of creativity and independent creation. The not original is the more developed concept within the decision. It includes the absence of a minimal degree of creativity as a major constituent. Different levels of absence of creativity also are distinguished, from the extreme absence of creativity to insufficient creativity. There is a gestalt effect of analogy between the delineation of the not original and the concept of computability. More specific correlations can be found within the extreme absence of creativity. "[S]o mechanical" in the decision can be correlated with an automatic mechanical procedure and clauses with a historical resonance with understandings of computability as what would naturally be regarded as computable. The routine within the extreme absence of creativity can be regarded as the product of a computational process. The concern of this article is with rigorously establishing an understanding of the extreme absence of creativity, primarily through the correlations with aspects of computability. The understanding established is consistent with the other elements of the not original. It also revealed as testable under real-world conditions. The possibilities for understanding insufficient creativity, a minimal degree of creativity, and originality, from the understanding developed of the extreme absence of creativity, are indicated.