Individual and couple decision behavior under risk: evidence on the dynamics of power balance

This article reports results of an experiment designed to analyze the link between risky decisions made by couples and risky decisions made separately by each spouse. We estimate both the spouses and the couples' degrees of risk aversion, we assess how the risk preferences of the two spouses aggregate when they make risky decisions, and we shed light on the dynamics of the decision process that takes place when couples make risky decisions. We find that, far from being fixed, the balance of power within the household is malleable. In most couples, men have, initially, more decision-making power than women but women who ultimately implement the joint decisions gain more and more power over the course of decision making.

Risk-aware Planning in BDI Agents

The ability of an autonomous agent to select rational actions is vital in enabling it to achieve its goals. To do so effectively in a high-stakes setting, the agent must be capable of considering the risk and potential reward of both immediate and future actions. In this paper we provide a novel method for calculating risk alongside utility in online planning algorithms. We integrate such a risk-aware planner with a BDI agent, allowing us to build agents that can set their risk aversion levels dynamically based on their changing beliefs about the environment. To guide the design of a risk-aware agent we propose a number of principles which such an agent should adhere to and show how our proposed framework satisfies these principles. Finally, we evaluate our approach and demonstrate that a dynamically risk-averse agent is capable of achieving a higher success rate than an agent that ignores risk, while obtaining a higher utility than an agent with a static risk attitude.

Uncertainty, learning and growth

The paper extends Blackburn and Galindev's (Economics Letters, Vol. 79 (2003), pp. 417-421) stochastic growth model in which productivity growth entails both external and internal learning behaviour with a constant relative risk aversion utility function and productivity shocks. Consequently, the relationship between long-term growth and short-term volatility depends not only on the relative importance of each learning mechanism but also on a parameter measuring individuals' attitude towards risk.

The Diffusion of Risks in Public Private Partnership Contracts

Purpose The UK government argues that the benefits of public private partnership (PPP) in delivering public infrastructure stem from: transferring risks to the private sector within a structure in which financiers put their own capital at risk; and, the performance based payment mechanism, reinforced by the due diligence requirements imposed by the lenders financing the projects (HM Treasury, 2010). Prior studies of risk in PPPs have investigated ‘what’ risks are allocated and to ‘whom’, that is to the public or the private sector. The purpose of this study is to examine ‘how’ and ‘why’ PPP risks are diffused by their financiers. Design/methodology/approach This study focuses on the financial structure of PPPs and on their financiers. Empirical evidence comes from interviews conducted with equity and debt financiers. Findings The findings show that the financial structure of the deals generates risk aversion in both debt and equity financiers and that the need to attract affordable finance leads to risk diffusion through a network of companies using various means that include contractual mitigation through insurance, performance support guarantees, interest rate swaps and inflation hedges. Because of the complexity this process generates, both procurers and suppliers need expensive expert advice. The risk aversion and diffusion and the consequent need for advice add cost to the projects impacting on the government’s economic argument for risk transfer. Limitations and implications The empirical work covers the private finance initiative (PFI) type of PPP arrangements and therefore the risk diffusion mechanisms may not be generalisable to other forms of PPP, especially those that do not involve the use of high leverage or private finance. Moreover, the scope of this research is limited to exploring the diffusion of risk in the private sector. Further research is needed on how risk is diffused in other settings and on the value for money implication of risk diffusion in PPP contracts. Originality/value The expectation inherent in PPP is that the private sector will better manage those risks allocated to it and because private capital is at risk, financiers will perform due diligence with the ultimate outcome that only viable projects will proceed. This paper presents empirical evidence that raises questions about these expectations. Key words: public private partnership, risk management, diffusion, private finance initiative, financiers