Regulatory Change and Capital Adjustment of US Credit Unions

We investigate the determinants of US credit union capital-to-assets ratios, before and after the implementation of the current capital adequacy regulatory framework in 2000. Capitalization varies pro-cyclically, and until the financial crisis credit unions classified as adequately capitalized or below followed a faster adjustment path than well capitalized credit unions. This pattern was reversed, however, in the aftermath of the crisis. The introduction of the PCA regulatory regime achieved a reduction in the proportion of credit unions classified as adequately capitalized or below that continued until the onset of the crisis. Since the crisis, the speed of recovery of credit unions in this category following an adverse capitalization shock was sharply reduced.

Restraing Regulatory Capture? Anglo America, Crisis Politics and Trajectories of Change in Global Financial Governance

A growing number of respected commentators now argue that regulatory capture of public agencies and public policy by leading banks was one of the main causal factors behind the financial crisis of 2007–2009, resulting in a permissive regulatory environment. This regulatory environment placed a faith in banks own internal risk models, contributed to pro-cyclical behaviour and turned a blind eye to excessive risk taking. The article argues that a form of ‘multi-level regulatory capture’ characterized the global financial architecture prior to the crisis. Simultaneously, regulatory capture fed off, but also nourished the financial boom, in a fashion that mirrored the life cycle of the boom itself. Minimizing future financial booms and crises will require continuous, conscious and explicit efforts to restrain financial regulatory capture now and into the future. The article assesses the extent to which this has been achieved in current global financial governance reform efforts and highlights some of the persistent difficulties that will continue to hamper efforts to restrain regulatory capture. The evidence concerning the extent to which regulatory capture is being effectively restrained is somewhat mixed, and where it is happening it is largely unintentional and accidental. Recent reforms have overlooked the political causes of the crisis and have failed to focus explicitly or systematically on regulatory capture.

Regulatory regime change in Turkish banks:Reactive or proactive?

This paper examines the positive contributions made toward restructuring the regulatory framework of Turkey's banking and financial sectors prior to and post the 2000–2001 financial crisis. Drawing on a framework initially developed by Onis and Senses, 2007 and Onis and Senses, 2009 and further referred to by Onis, 2009 and Onis, 2010 it argues that financial reforms undertaken by the Turkish government would not have been successful without the strong support of domestic coalitions. While the external pressures put on the Turkish government from the International Monetary Fund, The World Bank and the European Union for financial reforms were necessary to kick start the reforms as a reactive process, these pressures on their own may have served only the interests of financial business elites at the expense of the broader stakeholders. Empirical data for the study was collected from documentary analysis of key financial institutions and interviews with twenty major Turkish regulatory agents and other stakeholders. The paper then discusses how the perceptions of these stakeholders are embodied into, and have influenced, regulatory regime change in Turkey from a reactive state to a more proactive one.

Climate Change, national politics and grassroots action: an introduction

Climate change continues to dominate academic work within green/environmental politics. Indeed, there appears to be almost an inverse relationship between the lack of political leadership on tackling climate change and the growth in ever more sophisticated academic analyses of this complex and multifaceted problem. There is an increasing disjunction between the growth in our knowledge and understanding of the ethical, political, economic, sociological, cultural, and psychological aspects of climate change and the lack of political achievement in putting in place clear and binding targets, an agreed decarbonisation roadmap, and associated regulatory and policy instruments with enforcement. This gap might be taken as evidence that we do not need more reports on climate change. To quote that most unlikely of green politicians, Arnold Schwarzenegger, former Governor of California: ‘The debate is over. We know the science. We see the threat. And we know that the time for action is now’ (California Energy Commission 2007, p. 1). This special issue focuses on a variety of ways in which climate change is conceptualised in normative political and ethical theory, and addressed in policy and regulations.