Autonomy and Control of State Agencies:Comparing States and Agencies

Do public organizations with similar tasks or structures differ across states with respect to their autonomy and control? If so, why? By comparing the autonomy, control and internal management of state agencies, this book shows how New Public Management doctrines actually work in three small European states with different politico-administrative regimes. Using a unique set of similar survey data on 226 state agencies in Norway, Ireland and Flanders, this study explains differences in agency autonomy, control and management by referring to international isomorphic pressures, state-specific politico-administrative regimes and characteristics of agencies. Therefore, organization theory and neo-institutional schools are used to formulate four competing theoretical perspectives and hypotheses are tested through simple and advanced statistical techniques. By comparing practices between states and between types of agencies, this study substantially enhances scientific knowledge about why public organizations are granted autonomy, why they are controlled in specific ways, and how autonomy affects internal management.

The ‘Public Interest’ Agency of International Organizations? The case of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance

This article seeks to outline and explore some of the conditions necessary for International Organizations (IOs) to perform in a public interest fashion through a case study of the Principles of corporate governance formulated by the OECD. Rather than the more commonly documented pathological and dysfunctional behavioural forms of IOs, the case of the Principles, both in their formulation by the OECD, and in their assessment by the World Bank through the ROSC process, represent an episode of IO agency protecting and promoting a wider public interest. In exercising their agency, IO staff, have made the Principles more agreeable to a wider range of interested parties, giving them a general interest orientation, in accordance with a proceduralist definition of public interest. This case should therefore encourage IPE scholars to consider carefully and systematically the sets of circumstances and conditions, which might be required for IO agency to take more socially useful forms. In the final section, three indicators are identified which might be evaluated in future research into the positive public interest agency of IOs across a range of cases.