Hybrid cluster state proposal for a quantum game

We propose an experimental implementation of a quantum game algorithm in a hybrid scheme combining the quantum circuit approach and the cluster state model. An economical cluster configuration is suggested to embody a quantum version of the Prisoners' Dilemma. Our proposal is shown to be within the experimental state of the art and can be realized with existing technology. The effects of relevant experimental imperfections are also carefully examined.

Reflecting the Public Value of Sport: A game of two halves

This article draws on qualitative research that explores the concept of public value in the delivery of sport services by the organization Sport England. The research took place against a backdrop of shifting priorities following the award of the 2012 Olympic Games to London. It highlights the difficulties that exist in measuring the qualitative nature of the public value of sport and suggests there is a need to understand better the idea. Research with organizations involved alongside Sport England in the delivery of sport is described. This explores the potential to create a public value vision, how to measure it and how to focus public value on delivery beyond the aim of ‘sport for sports sake’ and more towards ‘sport for the greater good’. The article argues that this represents a game of ‘two halves’ in which the first half focuses on 2012 with the second half concerned with its legacy.

A simple game-theoretic analysis of peering and transit contracting among Internet service providers

The paper presents a simple game-theoretic model of two Internet service providers (ISPs), drawn from a larger set consisting of Tiers-1 and -2 ISPs, who choose between peering and transit agreements. The study focuses on the costs of interconnection taking into account traffic imbalances. The analysis suggests that if the traffic flows and the costs of interconnection are fairly shared, the provider's peer, otherwise they choose transit. Moreover, the joint profits are maximized under the transit arrangement. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game

In the Crawford-Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a simple mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of N possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the mediator suggests one of N actions to the uninformed decision-maker according to the probability distribution of the device. We show that such a simple mediated equilibrium cannot improve upon the unmediated N-partition Crawford-Sobel equilibrium when the preference divergence parameter (bias) is small.