The Private Finance Initiative: An Evolving Research Agenda

This article considers the development of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and contends that it is now deeply embedded and intertwined in policies to renew and modernize the United Kingdom's public services. After briefly reviewing prior research based upon the themes proposed by Broadbent and Laughlin (1999), this article suggests a new research agenda to reflect how the PFI has matured and developed in recent years.

Accountability and Value for Money in Private Finance Initiative Contracts

Within the context of New Public Management (NPM), successive UK governments have claimed that PFI projects provide more accountability, and arguably, more value for money (VFM) than conventional procurement for the public (HM Treasury 1995, 2000, 2003a and 2003b). However, recent empirical research in the UK on PFI has indicated its potential limitations for accountability and VFM (Broadbent, Gill and Laughlin, 2004; Edwards, Shaoul, Stafford and Arblaster, 2004; Shaoul, 2005; and Ismail and Pendlebury, 2006) albeit these are based on either published accounts or a limited number of key stakeholders. This paper attempts to partially redress this gap in the literature by presenting an interesting case of the impact of PFI on accountability and VFM in Northern Ireland's education sector. The findings of this research, based on forty two interviews with a wide range of key stakeholders, suggest that stakeholders have different and often conflicting expectations and the actual PFI accountability and VFM benefits are much more obfuscated than those claimed in Government publications.

Accountability and Value for Money: A Framework for Exploring the Relationship in Private Finance Initiative Contracts

There is an implicit assumption in the UK Treasury’s publications on public-private partnerships (PPP) – also more commonly known in the United Kingdom as private finance initiative (PFI) - that accountability and value for money (VFM) are related concepts. While recent academic studies on PPP/PFI (from now on as PFI) have focused on VFM, there is a notable absence of studies exploring the ‘presumed’ relationships between accountability and VFM. Drawing on Dubnick’s (Dubnick and Romzek, 1991, 1993; Dubnick, 1996, 1998, 2003, 2005; Dubnick and Justice, 2002) framework for accountability and PFI literature, we develop a research framework for exploring potential relationships between accountability and VFM in PFI projects by proposing alternative accountability cultures, processes and mechanisms for PFI. The PFI accountability model is then exposed to four criteria - warrantability, tractability, measurability and feasibility. Our preliminary interviews provide us guidance in identifying some of the cultures, processes and mechanisms indicated in our model which should enable future researchers to test not only the UK Government’s claimed relationships between accountability and VFM using more specific PFI empirical data, but also a potential relationship between accountability and performance in general.

Risk in Private Finance Initiative Projects::A Public Sector Perspective

The management of public sector risk is increasingly seen as a priority area of UK government policy. This has been highlighted recently by the Prime Minister Gordon Brown who stated that “the issue of public risk is one of the most challenging areas of policy-making for any government” (Strategic Risk, 2008). In response to these challenges, the UK Prime Minister has appointed a new body - the Risk and Regulation Advisory Council (RRAC) which is tasked with improving the way risk to the public is understood and managed. One area of particular concern with regard to the governance of public sector risks involves projects procured via the Private Finance Initiative (PFI). These projects involve long-term contracts, complex multi-party interactions and thus create various risks to public sector clients. Today, most PFI actors acknowledge the potentially adverse effects of these risks and make an effort to prevent or mitigate undesirable results. As a consequence, issues of risk allocation, risk transfer and risk management have become central to the PFI procurement process. This paper provides an overview of the risk categories and risk types which are relevant to the public sector in PFI projects. It analyses risk as a feature of uncertain future project-related events and examines potential pitfalls which can be associated with PFI risk management on the basis of a case study of a high-profile PFI hospital in Scotland. The paper concludes that, despite the trend towards diminished risk profiles during the operational phase, the public sector continues to be exposed to significant risks when engaging in PFI-based procurement.

The role of the National Audit Office in Private Finance Initiative endurance

The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) has become one of the UK’s most contentious public policies. Despite New Labour’s advocacy of PFI as a means of achieving better value for money, criticisms of PFI have centred on key issues such as a lack of cost effectiveness, exaggerated pricing of risk transfers, excessive private sector profits, inflexibility and cumbersome administrative arrangements. Nevertheless, PFI has persisted as a key
infrastructure procurement method in the UK and has been supported as such by successive governments, as well as influencing policy in the Republic of Ireland and other European Nations. This paper explores this paradoxical outcome in relation to the role played in the UK by the National Audit Office (NAO). Under pressure to justify its support for PFI, the Blair government sought support for its policies by encouraging the NAO to investigate issues relating to PFI as well as specific PFI projects. It would have been expected that in fulfilling its role as independent auditor, the NAO would have examined whether PFI projects could have been delivered more efficiently, effectively or economically through other means. Yet, in line with earlier research, we find evidence that the NAO failed to comprehensively assess
key issues such as the value for money of PFI projects, and in so doing effectively acted as a legitimator of PFI policy. Using concepts relating to legitimacy theory and the idea of framing, our paper looks into 67 NAO private finance reports published between 1997 and 2011, with the goal of identifying the preferences, values and ideology underpinning the
NAO’s view on PFI during this period. Our analysis suggests that the NAO sought to legitimise existing PFI practices via a selective framing of problems and questions. Utilising a longitudinal approach, our analysis further suggests that this patterns of selective framing persisted over an extended time period during which fundamental parameters of the policy (such as contract length, to name one of the most important issues) were rarely addressed.
Overall the NAO’ supportive stance toward PFI seems to have relied on 1) a focused on positive aspects of PFI, such as on time delivery or lessons learned, and 2) positive comments on aspects of PFI that were criticised elsewhere, such as the lack of flexibility of underlying contractual arrangements. Our paper highlights the possibility that, rather than providing for a critical assessment of existing policies, national auditing bodies can
contribute to the creation of legitimatory environments. In terms of accounting research we would suggests that the objectivity and independence of accounting watchdogs should not be taken for granted, and that instead a critical investigation of the biases which can characterise these bodies can contribute to a deeper understanding of the nature of lobbying networks in the modern state.

Does the UK Local Finance Improvement Trust (Lift) Initiative Improve Risk Management in Public-Private Procurement?

The UK government introduced the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and, latterly, the Local Improvement Finance Trust (LIFT) in an attempt to improve public service provision. As a variant of PFI, LIFT seeks to create a framework for the effective provision of primary care facilities. Like conventional PFI procurement, LIFT projects involve long-term contracts, complex multi-party interactions and thus create various risks to public sector clients. This paper investigates the advantages and disadvantages of LIFT with a focus on how this approach facilitates or impedes risk management from the public sector client perspective. Our paper concludes that LIFT has a potential for creating additional problems, including the further reduction of public sector control, conflicts of interest, the inappropriate use of enabling funds, and higher than market rental costs affecting the uptake of space in the buildings by local health care providers. However, there is also evidence that LIFT has facilitated new investment and that Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) have themselves started addressing some of the weaknesses of this procurement format through the bundling of projects and other forms of regional co-operation.

The Diffusion of Risks in Public Private Partnership Contracts

Purpose The UK government argues that the benefits of public private partnership (PPP) in delivering public infrastructure stem from: transferring risks to the private sector within a structure in which financiers put their own capital at risk; and, the performance based payment mechanism, reinforced by the due diligence requirements imposed by the lenders financing the projects (HM Treasury, 2010). Prior studies of risk in PPPs have investigated ‘what’ risks are allocated and to ‘whom’, that is to the public or the private sector. The purpose of this study is to examine ‘how’ and ‘why’ PPP risks are diffused by their financiers. Design/methodology/approach This study focuses on the financial structure of PPPs and on their financiers. Empirical evidence comes from interviews conducted with equity and debt financiers. Findings The findings show that the financial structure of the deals generates risk aversion in both debt and equity financiers and that the need to attract affordable finance leads to risk diffusion through a network of companies using various means that include contractual mitigation through insurance, performance support guarantees, interest rate swaps and inflation hedges. Because of the complexity this process generates, both procurers and suppliers need expensive expert advice. The risk aversion and diffusion and the consequent need for advice add cost to the projects impacting on the government’s economic argument for risk transfer. Limitations and implications The empirical work covers the private finance initiative (PFI) type of PPP arrangements and therefore the risk diffusion mechanisms may not be generalisable to other forms of PPP, especially those that do not involve the use of high leverage or private finance. Moreover, the scope of this research is limited to exploring the diffusion of risk in the private sector. Further research is needed on how risk is diffused in other settings and on the value for money implication of risk diffusion in PPP contracts. Originality/value The expectation inherent in PPP is that the private sector will better manage those risks allocated to it and because private capital is at risk, financiers will perform due diligence with the ultimate outcome that only viable projects will proceed. This paper presents empirical evidence that raises questions about these expectations. Key words: public private partnership, risk management, diffusion, private finance initiative, financiers

UK Public Private Partnerships and the Credit Crunch: A Case of Risk Contagion?

During the past twenty years, the UK has relied heavily on Public Private Partnerships (PPP) and especially the Private Finance Initiative in the procurement of infrastructure and services. Discussing the causes of the credit crunch and its effects on PPP, this paper notes that the provision of new public sector infrastructure and related services has been adversely affected by the impact of the credit crunch on Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs). These problems have arisen primarily from the unwillingness of commercial banks to replace collapsed PFI bond financing unless new PFI contracts reduce financial risks; which, in turn, is likely to increase the cost of these projects to the public sector. Additional financial strains have arisen for the UK government from the need to bail out collapsed PFI projects. Overall we find evidence that the UK commitment to PFI has not only increased immediate fiscal pressures on the UK when these have become least palatable, but has also created fiscal vulnerabilities at local and national levels which are likely to hamper the country’s ability to launch counter-cyclical responses to the ongoing crisis.

Perspectives on the Future of Public Private Partnership in the UK

During the past two decades the UK has played a leading position in the development and application of Public Private Partnership (PPP) based infrastructure procurement through its Private Finance Initiative model. This model had been developed during the last years of the Major Government and expanded during the early years of the Blair Government. The banking and economic crisis of 2007-09 has created major challenges to the use of PPP in the UK, making the sustainability of past levels of PPP investment and the future direction of PPP based infrastructure procurement in that country uncertain. This chapter summarises key developments in UK PPP up to the crisis; reviews the economic issues that have led up to the crisis; discusses the immediate impact of the crisis on the UK PFI and PPP market together with the transition arrangements that were put into to place by the Brown government; and, lastly, looks at recent initiatives taken by Cameron’s Conservative-Liberal Coalition Government under the designation of Private Finance 2 (PF2).

Education, Education, Education: the Third Way and PFI

In 1997, New Labour set about the task of reforming public services in the United Kingdom through the use of an ideology that became known as the ‘Third Way’. This research examines the context from which this concept emerged, and explores its relationship with the tools of delivery, with particular reference to the Private Finance Initiative (PFI). The paper begins by reviewing the Third Way, before analysing the arguments for and against PFI. Using an example from the Northern Ireland education sector, the paper argues that the characteristics associated with the Third Way are mirrored in the operational tools of public service delivery, such as PFI. The paper concludes that, within the context of the case study reviewed, there is a ‘consistent pragmatism’ in play in relation to how these delivery initiatives are operated and how they relate to their conceptual underpinnings.

Costs, outputs and outcomes in school PFI contracts and the significance of project size

This article examines operational Private Finance Initiative (PFI) school projects and reports the experiences of UK headteachers. It considers the impact of project size on value for money (VFM). Headteachers involved in small projects are more satisfied with costs than those involved in large projects, but headteachers involved in larger projects are more satisfied with affordability. Generally, heads are more satisfied with the buildings than with the services. The authors question the government’s recent policy changes to increase the size of PFI projects.

Crucial silences: When Accountability Met PFI and Finance Capital

During recent years, a wide spectrum of research has questioned whether public services/infrastructure procurement through private finance, as exemplified by the UK Private Finance Initiative (PFI), meets minimum standards of democratic accountability. While broadly agreeing with some of these arguments, this paper suggests that this debate is flawed on two grounds. Firstly, PFI is not about effective procurement, or even about a pragmatic choice of procurement mechanisms which can potentially compromise public involvement and input; rather it is about a process where the state creates new profit opportunities at a time when the international financial system is increasingly lacking in safe investment opportunities. Secondly, because of its primary function as investment opportunity, PFI, by its very nature, prioritises the risk-return criteria of private finance over the needs of the public sector client and its stakeholders. Using two case studies of recent PFI projects, the paper illustrates some of the mechanisms through which finance capital exercises control over the PFI procurement process. The paper concludes that recent proposals aimed at “reforming” or “democratising” PFI fail to recognise the objective constraints which this type of state-finance capital nexus imposes on political process.

Accounting, Regulation and Profitability: The Case of PFI Hospital Refinancing

The refinancing of PFI (Private Finance Initiative) projects represents one of the most contentious aspects of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in the UK. The negative publicity associated with UK PFI refinancing deals is associated with several factors, including, evidence of massive private sector profit making, the failure of private sector financiers to share refinancing profits and, lastly, private sector frustration of adequate regulatory intervention in this area. Utilising a dynamic model of capital market and state interaction, this paper explains these outcomes as a function of effective private sector lobbying of bureaucratic state agencies to alter the structure of accounting, accountability and regulation with the goal of securing favourable profit and risk outcomes. These dynamics are illustrated with reference to the history of UK PFI refinancing and a case study of one of the projects where these gains reached extreme levels.