Putting a Price on Prisoner Release: The History of Bail and the Future of Parole

In this article, we argue that the history of bail foretells the future of parole. Under a plancalled the Conditional Post-Conviction Release Bond Act (recently passed into law inthree states), US prisoners can secure early release only after posting ‘post-convictionbail’. As with pre-trial bail, the fledgling model would require prisoners to pay a percent-age of the bail amount to secure their release under the contractual responsibility of acommercial bail agency. If release conditions are breached, bounty hunters are legallyempowered to seize and return the parolee to prison. Our inquiry outlines the origins of this post-conviction bond plan and the research upon which it is based. Drawing on the‘new penology’ framework, we identify several underlying factors that make for a ripeadvocacy environment and set the stage for widespread state-level adoption of this planin the near future. Post-conviction bail fits squarely within the growing policy trendstoward privatization, managerialism, and actuarial justice. Most importantly, though,advocates have the benefit of precedent on their side, as most US states have longrelied on a system of commercial bail bonding and private bounty hunting to manageconditional pretrial release.

Reconceptualising Penality: A comparative perspective on punitiveness in Ireland, Scotland and New Zealand

Drastic increases in the use of imprisonment; the introduction of ‘three strikes’ laws and mandatory sentences; restrictions on parole - all of these developments appear to signify a new, harsher era or ‘punitive turn’. Yet these features of criminal justice are not universally present in all Western countries. Drawing on empirical data, Hamilton examines the prevalence of harsher penal policies in Ireland, Scotland and New Zealand, thereby demonstrating the utility of viewing criminal justice from the perspective of smaller jurisdictions.

This highly innovative book is thoroughly critical of the way in which punitiveness is currently measured by leading criminologists. It is essential reading for students and scholars of criminology, penology, criminal justice and socio-legal studies, as well as criminal lawyers and practitioners.

How Does Justice Sound? Enunciative Modalities, Law’s Logos and Woman’s Voice

In the throes of her mimetic exposure of the lie of phallocratic discursive unity in 'Speculum of the Other Woman', Irigaray paused on the impossibility of woman’s voice and remarked that ‘it [was] still better to speak only in riddles, allusions, hints, parables.’ Even if asked to clarify a few points. Even if people plead that they just don’t understand. After all, she said, ‘they never have understood.’ (Irigaray 1985, 143).

That the law has never understood a uniquely feminine narrative is hardly controversial, but that this erasure continues to have real and substantive consequences for justice is a reality that feminists have been compelled to remain vigilant in exposing. How does the authority of the word compound law’s exclusionary matrix? How does law remain impervious to woman’s voice and how might it hear woman’s voice? Is there capacity for a dialogic engagement between woman, parler femme, and law?

This paper will explore these questions with particular reference to the experience of women testifying to trauma during the rape trial. It will argue that a logically linked historical genealogy can be traced through which law has come to posit itself as an originary discourse by which thinking is very much conflated with being, or in other terms, law is conflated with justice. This has consequences both for women’s capacity to speak or represent the harm of rape to law, but also for law’s ability to ‘hear’ woman’s voice and objectively adjudicate in cases of rape. It will suggest that justice requires law acknowledge the presence of two distinct and different subjects and that this must be done not only at the symbolic level but also at the level of the parole, syntax and discourse.

Inhuman and Degrading Punishment, Dignity, and the Limits of Retribution

The recent judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Vinter and others v United Kingdom provides a much needed clarification of the parameters of the prohibition on inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as it applies to whole life orders of imprisonment under mandatory life sentences – essentially, life imprisonment without parole. The Grand Chamber’s judgment refines Strasbourg doctrine on life imprisonment and the prospect of release and illuminates key principles concerning inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the ECHR. This article considers the judgment’s profound significance in relation to both human rights and penology.