Stressed Web Environments as Strategic Games: Risk Profiles and Weltanschauung

We consider the behaviour of a set of services in a stressed web environment where performance patterns may be difficult to predict. In stressed environments the performances of some providers may degrade while the performances of others, with elastic resources, may improve. The allocation of web-based providers to users (brokering) is modelled by a strategic non-cooperative angel-daemon game with risk profiles. A risk profile specifies a bound on the number of unreliable service providers within an environment without identifying the names of these providers. Risk profiles offer a means of analysing the behaviour of broker agents which allocate service providers to users. A Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of such a game in which no user can locally improve their choice of provider – thus, a Nash equilibrium is a viable solution to the provider/user allocation problem. Angel daemon games provide a means of reasoning about stressed environments and offer the possibility of designing brokers using risk profiles and Nash equilibria.

Cooperative transmission protocol with full diversity and iterative detection

The authors propose a three-node full diversity cooperative protocol, which allows the retransmission of all symbols. By allowing multiple nodes to transmit simultaneously, relaying transmission only consumes limited bandwidth resource. To facilitate the performance analysis of the proposed cooperative protocol, the lower and upper bounds of the outage probability are first developed, and then the high signal-to-noise ratio behaviour is studied. Our analytical results show that the proposed strategy can achieve full diversity. To achieve the performance gain promised by the cooperative diversity, at the relays decode-and-forward strategy is adopted and an iterative soft-interference-cancellation minimum mean-squared error equaliser is developed. The simulation results compare the bit-error-rate performance of the proposed protocol with the non-cooperative scheme and the scheme presented by Azarian et al. ( 2005).

A solution concept for network games: The role of multilateral interactions

We propose an allocation rule that takes into account the importance of both players and their links and characterize it for a fixed network. Our characterization is along the lines of the characterization of the Position value for Network games by van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012). The allocation rule so defined admits multilateral interactions among the players through their links which distinguishes it from the other existing rules. Next, we extend our allocation rule to flexible networks à la Jackson (2005).

Network formation under mutual consent and costly communication

We consider two different approaches to describe the formation of social networks under mutual consent and costly communication. First, we consider a network-based approach; in particular Jackson–Wolinsky’s concept of pairwise stability. Next, we discuss a non-cooperative game-theoretic approach, through a refinement of the Nash equilibria of Myerson’s consent game. This refinement, denoted as monadic stability, describes myopically forward looking behavior of the players. We show through an equivalence that the class of monadically stable networks is a strict subset of the class of pairwise stable networks that can be characterized fully by modifications of the properties defining pairwise stability.

Strategic behavior under partial cooperation

We investigate how a group of players might cooperate with each other within the setting of a non-cooperative game. We pursue two notions of partial cooperative equilibria that follow a modification of Nash's best response rationality rather than a core-like approach. Partial cooperative Nash equilibrium treats non-cooperative players and the coalition of cooperators symmetrically, while the notion of partial cooperative leadership equilibrium assumes that the group of cooperators has a first-mover advantage. We prove existence theorems for both types of equilibria. We look at three well-known applications under partial cooperation. In a game of voluntary provision of a public good we show that our two new equilibrium notions of partial cooperation coincide. In a modified Cournot oligopoly, we identify multiple equilibria of each type and show that a non-cooperator may have a higher payoff than a cooperator. In contrast, under partial cooperation in a symmetric Salop City game, a cooperator enjoys a higher return.

Identity and Link Reliability in Social Networks

This paper considers a non-cooperative network formation game where identity is introduced as a single dimension to capture the characteristics of a player in the network. Players access to the benefits from the link through direct and indirect connections. We consider cases where cost of link formation paid by the initiator. Each player is allowed to choose their commitment level to their identities. The cost of link formation decreases as the players forming the link share the same identity and higher commitment levels. We then introduce link imperfections to the model. We characterize the Nash networks and we find that the set of Nash networks are either singletons with no links formed or separated blocks or components with mixed blocks or connected.

Latent and Explicit Authority in Hierarchical Organizations

We consider the problem of the exercise of authority within social production organizations, embedding the decision makers into a structure of formal authority relationships. We distinguish two types of behavior. First, we introduce an equilibrium notion implementing latent authority under which subordinates submit themselves to authority even though such authority is not en- forced explicitly. Second, we compare this with a non-cooperative equilibrium concept describing explicit exercise of authority. We show that for low enough enforcement costs both forms of authority will be exercised in equilibrium, but for higher enforcement costs latent authority will be exercised while explicit authority will not.

Partial Cooperation in Strategic Decision Situations

We consider a normal form game in which there is a single exogenously given coalition of cooperating players that can write a binding agreement on pre-selected actions. These collective actions typically represent a certain number of dimensions in the players’ strategy space. The actions represented by the other dimensions of the strategy space remain under the complete, individual control of the players.
We consider a standard extension of the Nash equilibrium concept denoted as a partial cooperative equilibrium as well as an equilibrium concept in which the coalition of cooperators has a leadership position. Existence results are developed for these new equilibrium concepts. We identify conditions on these partial cooperative games under which the various equilibrium concepts are equivalent.
We apply this game theoretic framework to existing models of multi-market oligopolies and international pollution abatement. In a multi-market oligopoly typically a merger paradox emerges in the partial cooperative equilibrium, which vanishes if the cartel of collaborators exploits its leadership position. Our application to international pollution abatement treaties shows that cooperation by a sufficiently large group of countries results in a Pareto improvement over the standard tragedy of the commons outcome described by the Nash equilibrium.

Network Connectivity under Node Failure

We examine a non-cooperative model of network formation where players may stop functioning with a given probability. When this happens all the links associated with this player are no longer available in the network. In the model, players receive benefits from connecting directly and indirectly to other agents in the network through costly links. We identify conditions under which a Nash network will remain connected after the loss of k nodes by introducing the notion of k-Node Super Connectivity network. We identify similar conditions for efficient networks as well.

Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization

We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for which partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria exist in supermodular games. Finally, we provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful.

Cooperative bank efficiency in Japan: a parametric distance function analysis

This study examines the relative performance of Japanese cooperative banks between 1998 and 2009, explicitly modeling non-performing loans as an undesirable output. Three key findings emerge. First, the sector is characterized by increasing returns to scale which supports the ongoing amalgamation process within the sector. Second, although restricted in product offerings, markets and their membership base, Japanese cooperatives secured both technical progress (a positive shift in the frontier) and a decrease in technical inefficiency (distance from the frontier). Third, the analysis highlighted that regulatory pressure to reduce non-performing loans will have an adverse impact on both output and performance. 

Examining the Neurocognitive Validity of Commercially Available, Smartphone-Based Puzzle Games

Cognitive assessment typically involves assessing a person’s cognitive performance in unfamiliar and ar-guably unnatural clinical surroundings. User-centred approaches to assessment and monitoring, driven by issues such as enjoyability and familiarity, are largely absent. Everyday technologies, for example, smartphones represent an opportunity to obtain an objective assessment of a person’s cognitive capabili-ties in a non-threatening, discreet and familiar way, e.g. by everyday puzzle games undertaken as a leisure activity at home. We examined the strength of relationships that exist between performance on common puzzle games and standard measures of neuropsychological performance. Twenty-nine participants, aged 50 - 65 years, completed a comprehensive neuropsychological test battery and played three smart-phone-based puzzle games in triplicate: a picture puzzle [Matches Plus], a word puzzle [Jumbline] and a number puzzle [Sudoku]. As anticipated, a priori, significant correlations were observed between scores on a picture puzzle and visual memory test (r = 0.49; p = 0.007); a word puzzle and estimated verbal IQ (r = 0.53; p = 0.003) and verbal learning (r = 0.30; p = 0.039) tests; and a number puzzle and reason-ing/problem solving test (r = 0.42; p = 0.023). Further analyses making allowance for multiple compari-sons identified a significant unanticipated correlation (r = 0.49; p = 0.007) between number puzzle scores and a measure of nonverbal working memory. Performance on these smartphone-based games was in-dicative of relative cognitive ability across several cognitive domains at a fixed time point. Smart-phone-based, everyday puzzle games may offer a valid, portable measure of assessing and monitoring cognition in older adults.

Security Enhancement of Cooperative Single Carrier Systems

In this paper, the impact of multiple active eavesdroppers on cooperative single carrier systems with multiple relays and multiple destinations is examined. To achieve the secrecy diversity gains in the form of opportunistic selection, a two-stage scheme is proposed for joint relay and destination selection, in which, after the selection of the relay with the minimum effective maximum signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) to a cluster of eavesdroppers, the destination that has the maximum SNR from the chosen relay is selected. In order to accurately assess the secrecy performance, the exact and asymptotic expressions are obtained in closed-form for several security metrics including the secrecy outage probability, the probability of non-zero secrecy rate, and the ergodic secrecy rate in frequency selective fading. Based on the asymptotic analysis, key design parameters such as secrecy diversity gain, secrecy array gain, secrecy multiplexing gain, and power cost are characterized, from which new insights are drawn. Moreover, it is concluded that secrecy performance limits occur when the average received power at the eavesdropper is proportional to the counterpart at the destination. Specifically, for the secrecy outage probability, it is confirmed that the secrecy diversity gain collapses to zero with outage floor, whereas for the ergodic secrecy rate, it is confirmed confirm that its slope collapses to zero with capacity ceiling.

Outage performance of cognitive cooperative networks with relay selection over double-Rayleigh fading channels

This study considers a dual-hop cognitive inter-vehicular relay-assisted communication system where all
communication links are non-line of sight ones and their fading is modelled by the double Rayleigh fading distribution.
Road-side relays (or access points) implementing the decode-and-forward relaying protocol are employed and one of
them is selected according to a predetermined policy to enable communication between vehicles. The performance of
the considered cognitive cooperative system is investigated for Kth best partial and full relay selection (RS) as well as
for two distinct fading scenarios. In the first scenario, all channels are double Rayleigh distributed. In the second
scenario, only the secondary source to relay and relay to destination channels are considered to be subject to double
Rayleigh fading whereas, channels between the secondary transmitters and the primary user are modelled by the
Rayleigh distribution. Exact and approximate expressions for the outage probability performance for all considered RS
policies and fading scenarios are presented. In addition to the analytical results, complementary computer simulated
performance evaluation results have been obtained by means of Monte Carlo simulations. The perfect match between
these two sets of results has verified the accuracy of the proposed mathematical analysis.