Optimal Front Page Advertising

We consider a model of an on-line software market, where an intermediary distributes products from sellers to buyers. When products of sellers are vertically differentiated, an intermediary, earning a proportion of sales, has an incentive to hide the worse product on the second page, and only keep the better product on the front page: that weakens the competition, allowing the seller with the better product to charge a higher price. With heterogeneous visiting costs to the second page, the platform's revenue might improve, but the outcome will become socially suboptimal.

On the waterfront: neoliberal urbanism and the politics of public benefit

Dear Philip,

Thank you for adding your record to Pure. We notice that as of yet you have not uploaded your accepted manuscript for this publication.

As you may be aware HEFCE require that the accepted manuscripts of all journal articles and conference proceedings with an ISSN accepted from the 1st April 2016 are uploaded to Pure within 3 months of early online publication to ensure eligibility for the post 2014 REF.

The accepted manuscript is the final accepted version after changes from peer review have been incorporated. It is usually a Word or plain text file without publisher logos and prior to copy-editing and typesetting applied by the publisher.

If you have this version, I would be grateful if you could upload it to the record, selecting "Accepted author manuscript (post print)" from the document version drop down menu. If you have not done so already, please add your date of acceptance. Library staff will apply a copyright statement and any embargo required by the publisher.

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Kind regards,


Mark

Open Access Team