The Engine of Thought Is a Hybrid: Roles of Associative and Structured Knowledge in Reasoning

Across a range of domains in psychology different theories assume different mental representations of knowledge. For example, in the literature on category-based inductive reasoning, certain theories (e.g., Rogers & McClelland, 2004; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2008) assume that the knowledge upon which inductive inferences are based is associative, whereas others (e.g., Heit & Rubinstein, 1994; Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009; Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, López, & Shafir, 1990) assume that knowledge is structured. In this article we investigate whether associative and structured knowledge underlie inductive reasoning to different degrees under different processing conditions. We develop a measure of knowledge about the degree of association between categories and show that it dissociates from measures of structured knowledge. In Experiment 1 participants rated the strength of inductive arguments whose categories were either taxonomically or causally related. A measure of associative strength predicted reasoning when people had to respond fast, whereas causal and taxonomic knowledge explained inference strength when people responded slowly. In Experiment 2, we also manipulated whether the causal link between the categories was predictive or diagnostic. Participants preferred predictive to diagnostic arguments except when they responded under cognitive load. In Experiment 3, using an open-ended induction paradigm, people generated and evaluated their own conclusion categories. Inductive strength was predicted by associative strength under heavy cognitive load, whereas an index of structured knowledge was more predictive of inductive strength under minimal cognitive load. Together these results suggest that associative and structured models of reasoning apply best under different processing conditions and that the application of structured knowledge in reasoning is often effortful.

Comparisons, mental models, and the action effect in judgments of regret

People tend to attribute more regret to a character who has decided to take action and experienced a negative outcome than to one who has decided not to act and experienced a negative outcome. For some decisions, however, this finding is not observed in a between-participants design and thus appears to rely on comparisons between people's representations of action and their representations of inaction. In this article, we outline a mental models account that explains findings from studies that have used within- and between-participants designs, and we suggest that, for decisions with uncertain counterfactual outcomes, information about the consequences of a decision to act causes people to flesh out their representation of the counterfactual states of affairs for inaction. In three experiments, we confirm our predictions about participants' fleshing out of representations, demonstrating that an action effect occurs only when information about the consequences of action is available to participants as they rate the nonactor and when this information about action is informative with respect to judgments about inaction. It is important to note that the action effect always occurs when the decision scenario specifies certain counterfactual outcomes. These results suggest that people sometimes base their attributions of regret on comparisons among different sets of mental models.

Is low self-esteem an inevitable consequence of stigma? An example from women with chronic mental health problems

It is often assumed that membership in a stigmatized group has negative consequences for the self-concept. However, this relationship is neither straightforward nor inevitable, and there is evidence suggesting that negative consequences may not necessarily occur (Psychol. Rev. 96(4) (1989) 608). This paper argues that the relationship has not been sufficiently theorized, and that a more detailed analysis is called for in order to understand the relationship between stigma and the self. The paper presents a critical examination of modified labeling theory (Am. Sociol. Rev. 52 (1987) 96), with examples from a study examining perceptions of stigma and their relationship to self-evaluation in women with chronic mental health problems. Open-ended interviews and qualitative analyses were used in preference to global measures of self-esteem. It was found that although the women were aware of society's unfavorable representations of mental illness, and the effects this had on their lives, they did not accept these representations as valid and therefore rejected them as applicable to the self. The participants did not deny their mental health problems, but their acceptance of labels was critical and pragmatic. Labels were rejected when they were perceived as carrying an unrealistic and negative stereotype, or when the women felt that their symptoms did not fit with the diagnostic criteria. The research illustrates the importance of considering people's subjective understandings of stigmatized conditions and societal reactions in order to understand the relation between stigma and the self. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Removing children from the care of adults with diagnosed mental illnesses - a clash of human rights?

Health and social services providers throughout Europe are increasingly aware of the possibility of litigation from service users arising from the application of a human rights perspective to public service provision. The substantial body of case law that has emerged from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is used regularly as the basis for this litigation at national and European levels. This paper presents an analysis of ECHR cases related to breaches of human rights that occurred when children were taken into care from families in which one or both parents had a diagnosed mental illness. The issues raised by these cases include the following: how to ensure that the right to family life is protected for adults with mental illnesses; how to ensure access and opportunities for parents to continue bonding with children in care; and how to avoid damaging children while giving time for a proper assessment of the care situation.