Varieties of Economic Crisis, Varieties of Ideational Change: How and Why Macroeconomic Policy and Financial Regulation Differ

One of the principal tasks facing post-crash academic political economy is to analyse patterns of ideational change and the conditions that produce such change. What has been missing from the existing literature on ideational change at times of crises however, is a sense of how processes of persuasive struggle, and how the success of those ‘norm entrepreneurs’ arguing for ideational change is shaped by two contextual variables: the most immediate material symptoms and problems that a crisis displays (the variety of crisis); and the institutional character of the policy subsystem that agents have to operate within to affect change. Introducing these two variables into our accounts of persuasive struggle and ideational change enables us to deepen our understanding of the dynamics of ideational change at times of crisis. The article identifies that a quite rapid and radical intellectual change has been evident in the field of financial regulation in the form of an embrace of a macroprudential frame. In contrast in the field of macroeconomic policy - both monetary and fiscal policy, many pre-crash beliefs remain prominent, there is evidence of ideational stickiness and inertia, and despite some policy experimentation, overarching policy frameworks and their rationales have not been overhauled. The article applies Peter Hall’s framework of three orders of policy changes to help illuminate and explain the variation in patterns of change in the fields of financial regulation and macroeconomic policy since the financial crash of 2008. The different patterns of ideational change in macroeconomic policy and financial regulation in the post-crash period can be explained by timing and variety of crisis; sequencing of policy change; and institutional political differences between micro policy sub systems and macro policy systems.

Crisis Management in the Eastern Mediterranean (Implications for Policymakers)

This article examines Greek-Turkish crisis behaviour in the Eastern Mediterranean over the past two decades. Crises are first defined and classified, after which a number of common misperceptions are then addressed in light of recent experience. Three broad categories of foreign policy crises are analyzed: 1) those involving ethnically related minorities across the border; 2) those with 'alien' minorities within borders; and 3) those with third countries involving territories and resources. The article examines whether crises are simply elite-driven or partly endorsed and motivated by mass publics in both countries, and whether Greek-Turkish crisis behaviour reflects enduring ethnic rivalries, 'genuine' security interests, or domestic political needs and norms. The article draws upon the Greek-Turkish experience of the past two decades to illuminate contemporary dilemmas and issues which policymakers face in this region.