Genocide and the International Court of Justice: Finally, a Duty to Prevent the Crime of Crimes

The International Court of Justice has issued its long-awaited decision in the suit filed by Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbia and Montenegro with respect to the 1992–1995 war. The decision confirms the factual and legal determinations of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ruling that genocide was committed during the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995 but that the conflict as a whole was not genocidal in nature. The Court held that Serbia had failed in its duty to prevent genocide in Srebrenica, although—because, the Court said, there was no certainty that it could have succeeded in preventing the genocide—no damages were awarded. The judgment provides a strong and authoritative statement of the general duty upon states to prevent genocide that dovetails well with the doctrine of the responsibility to protect.

UK Power Sector Challenge to National Allocation Plan Under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme Refused by the European Court of Justice

In Case T-130/06 Drax Power and others v European Commission, the Court of First Instance held that an application by Drax Power and others for annulment of Commission Decision (C(2006)426 final of 22 February 2006 concerning a proposed amendment to the National Allocation Plan notified by the UK in accordance with the EU Emissions Trading Directive was inadmissable. The Court ruled that the applicants could not be considered to be 'directly concerned' by the contested decision within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 of the European Treaty, on legal standing: 'Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision, which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another persion, is of direct and individual concern to the former...'

Recognition and Redistribution in Theories of Justice Beyond the State

We consider here how cultural and socioeconomic dimensions of justice beyond the state are related. First we examine cosmopolitan theories that have drawn on John Rawls's egalitarian liberal framework to argue that a just global order requires substantive, transnational redistribution of material resources. We then assess the view, ironically put forward by Rawls himself, that this perspective is ethnocentric and insufficiently tolerant of non-liberal cultures. We argue that Rawls is right to be concerned about the danger of ethnocentrism, but wrong to assume that this requires us to reject the case for substantive redistribution across state boundaries. A more compelling account of justice beyond the state will integrate effectively socioeconomic and cultural aspects of justice. We suggest that this approach is best grounded in a critical theory of recognition that responds to the damage caused to human relations by legacies of historical injustice.