Luce Irigaray: Back to the Beginning

In 2014 it will be 40 years since Luce Irigaray’s (second) doctoral thesis Speculum de l'autre femme was first published. That book, widely recognized as the most important text in feminist philosophy, was to introduce Irigaray’s critique of western philosophy and psychoanalysis and her ethics of sexual difference for which she was to become so well known. Irigaray, well into her eighties now, has published continuously since Speculum, despite her exclusion from French academic life after her expulsion in 1974 from the Université de Paris VIII Vincennes. That her latest book In the Beginning, She Was, released on the eve of Speculum’s anniversary, is perhaps the most personally revelatory of her works and revisits many of the same themes and issues that concerned her in Speculum cannot be coincidental. In this critical notice we examine Irigaray’s latest offering arguing that her contribution is twofold as she combines with new clarity her longstanding critique of phallocratic culture and her transformative vision of humanity as a culture of sexuate difference. There are a number of important themes addressed in the six chapters of the book, but for the purposes of this discussion our analysis will focus mostly on elaborating her critique of Western culture, on the usefulness of her work for rethinking masculine subject formation and on the figure of Antigone, as a feminine subject on her own terms, as a way of imagining a possible relation between two subjects within a culture of sexuate difference. We argue that this book continues to illustrate Irigaray’s importance as one of the most radical and prophetic philosophers of our time.

Thinking Sexual Difference Through the Law of Rape

2013 marks 10 years since the Sexual Offences Act 2003 was passed. That Act made significant changes to the law of rape which appear now to have made very little difference to reporting, prosecution or conviction rates. This article argues that the Act has failed against its own measures because it remains enmeshed within a conceptual framework of sexual indifference in which woman continues to be constructed as man’s (defective) other. This construction both constricts the frame in which women’s sexuality can be thought and distorts the harm of rape for women. It also continues woman’s historic alienation from her own nature and denies her entitlement to a becoming in line with her own sexuate identity. Using Luce Irigaray’s critical and constructive frameworks, the article seeks to imagine how law might ‘cognize’ sexual difference and thus take the preliminary steps to a juridical environment in which women can more adequately understand and articulate the harm of rape.

How Does Justice Sound? Enunciative Modalities, Law’s Logos and Woman’s Voice

In the throes of her mimetic exposure of the lie of phallocratic discursive unity in 'Speculum of the Other Woman', Irigaray paused on the impossibility of woman’s voice and remarked that ‘it [was] still better to speak only in riddles, allusions, hints, parables.’ Even if asked to clarify a few points. Even if people plead that they just don’t understand. After all, she said, ‘they never have understood.’ (Irigaray 1985, 143).

That the law has never understood a uniquely feminine narrative is hardly controversial, but that this erasure continues to have real and substantive consequences for justice is a reality that feminists have been compelled to remain vigilant in exposing. How does the authority of the word compound law’s exclusionary matrix? How does law remain impervious to woman’s voice and how might it hear woman’s voice? Is there capacity for a dialogic engagement between woman, parler femme, and law?

This paper will explore these questions with particular reference to the experience of women testifying to trauma during the rape trial. It will argue that a logically linked historical genealogy can be traced through which law has come to posit itself as an originary discourse by which thinking is very much conflated with being, or in other terms, law is conflated with justice. This has consequences both for women’s capacity to speak or represent the harm of rape to law, but also for law’s ability to ‘hear’ woman’s voice and objectively adjudicate in cases of rape. It will suggest that justice requires law acknowledge the presence of two distinct and different subjects and that this must be done not only at the symbolic level but also at the level of the parole, syntax and discourse.