Imperfect assessment and limited information preclude optimal strategies in male-male fights in the orb-weaving spider Metellina mengei

Agonistic behaviour between male orb-web spiders Metellina mengei competing for access to female webs was examined in field experiments to test the major predictions of game theory. Winners of fights were significantly larger than losers, particularly with respect to the length of the first pair of legs, which are sexually dimorphic in this species and used extensively in agonistic encounters. The size of the winning male had no influence on contest intensity or duration, and neither did relative size. However, fight intensity and duration were both positively correlated with the size of the losing male. Resident males won significantly more contests than intruders. Winning intruders were significantly larger than winning residents and it was these winning intruders that tended to produce the longer fights. Female weight and hence reproductive value had a marked influence on fight intensity and duration of fights won by the intruder but not those won by the resident. This indicates that only the resident obtains information about the female. These data are discussed with reference to the discrepancy with theory and a failure of some contestants to obtain information on resource value and relative contestant size necessary to optimize fight strategy.

Local Conventions in Game Play in an Evolving Dual Social Network Framework

People usually perform economic interactions within the social setting of a small group, while they obtain relevant information from a broader source. We capture this feature with a dynamic interaction model based on two separate social networks. Individuals play a coordination game in an interaction network, while updating their strategies using information from a separate influence network through which information is disseminated. In each time period, the interaction and influence networks co-evolve, and the individuals’ strategies are updated through a modified naive learning process. We show that both network structures and players’ strategies always reach a steady state, in which players form fully connected groups and converge to local conventions. We also analyze the influence exerted by a minority group of strongly opinionated players on these outcomes.