A Game-Theoretic Approach for Threats Detection and Intervention in Surveillance

Threat prevention with limited security resources is a challenging problem. An optimal strategy is to eectively predict attackers' targets (or goals) based on current available information, and use such predictions to prevent (or disrupt) their planned attacks. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic framework to address this challenge which encompasses the following three elements. First, we design a method to analyze an attacker's types in order to determine the most plausible type of an attacker. Second, we propose an approach to predict possible targets of an attack and the course of actions that the attackers may take even when the attackers' types are ambiguous. Third, a game-theoretic based strategy is developed to determine the best protection actions for defenders (security resources).

Game-­theoretic Resource Allocation with Real-­time Probabilistic Surveillance Information

Game-theoretic security resource allocation problems have generated significant interest in the area of designing and developing security systems. These approaches traditionally utilize the Stackelberg game model for security resource scheduling in order to improve the protection of critical assets. The basic assumption in Stackelberg games is that a defender will act first, then an attacker will choose their best response after observing the defender’s strategy commitment (e.g., protecting a specific asset). Thus, it requires an attacker’s full or partial observation of a defender’s strategy. This assumption is unrealistic in real-time threat recognition and prevention. In this paper, we propose a new solution concept (i.e., a method to predict how a game will be played) for deriving the defender’s optimal strategy based on the principle of acceptable costs of minimax regret. Moreover, we demonstrate the advantages of this solution concept by analyzing its properties.

Setting the Rules of the Game: Mega-Regionals and the Role of the WTO

Faced with a WTO in a state of paralysis, large developed trading nations have shifted their attentions to other fora to pursue their trade policy objectives. In particular, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are now being used to promote the regulatory disciplines that were previously rejected by developing countries at the multilateral level. These so-called ‘deep’ or ‘21st century’ PTAs address a variety of issues, from technical norms, procurement, investment protection and intellectual property rights to social and environmental protection. Moreover, recently, developed countries have sought to negotiate PTAs which are large in scale, both in terms of economic size and geographical reach, including the so-called ‘mega-regional’ PTAs, such as the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, the EU-Japan PTA, the Transpacific Partnership, and the China-backed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. These mega-regional PTAs are distinctive not just in terms of their sheer size and the breadth and depth of issues addressed, but also because some of their proponents readily admit that one of the central aims pursued by such agreements is to design global rules on new trade issues. In other words, these agreements are being conceived as alternatives to multilateral rule making at the WTO level. The proliferation of 21st century trade deals raises important questions concerning the continued relevance of the WTO as a global rule-making venue, and the impact that the regulatory disciplines promoted in such agreements will have on both developing and developed countries. This paper discusses the emerging features of an international trading system that is increasingly populated by large-scale PTAs and discusses some of the points of tension that arise from such practice. Firstly, it examines instances of horizontal tension resulting from the proliferation of PTAs, particularly the extent to which such PTAs represent a threat or multilateral trade governance. Secondly, it looks at an example of vertical tension by examining the manner in which the imposition of regulatory disciplines through trade agreements can undermine the ability of countries, especially developing countries, to pursue legitimate public interest objectives. Finally, the paper considers a number of steps that could be considered to address some of the adverse effects associated with the fragmentation of the international trading system, including the option of embracing variable geometry within the WTO framework and the need to develop mechanisms that provide flexibility for developing countries in the implementation of regulatory disciplines.

The Influence of Child Protection Orientation on Child Welfare Practice

This article reports the findings of the second part of a two-part research project examining the potential for social workers to make changes in their work with families and children. While social workers in the United Kingdom have been encouraged to shift from a child protection to a child welfare orientation in their practice, such changes have been hampered by professional and organisational concern to manage risk. The research explores the influence of a child protection orientation on practice in child welfare cases. The findings, from two file analyses and interviews with twenty-six social workers, indicate that such an influence is indeed apparent. This is evidenced in two ways; firstly patterns of practice in child welfare cases are similar to those in child protection cases. Secondly, while the majority of social workers express an attitudinal desire to move towards a child welfare orientation, they still prioritise the management of risk in their practice. It is argued that social workers need permission from their employing organisations to make changes in their practice. This, in turn, requires such organisations to state clear goals in line with a child welfare orientation and develop holistic strategies to achieve these.