Political Liberalism, Free Speech and Public Reason

In this paper, I critically assess John Rawls' repeated claim that the duty of civility is only a moral duty and should not be enforced by law. In the first part of the paper, I examine and reject the view that Rawls' position may be due to the practical difficulties that the legal enforcement of the duty of civility might entail. I thus claim that Rawls' position must be driven by deeper normative reasons grounded in a conception of free speech. In the second part of the paper, I therefore examine various arguments for free speech and critically assess whether they are consistent with Rawls' political liberalism. I first focus on the arguments from truth and self-fulfilment. Both arguments, I argue, rely on comprehensive doctrines and therefore cannot provide a freestanding political justification for free speech. Freedom of speech, I claim, can be justified instead on the basis of Rawls' political conception of the person and of the two moral powers. However, Rawls' wide view of public reason already allows scope for the kind of free speech necessary for the exercise of the two moral powers and therefore cannot explain Rawls' opposition to the legal enforcement of the duty of civility. Such opposition, I claim, can only be explained on the basis of a defence of unconstrained freedom of speech grounded in the ideas of democracy and political legitimacy. Yet, I conclude, while public reason and the duty of civility are essential to political liberalism, unconstrained freedom of speech is not. Rawls and political liberals could therefore renounce unconstrained freedom of speech, and endorse the legal enforcement of the duty of civility, while remaining faithful to political liberalism.

Insults, free speech and offensiveness

This article examines what is wrong with some expressive acts, ‘insults’. Their putative wrongfulness is distinguished from the causing of indirect harms, aggregated harms, contextual harms, and damaging misrepresentations. The article clarifies what insults are, making use of work by Neu and Austin, and argues that their wrongfulness cannot lie in the hurt that is caused to those at whom such acts are directed. Rather it must lie in what they seek to do, namely to denigrate the other. The causing of offence is at most evidence that an insult has been communicated; it is not independent grounds of proscription or constraint. The victim of an insult may know that she has been insulted but not accept or agree with the insult, and thereby submit to the insulter. Hence insults need not, as Waldron argues they do, occasion dignitary harms. They do not of themselves subvert their victims' equal moral status. The claim that hateful speech endorses inequality should not be conflated with a claim that such speech directly subverts equality.

Thus, ‘wounding words’ should not unduly trouble the liberal defender of free speech either on the grounds of preventing offence or on those of avoiding dignitary harms.

Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech

This is a study of free speech and hate speech with reference to the international standards and to the United States jurisprudence. The study, in a comparative and critical fashion, depicts the historical evolution and the application of the concept of ‘free speech,’ within the context of ‘hate speech.’ The main question of this article is how free speech can be discerned from hate speech, and whether the latter should be restricted. To this end, it examines the regulation of free speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and in light of the international standards, particularly under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The study not only illustrates how elusive the endeavour of striking a balance between free speech and other vital interests could be, but also discusses whether and how hate speech should be eliminated within the ‘marketplace of ideas.’

The Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in Freedom of Expression and Public Morality Cases

This paper discusses whether or not Strasbourg organs have created principled criteria governing the use of the doctrine within the context of free speech and public morals. The first part of the paper gives an overview of the doctrine and further examines how the doctrine has evolved within the European context. Part II focuses on the rationale behind the doctrine and discusses the legitimacy of the doctrine in light of its application to various forms of free speech. Part III covers one of the most problematic applications of the doctrine in matters concerning public morality, where Contracting States have a wide margin of appreciation. This part will discuss whether or not the “lack of European consensus” criterion is an elusive concept that might create a risk of abuse in the application of the doctrine. The paper concludes that while margin of appreciation today serves as a flexible instrument between the local necessities and the universal application of human rights, the imprecise and contradictory points might lead to its potential abuse that might endanger its future existence.

The Democratic Dynamics of Government Consultations. Speaking Freely and Listening Properly

There is a growing use of consultation and e-consultation procedures by governments. This chapter seeks to examine the role of consultation as part of a new technology of government. Consultation on policy development can reinvigorate democratic engage- ment but often it can silence views through a sort of participatory disempowerment; it can loosen the democratic anchorage of the public service within the state. The chapter develops a governmentality perspective interrogating what participation, democratic engagement and free speech mean in this context, and how ideas of publicness are constructed, managed and controlled. The focus is on the nature of consultation, its relationship to ideas of free speech and speaking freely, and its potential to empower subaltern counterpublics which can formulate oppositional interpretations and urge alternative conclusions. The aim is to develop an idea of the democratic adequacy of the consultation process and draw out a sense of how democratic engagement here can be structured – for good or ill.

Wide Matching - An Approach to Improving Noise Robustness for Speech Enhancement

It is shown that under certain conditions it is possible to obtain a good speech estimate from noise without requiring noise estimation. We study an implementation of the theory, namely wide matching, for speech enhancement. The new approach performs sentence-wide joint speech segment estimation subject to maximum recognizability to gain noise robustness. Experiments have been conducted to evaluate the new approach with variable noises and SNRs from -5 dB to noise free. It is shown that the new approach, without any estimation of the noise, significantly outperformed conventional methods in the low SNR conditions while retaining comparable performance in the high SNR conditions. It is further suggested that the wide matching and deep learning approaches can be combined towards a highly robust and accurate speech estimator.