How Does Justice Sound? Enunciative Modalities, Law’s Logos and Woman’s Voice

In the throes of her mimetic exposure of the lie of phallocratic discursive unity in 'Speculum of the Other Woman', Irigaray paused on the impossibility of woman’s voice and remarked that ‘it [was] still better to speak only in riddles, allusions, hints, parables.’ Even if asked to clarify a few points. Even if people plead that they just don’t understand. After all, she said, ‘they never have understood.’ (Irigaray 1985, 143).

That the law has never understood a uniquely feminine narrative is hardly controversial, but that this erasure continues to have real and substantive consequences for justice is a reality that feminists have been compelled to remain vigilant in exposing. How does the authority of the word compound law’s exclusionary matrix? How does law remain impervious to woman’s voice and how might it hear woman’s voice? Is there capacity for a dialogic engagement between woman, parler femme, and law?

This paper will explore these questions with particular reference to the experience of women testifying to trauma during the rape trial. It will argue that a logically linked historical genealogy can be traced through which law has come to posit itself as an originary discourse by which thinking is very much conflated with being, or in other terms, law is conflated with justice. This has consequences both for women’s capacity to speak or represent the harm of rape to law, but also for law’s ability to ‘hear’ woman’s voice and objectively adjudicate in cases of rape. It will suggest that justice requires law acknowledge the presence of two distinct and different subjects and that this must be done not only at the symbolic level but also at the level of the parole, syntax and discourse.

Unmasking the ‘Elderly Mystique’: why it is time to make the personal political in ageing research

This article uses feminist scholarship to investigate ‘the elderly mystique’ – which contends that the potential of old age is masked by a set of false beliefs about ageing (i.e. ageism) which permeate social, economic and political life (Cohen, 1988).
The article presents a theoretical model which explores the extent to which institutionalised ageism shapes the trajectory of life after 60. The hypothesis under-pinning the model is simple: The challenge for ageing societies is not the average age of a given population but, rather, how age is used to structure economic, social and political life. An inter-disciplinary framework is used to examine how biological facts about ageing are used to segregate older from younger people, giving older people the status of “other”; economically through retirement, politically through assumptions about ‘the grey vote’ and socially through ageist stereotyping in the media and through denial and ridicule of the sexuality of older people. Each domain is informed by the achievements of feminist theory and research on sexism and how its successes and failures can inform critical investigations of ageism.
The paper recognises the role of ageism in de-politicising the lived experience of ageing. The paper concludes that feminist scholarship, particularly work by feminists in their seventies, eighties and nineties has much to offer in terms of re-framing gerontology as an emancipatory project for current and future cohorts of older people.

The Illusions of Post-Feminism, Ghosts of Gender and the Discourses of Law

This article seeks to consider evidence of post-feminist and "post-equality" gender narratives contained in the discourses of law in the UK and European contexts. Analysis of perennial ghosts of gender in the areas of gender-neutrality in policy, legislative regulation of sexual crimes, and the adjudication of gendered issues by judges will be undertaken in order to renew and reinstate the focus of the legal feminist project and advocate for continued scrutiny in these three practical areas.

From the Right to Life to the Right to Livability: Radically Re-approaching ‘Life’ in Human Rights Politics

This article critically reflects on current mainstream debate on abortion in international human rights discourse and the conception of life underpinning it. The public health focus on access to safe abortion which has dominated this discourse can be detected as committed to a fundamentally liberal idea of bounded and individual subjecthood which mirrors the commitments of the liberal right to life more generally. However, feminist challenges to this frame seeking to advance wider access to reproductive freedoms appear equally underpinned by a liberal conception of life. It is asserted that feminists may offer a more radical challenge to the current impasse in international debate on abortion by engaging with the concept of livability which foregrounds life as an interdependent and conditioned process. The trope of the ‘right to livability’ developed in this article presents a means to reposition the relation between rights and life and facilitate such radical engagement which better attends to the socio-political conditions shaping our interdependent living and being.