“The Role of Judges in the Formation of Public Law: Activism or Autolimitation?

(with G. Anthony).

Common Mistake in Contract Law

English law has long struggled to understand the effect of a fundamental common mistake in contract formation. Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd [1932] AC 161 recognises that a common mistake which totally undermines a contract renders it void. Solle v Butcher [1950] 1 KB 671 recognises a doctrine of 'mistake in equity' under which a serious common mistake in contract formation falling short of totally undermining the contract could give an adversely affected party the right to rescind the contract. This article accepts that the enormous difficulty in differentiating these two kinds of mistake justifies the insistence by the Court of Appeal in The Great Peace [2003] QB 679 that there can be only one doctrine of common mistake. However, the article proceeds to argue that where the risk of the commonly mistaken matter is not allocated by the contract itself a better doctrine would be that the contract is voidable.

Testing preference formation in learning design contingent valuation (LDCV) using advanced information and repetitive treatments

Policymakers have largely replaced Single Bounded Discrete Choice (SBDC) valuation by the more statistically efficient repetitive methods; Double Bounded Discrete Choice (DBDC) and Discrete Choice Experiments (DCE) . Repetitive valuation permits classification into rational preferences: (i) a priori well-formed; (ii) consistent non-arbitrary values “discovered” through repetition and experience; (Plott, 1996; List 2003) and irrational preferences; (iii) consistent but arbitrary values as “shaped” by preceding bid level (Tufano, 2010; Ariely et al., 2003) and (iv) inconsistent and arbitrary values. Policy valuations should demonstrate behaviorally rational preferences. We outline novel methods for testing this in DBDC applied to renewable energy premiums in Chile.