Environmental pricing of externalities from different sources of electricity generation in Chile

The rapid increase in electricity demand in Chile means a choice must be made between major investments in renewable or non-renewable sources for additional production. Current projects to develop large dams for hydropower in Chilean Patagonia impose an environmental price by damaging the natural environment. On the other hand, the increased use of fossil fuels entails an environmental price in terms of air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions contributing to climate change. This paper studies the debate on future electricity supply in Chile by investigating the preferences of households for a variety of different sources of electricity generation such as fossil fuels, large hydropower in Chilean Patagonia and other renewable energy sources. Using Double Bounded Dichotomous Choice Contingent Valuation, a novel advanced disclosure method and internal consistency test are used to elicit the willingness to pay for less environmentally damaging sources. Policy results suggest a strong preference for renewable energy sources with higher environmental prices imposed by consumers on electricity generated from fossil fuels than from large dams in Chilean Patagonia. Policy results further suggest the possibility of introducing incentives for renewable energy developments that would be supported by consumers through green tariffs or environmental premiums. Methodological findings suggest that advanced disclosure learning overcomes the problem of internal inconsistency in SB-DB estimates.

Parimutuel betting under asymmetric information

This paper examines simple parimutuel betting games under asymmetric information, with particular attention to differences between markets in which bets are submitted simultaneously versus sequentially. In the simultaneous parimutuel betting market, all (symmetric and asymmetric) Bayesian-Nash equilibria are generically characterized as a function of the number of bettors and the quality of their private information. There always exists a separating equilibrium, in which all bettors follow their private signals. This equilibrium is unique if the number of bettors is sufficiently large. In the sequential framework, earlier bets have information externalities, because they may reveal private information of bettors. They also have payoff externalities, because they affect the betting odds. One effect of these externalities is that the separating equilibrium disappears if the number of betting periods is sufficiently large. (C) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Structural Capital of University Spin-Out Firms: The Moderating Role of University Incubators

University incubators (UI) are generally believed to be important in the successful commercialisation of university spin-outs (USO) with over half of all UK Universities having established an on-campus UI. In this chapter we examine the value of UIs in the spin-out process, focusing on the structural networks of USOs located in a UI as compared to USOs in a University with no access to a UI. Our primary research question is therefore: to what extent does the structural network of USOs with access to an on-campus UI differ from USOs without? The research therefore con-tributes to a growing critique of the effectiveness of UIs in commercialis-ing academic research and the recognition of positive direct and indirect externalities from participation in networks. Through network mapping of all USOs from two research intensive universities, we profile and ana-lyse the formal and informal network ties of USOs to various partners in-ternal and external to the host university. Through interviews we also consider how these networks enhance the resources and capabilities of USOs. Our findings highlight significant differences, with USOs located in a UI having more informal but fewer formal ties, both to other USOs as well as within the host University. In contrast, location in an incuba-tor was not found to affect the extent and nature of ties with external or-ganisations. Reasons for these differences are examined through inter-views with the USOs and point to various factors including the proactive brokering role of incubator and university staff, university bureaucracy, the hidden networks of executive board members across USOs, university equity investment policy and complementary technologies.

Business Intelligence and Multi-market Competition

We consider a multi-market framework where a set of firms compete on two oligopolistic markets. The cost of production of each firm allows for spillovers across markets, ensuring that output decisions for both markets have to be made jointly. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can establish links gathering business intelligence about other firms. A link formed by a firm generates two types of externalities for competitors and consumers. We characterize the business intelligence equilibrium networks and networks that maximize social welfare. By contrast with single market competition, we show that in multi-market competition there exist situations where intelligence gathering activities are underdeveloped with regard to social welfare and should be tolerated, if not encouraged, by public authorities.

Stability in a Network Economy: The Role of Institutions

We consider an economy in which agents are embedded in a network of potential value-generating relationships. Agents are assumed to be able to participate in three types of economic interactions: Autarkic self-provision; bilateral interaction; and multilateral collaboration through endogenously provided platforms.
We introduce two stability concepts and provide sufficient and necessary conditions on the network structure that guarantee existence, in cases of the absence of externalities, link-based externalities and crowding externalities. We show that institutional arrangements based on socioeconomic roles and leadership guarantee stability. In particular, the stability of more complex economic outcomes requires more strict and complex institutional rules to govern economic interactions. We investigate strict social hierarchies, tiered leadership structures and global market places.