Politicians, elections and catastrophe: the general election of 1847

Over the last decade, much new research has appeared on the subject of the Great Irish Famine but, remarkably, a major political event during the famine - the 1847 general election - has received virtually no mention. Recent work on politics in this period has tended to concentrate on political reaction in Britain rather than Ireland. The aim of this article is to examine the response of Irish politicians to the famine during the general election of 1847. The main source has been the political addresses and nomination speeches of most of the 140 candidates. The evidence from this material shows that, although the famine was an important matter in many constituencies, it was not the dominant issue countrywide. Various proposals to deal with the famine emerged, but there was an absence of agreed, practical measures to deal with immediate problems. The parties in Ireland failed to create a common platform to challenge the government over its efforts. Ideological constraints played an important part in these failures. The general election of 1847 represents a lost opportunity to tackle some of the effects of the famine.

Satellite flies (Leucophora personata, Diptera : Anthomyiidae) and other dipteran parasites of the communal bee Andrena agilissima (Hymenoptera : Andrenidae) on the island of Elba, Italy

Solitary and presocial aculueate Hymenoptera are parasitized by a range of dipteran species in the families Axithomyiidae, Bombyliidae, Conopidae, Phoridae, and Sarcophagidae that are likely to impact on their hosts. We undertook a study over several years of a univoltine and communal bee, Andrena agilissima, and its main dipteran parasites, in particular the satellite fly Leucophora personata (Diptera: Anthomyiidae). Behavioural and ecological data were collected from one nesting aggregation of the host bee on the island of Elba, Italy, from 1993 to 2003, and from a foraging site of the bee, ca 5 km from the nesting aggregation. Other Diptera associated with A. agilissmia at the field site were the bee fly Bombylius fimbriatus (Bombyliidae), the conopid fly Zodion cinereum (Conopidae), and the scuttle fly Megaselia andrenae (Phoridae). The phenology of the Diptera broadly overlapped with that of their host across the season of activity (end of April and all of May). Diurnal activity patterns differed slightly; L. personata in particular was active at the host's nesting site before A. agilissima. Female satellite flies also showed a range of behaviours in gaining entry to a host nest. We summarize published data on this and other Leucophora species that parasitize Andrena host bees. Host bees returning to their nests occasionally undertook zig-zag flight manoeuvres if followed by a satellite fly that were generally successful in evading the fly. Satellite flies that entered a nest, presumably to oviposit, were less likely to remain therein if another host bee entered the same nest, suggesting that one advantage to communal nesting for this host is a reduction in brood cell parasitism by L. personata. We provide the first clear evidence for parasitism by a Zodion of any Andrena host. Both L. personata and M. andrenae concentrated their parasitic activities in the zone of the host nesting aggregation with highest nest densities. Three of the Diptera, L. personata, B. fimbriatus, and Z. cinereum, seemed to have extremely low rates of parasitism whilst that of M. andrenae appeared low. Though they have refined parasitic behaviour that allows them to gain entry into host nests (L. personata, B. fimbriatus, and M. andrenae) or to parasitize adults (Z. cinercum), these parasites seem not to impact upon the dynamics of the host A. agilissima at the nesting aggregation, and the host possesses traits to reduce parasitism.

Perceptions and reality: Economic voting at the 2004 European Parliament elections

One of the most influential explanations of voting behaviour is based on economic factors: when the economy is doing well, voters reward the incumbent government and when the economy is doing badly, voters punish the incumbent. This reward-punishment model is thought to be particularly appropriate at second order contests such as European Parliament elections. Yet operationalising this economic voting model using citizens' perceptions of economic performance may suffer from endogeneity problems if citizens' perceptions are in fact a function of their party preferences rather than being a cause of their party preferences. Thus, this article models a 'strict' version of economic voting in which they purge citizens' economic perceptions of partisan effects and only use as a predictor of voting that portion of citizens' economic perceptions that is caused by the real world economy. Using data on voting at the 2004 European Parliament elections for 23 European Union electorates, the article finds some, but limited, evidence for economic voting that is dependent on both voter sophistication and clarity of responsibility for the economy within any country. First, only politically sophisticated voters' subjective economic assessments are in fact grounded in economic reality. Second, the portion of subjective economic assessments that is a function of the real world economy is a significant predictor of voting only in single party government contexts where there can be a clear attribution of responsibility. For coalition government contexts, the article finds essentially no impact of the real economy via economic perceptions on vote choice, at least at European Parliament elections.

Hiring Incentives and Labour Force Participation in Italy

A long-standing economic tradition maintains that labour supply reacts to market tightness; its sensitivity to job quality has received less attention. If firms hire workers with both temporary and open-ended contracts, does participation increase when more permanent jobs are available? We investigate this relationship within a policy evaluation framework; in particular, we examine how labour supply reacted in Italy to a recent subsidy in favour of open-ended contracts. This subsidy increased labour force participation by 1.4% in 2001 and 2.1% in 2002. This increase was concentrated on males aged 35-54, with a low or at most a secondary schooling level.

The Bronze Age of S. Italy, Sicily and Malta

in Development and decline in the Mediterranean Bronze Age. Mathers, C..and Stoddart, S.K.F, (eds.). 1.