Economic Stability and Economic Governance in the Euro Area:What the European Crisis Can Teach on the Limits of Economic Integration

The recent European economic crisis has dramatically exposed the failures of
the various institutional mechanisms in place to maintain economic stability
in Europe, and has unveiled the difficulty in achieving international coordination
on fiscal and financial stability policies. Drawing on the European
experience, this article analyzes the concept of economic stability in international
law and highlights the peculiar problems connected to its maintenance
or promotion. First, we demonstrate that policies that safeguard and
protect economic stability are largely regulated and managed at the national
level, due to their inextricable relationship with the exercise of national political
power. Until recently, more limited levels of pan-European integration
did not make the coordination of economic stability policies seem necessary.
However, a much deeper level of economic integration makes it very difficult
to tackle an international economic crisis through national responses. If EU
Member states wish to maintain and deepen economic integration, they
must accept an erosion of sovereignty over their economic stability policies.
This will not only deprive states of a fundamental anchor of political power,
but also create a challenge for the maintenance of democratic control over
economic policies. Second, this article argues that soft law approaches are
likely ineffective in enforcing the regulatory disciplines required to ensure
economic stability.

New Organizational Leadership: Nonstate Actors in Global Economic Governance

States and international organizations have found irresistible cause in a globalizing world to coopt nonstate actors (NGOs, private standard setters and so forth) to manage the manifold problems arising under their stretched mandates and resources. The pooling of capacities in the pursuit of common goals seems perfectly sensible. Yet although the strategy of cooptation has become a policy of choice, policy makers often lack full knowledge of its implications. As Philip Selznick first showed, cooptation can have unintended consequences, shifting leadership from one organization to another. We place this fertile insight in a better specified analytical framework. That is, one capable of explaining when and how leadership shifts occur and where the status quo leaders will remain at the helm. Using original interview data and structured focused comparisons to test the framework, we reveal dramatic variation in leadership changes following the cooptation of outside actors in global financial and environmental governance.

The EU Constitution of Social Governance in an Economic Crisis: in Defence of a Transnational Dimension to Social Europe

Conventional wisdom has it that the EU is unable to promote viable social integration, which contrasts with its commitments to improving working and living conditions and to social values and goals such as solidarity, social protection and social inclusion. This
article challenges two diff erent standpoints: on the one hand, competitive neoliberalism demands that the EU focuses on economic integration through legally binding internal market and competition rules even if Member States can only maintain a limited commitment to social inclusion, while authors defending the social models unique to the continent of Europe demand that the EU rescinds some of its established legal principles in order to make breathing space for Member States to maintain market correcting social policies. Both positions convene that there should be no genuine social policy at EU level.
This article uses scenarios of widely discussed rulings by the Court of Justice to illustrate that legally enforceable economic integration would prevent most Member States from achieving sustainable health services, labour relations and free university education on the basis of national closure. Since the EU has limited legislative competences to create EU level institutions to balance inequalities, it derives a Constitution of Social Governance from the EU’s values, proposing that the Court of Justice develops its urisprudence into an instrument for challenging European disunion induced by new EU economic governance

Devolution and the political representation of business interests in the UK

The devolution of political power in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and the developing regional agenda in England are widely read as a significant reconfiguration of the institutions and scales of economic governance. The process is furthest developed in Scotland while Wales and Northern Ireland, in their own distinct ways, provide intermediate cases. Devolution is least developed in England where regional political identities are generally weak and the historical legacy of regional institutions is limited.