Income, deprivation and economic stress in the enlarged European Union

At risk of poverty indicators based on relative income measures suggest that within the enlarged EU societies located at quite different points on a continuum of affluence have similar levels of poverty. Substantial differences in levels of income between societies do not in themselves invalidate this approach. However, the relative income approach fails to capture the fact that, if countries are grouped in terms of level of GDP, between economic cluster differences in life-style deprivation are sharper at lower income levels. Support for the argument relating to restricted reference groups is found in relation to the contrast between the twelve most affluent EU countries and all others. The limitations of relative income poverty lines have little to do with the process of enlargement as such. Instead the major problem involves the weak association between income and deprivation in the more affluent countries. However, as a consequence of such difficulties, such indicators do not provide entirely meaningful comparisons of levels of disadvantage across economic clusters. The current analysis, rather than supporting the alternative of a focus on absolute income or an EU wide poverty line, suggests that we should take the argument for adopting a multidimensional approach to the measurement of poverty more seriously.

Inequality, state ownership and the European Union: How economic context and economic ideology shape support for the European Union

This article investigates the extent to which economic ideology affects people's support for European Union integration and how this is conditioned by economic context. We argue that people on the economic left who live in a country with conditions of high income inequality and little state ownership will support European integration, because more integration would move public policy in a left-wing direction. By contrast, people on the left who live in a country with conditions of low income inequality and widespread public ownership are likely to be eurosceptic, as further integration would result in a more right-wing public policy. We empirically confirm our hypotheses and discuss the implications for European Union democracy.

Perceptions and reality: Economic voting at the 2004 European Parliament elections

One of the most influential explanations of voting behaviour is based on economic factors: when the economy is doing well, voters reward the incumbent government and when the economy is doing badly, voters punish the incumbent. This reward-punishment model is thought to be particularly appropriate at second order contests such as European Parliament elections. Yet operationalising this economic voting model using citizens' perceptions of economic performance may suffer from endogeneity problems if citizens' perceptions are in fact a function of their party preferences rather than being a cause of their party preferences. Thus, this article models a 'strict' version of economic voting in which they purge citizens' economic perceptions of partisan effects and only use as a predictor of voting that portion of citizens' economic perceptions that is caused by the real world economy. Using data on voting at the 2004 European Parliament elections for 23 European Union electorates, the article finds some, but limited, evidence for economic voting that is dependent on both voter sophistication and clarity of responsibility for the economy within any country. First, only politically sophisticated voters' subjective economic assessments are in fact grounded in economic reality. Second, the portion of subjective economic assessments that is a function of the real world economy is a significant predictor of voting only in single party government contexts where there can be a clear attribution of responsibility. For coalition government contexts, the article finds essentially no impact of the real economy via economic perceptions on vote choice, at least at European Parliament elections.

Non-union employee representation, union avoidance and the managerial agenda

Non-union employee representation is an area which has attracted much interest in the voice literature. Much of the literature has been shaped by a dialogue which considers NERs as a means of union avoidance. More recently however scholars have suggested that for NERs to work in such contexts, they may need to be imbued with a higher set of functionalities to remain viable entities. Using a critical case study of a union recognition drive and managerial response in the form of an NER, this article contributes to a more nuanced interpretation of the literature dialogue than hitherto exists. A core component of the findings directly challenge existing interpretations within the field; namely that NERs are shaped by a paradox of managerial action. It is argued that the NER failed to satisfy for employees because of a structural remit, rather than through any paradox in managerial intent.

Trades Unions and the Transition away from 'actually existing unsustainability':From economic crisis to a new political economy beyond growth

Traditionally trades unions have accepted and promoted orthodox economic growth as a policy imperative. In recent years there has been a noticeable ‘greening’ of trade unions in relation to initiatives such as the ‘Green new deal’ and the creation of ‘green collar’ employment and the focus on a ‘just transition’ to a low carbon economy. Yet given the growing evidence of the negative impacts of economic growth in terms of environmental, resource and pollution impacts as well as the inability of economic growth to tackle (as opposed to managed) socio-economic inequality, it is timely to review the case for trades unions to fundamentally rethink the commitment to orthodox economic growth. That is, for trades unions to consider going beyond their current ‘green/sustainability’ strategies to consider more radical ‘post-growth’ policy positions. This chapter will explore some of the dimensions of a ‘post-growth’ trade union agenda by considering the evidence for going beyond growth from within the trade union movement (specifically looking at the International Labor Organization’s 2004 report on Economic Security, to internal union discussions around trades unionism and climate change) and external evidence ranging from Wilkinson and Pickett’s The Spirit Level (which suggests amongst other things that in the developed world what is needed is not economic growth but greater redistribution and lowering inequality – issues also of traditional interest to the Trades Union movement) to Tim Jackson’s Prosperity without Growth (which suggests that economic growth is ecologically unsustainable as well having passed a threshold beyond which it is contributing to human well-being in the developed world). As well as discussing the relationship between trades unionism and what may be called ‘green political economy’ (such as the ‘degrowth’ and ‘limits to growth’ perspectives) this chapter will also discuss the practical/policy implications of this ‘post-growth’ perspective in relation to trades unionism’s analysis of capitalism and its transformation in the context of a climate changed, carbon constrained world, including implications for ideas such as basic income, a shorter working week and what a trades unionism focused on how to achieve high quality of life within a low carbon context might look like.

Social Class Variation in Risk: A Comparative Analysis of the Dynamics of Economic Vulnerability

A joint concern with multidimensionality and dynamics is a defining feature of the pervasive use of the terminology of social exclusion in the European Union. The notion of social exclusion focuses attention on economic vulnerability in the sense of exposure to risk and uncertainty. Sociological concern with these issues has been associated with the thesis that risk and uncertainty have become more pervasive and extend substantially beyond the working class. This paper combines features of recent approaches to statistical modelling of poverty dynamics and multidimensional deprivation in order to develop our understanding of the dynamics of economic vulnerability. An analysis involving nine countries and covering the first five waves of the European Community Household Panel shows that, across nations and time, it is possible to identify an economically vulnerable class. This class is characterized by heightened risk of falling below a critical resource level, exposure to material deprivation and experience of subjective economic stress. Cross-national differentials in persistence of vulnerability are wider than in the case of income poverty and less affected by measurement error. Economic vulnerability profiles vary across welfare regimes in a manner broadly consistent with our expectations. Variation in the impact of social class within and across countries provides no support for the argument that its role in structuring such risk has become much less important. Our findings suggest that it is possible to accept the importance of the emergence of new forms of social risk and acknowledge the significance of efforts to develop welfare states policies involving a shift of opportunities and decision making on to individuals without accepting the 'death of social class' thesis.

Material Deprivation, Economic Stress, and Reference Groups in Europe: An Analysis of EU-SILC 2009

In this article, we take advantage of the recent availability of data from the special module on material deprivation in the 2009 European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between material deprivation and economic stress, the mediating and moderating roles played by cross-national differences in levels of income and income inequality, and the implications for competing perspectives on the nature of reference groups in Europe. The article establishes the critical role of basic deprivation, relating to inability to enjoy customary standards of living, in influencing economic stress levels. National income levels and inequality had no direct influence on economic stress. However, the impact of basic deprivation was stronger in countries with higher levels of income, indicating the crucial role of national reference groups. An interaction between basic deprivation and income inequality was also observed. However, contrary to the expectation that experiencing basic deprivation in a national context of high income inequality is likely to be particularly stressful, the consequences of such deprivation were most negative in low inequality countries. Experiencing basic deprivation where high income levels and lower inequality would lead to the expectation that such deprivation is eminently avoidable exacerbates its impact. © The Author 2013.

Low Pay, In-Work Poverty and Economic Vulnerability: A Comparative Aanalysis Using EU-SILC

We explore the potential of data from EU-SILC (Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) for the enlarged European Union for the study of low pay and its relationship to household poverty and vulnerability. Limitations of the earnings data currently available mean the analysis covers only 14 of these countries. For employees who are not low paid, income poverty is seen to be rare. The low paid face a much higher risk of being in a household below relative income poverty thresholds, ranging from 7 per cent in Belgium and the Netherlands up to 1718 per cent in Austria, Estonia and Lithuania. The likelihood of their being in a poor household is clearly linked to gender, age and social class. In most of the countries only a minority of low-paid individuals are in vulnerable households.

Multiple deprivation and persistent poverty in the European Union

The literature on Social exclusion has focused attention on the processes leading to exposure to multiple disadvantage. Despite the influence this perspective has had on both academic and policy discussions, conceptual analysis has remained imprecise and empirical evidence modest. We have made use of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) in order to examine the extent to which persistent income poverty results in multiple deprivation. Our analysis shows that only a modest proportion of the persistently poor can he characterized as being exposed to such deprivation. While persistent poverty and multiple deprivation combine to produce extremely high levels of economic strain, there is no evidence that they interact in a significant fashion. We argue that understanding deprivation is not facilitated by focusing on a cleavage between a multiply deprived minority and a comfortable majority, and we consider the policy implications of this argument.