Bogeymen, lunatics and fanatics: collective actions and the private enforcement of European competition law

The European desire to ensure that bearers of EU rights are adequately compensated for any infringement of these rights, particularly in cases where the harm is widely diffused, and perhaps not even noticed by those affected by it, collides with another desire: to avoid the perceived excesses of an American-style system of class actions. The excesses of these American class actions are in European discourse presented as a sort of bogeyman, which is a source of irrational fear, often presented by parental or other authority figures. But when looked at critically, the bogeyman disappears. In this paper, I examine the European (and UK) proposals for collective action. I compare them to the American regime. The flaws and purported excesses of the American regime, I argue, are exaggerated. A close, objective examination of the American regime shows this. I conclude that it is not the mythical bogeyman of a US class action that is the barrier to effective collective redress; rather, the barriers to effective, wide-ranging group actions lie within European legal culture and traditions, particularly those mandating individual control over litigation.

Inter-Agency Evidence Sharing in Competition Law Enforcement

While transnational antitrust enforcement is becoming only more common, the access to foreign-based evidence remains a considerable practical challenge. This article appraises considerations and concerns surrounding confidentiality, and looks into ways of their possible accommodation. It further identifies and critically evaluates the existing mechanisms allowing for inter-agency confidential information/ evidence sharing in competition law enforcement. The article outlines the shortcomings of the current framework and points to novel unilateral approaches. In the latter regard the focus is devoted to Australia, where the competition agency is empowered to share confidential information with foreign counterparts, also without any underlying bilateral agreement and on a non-reciprocal basis. This solution shows that a pragmatic and workable approach to inter-agency evidence sharing can be achieved.

On convergence with hiccups: recent amendments to Poland's competition law

Discusses the amendments to the Polish Competition Act 2007 adopted in June 2014 which aim to enhance the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement, including the introduction of: (1) civil fines for individuals; (2) a "leniency plus" programme based on the US model; (3) a settlement procedure; and (4) extended inspection powers for the Competition Authority. Assesses the likely effectiveness of the reforms.

Export Cartels: Is it Legal to Target your Neighbour? Analysis in Light of Recent Case Law

Despite the growing sophistication of antitrust regimes around the world, export cartels benefit from special treatment: they are almost universally tolerated, if not encouraged in the countries of origin. Economists do not offer an unambiguous policy recommendation on how to deal with them in part due to the lack of empirical data. This article discusses arguments for and against export cartels and it identifies the existing gaps in the present regulatory framework. The theoretical part is followed by an analysis of the recent case law: a US cartel challenged with different outcomes in India and South Africa, as well as Chinese export cartels pursued in the USA. The Chinese cases are particularly topical as the conduct at stake, apart from being subject to private antitrust actions before US courts, was also challenged within the WTO dispute settlement framework, pointing out to the existing interface between trade and competition. While the recent developments prove that unaddressed issues tend not to vanish, the new South-North dimension has the potential of placing export cartels again on the international agenda. Pragmatic thinking suggests looking for the solution within the WTO framework.

The Polish Competition Authority Submits a Draft Amendment to the Polish Competition Act: Revolution or Fine-Tuning?

This piece highlights and offers a brief analysis of the most important of the
proposed changes to Polish competition law. The draft proposal envisages introduction of, inter alia, financial penalties for individuals, two-stage merger review process, important changes to the leniency program (including introduction of leniency plus), as well as such new tools as remedies and settlements.

The Polish Competition Authority Publishes its Annual Report for 2012

In May 2013 the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK), the Polish Competition Authority, published its Annual Report for 2012. This piece provides an overview of the reported activities within the competition law & policy domain, and comments on some of them.