Sheriffs and outlaws: in pursuit of effective enforcement

Compliance has emerged as a key component of regulatory control, but has been subject to limited research. This paper examines compliance in relation to planning control in the jurisdiction of Northern Ireland. It draws upon a review of practice and procedure used to deal with planning enforcement cases and interviews conducted with professional planners. Many of the options considered emerge from the Review of Planning Enforcement System in England published by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2002). The findings are incorporated with theoretical perspectives of regulatory compliance and provide a platform for more effective control of development.

Article 260(2) TFEU: An Effective Judicial Procedure for the Enforcement of Judgments?

Article 260(2) TFEU (ex 228(2) EC) enables the European Court of Justice to enforce compliance with its judgements. This article analyses its use in doing so and questions whether it could be applied more effectively. It commences by highlighting the principally economic and environmental context of the case-law, and by examining the initiatives taken to tackle delays in bringing these cases before the Court. The article then critically evaluates the effectiveness of the financial sanctions available to the Court. In doing so, it aims to fill a gap in present research by looking beyond the procedural measures through which the Court and the Commission operate to examine the practical impact of Article 260(2) itself.

A multiagent network for peer norm enforcement

In a multiagent system where norms are used to regulate the actions agents ought to execute, some agents may decide not to abide by the norms if this can benefit them. Norm enforcement mechanisms are designed to counteract these benefits and thus the motives for not abiding by the norms. In this work we propose a distributed mechanism through which agents in the multiagent system that do not abide by the norms can be ostracised by their peers. An ostracised agent cannot interact anymore and looses all benefits from future interactions. We describe a model for multiagent systems structured as networks of agents, and a behavioural model for the agents in such systems. Furthermore, we provide analytical results which show that there exists an upper bound to the number of potential norm violations when all the agents exhibit certain behaviours. We also provide experimental results showing that both stricter enforcement behaviours and larger percentage of agents exhibiting these behaviours reduce the number of norm violations, and that the network topology influences the number of norm violations. These experiments have been executed under varying scenarios with different values for the number of agents, percentage of enforcers, percentage of violators, network topology, and agent behaviours. Finally, we give examples of applications where the enforcement techniques we provide could be used.