Export Cartels: Is it Legal to Target your Neighbour? Analysis in Light of Recent Case Law

Despite the growing sophistication of antitrust regimes around the world, export cartels benefit from special treatment: they are almost universally tolerated, if not encouraged in the countries of origin. Economists do not offer an unambiguous policy recommendation on how to deal with them in part due to the lack of empirical data. This article discusses arguments for and against export cartels and it identifies the existing gaps in the present regulatory framework. The theoretical part is followed by an analysis of the recent case law: a US cartel challenged with different outcomes in India and South Africa, as well as Chinese export cartels pursued in the USA. The Chinese cases are particularly topical as the conduct at stake, apart from being subject to private antitrust actions before US courts, was also challenged within the WTO dispute settlement framework, pointing out to the existing interface between trade and competition. While the recent developments prove that unaddressed issues tend not to vanish, the new South-North dimension has the potential of placing export cartels again on the international agenda. Pragmatic thinking suggests looking for the solution within the WTO framework.

Economic Stability and Economic Governance in the Euro Area:What the European Crisis Can Teach on the Limits of Economic Integration

The recent European economic crisis has dramatically exposed the failures of
the various institutional mechanisms in place to maintain economic stability
in Europe, and has unveiled the difficulty in achieving international coordination
on fiscal and financial stability policies. Drawing on the European
experience, this article analyzes the concept of economic stability in international
law and highlights the peculiar problems connected to its maintenance
or promotion. First, we demonstrate that policies that safeguard and
protect economic stability are largely regulated and managed at the national
level, due to their inextricable relationship with the exercise of national political
power. Until recently, more limited levels of pan-European integration
did not make the coordination of economic stability policies seem necessary.
However, a much deeper level of economic integration makes it very difficult
to tackle an international economic crisis through national responses. If EU
Member states wish to maintain and deepen economic integration, they
must accept an erosion of sovereignty over their economic stability policies.
This will not only deprive states of a fundamental anchor of political power,
but also create a challenge for the maintenance of democratic control over
economic policies. Second, this article argues that soft law approaches are
likely ineffective in enforcing the regulatory disciplines required to ensure
economic stability.

The WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism – An Effective Surveillance Mechanism for Aid for Trade?

There has always been a question mark over how best to integrate developing countries into the world trading system and traditionally the WTO has used special and differential treatment (S&D) to do so. However, since 1996 the WTO has been involved with the Aid for Trade (AfT) initiative typically co-ordinated by the OECD and UN. This article firstly outlines the background to AfT since 1996 under the numerous agencies working in the area, highlighting how importance has always been placed on the monitoring and effectiveness of the process. It then turns to assessing the various methods currently used and the proposal of the WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) as a potential monitoring tool of AfT.

GSP+ and Human Rights::Is the EU's Approach the Right One?

Among the purposes of the EU’s GSP+ programme is to link human rights to trade incentives, with the idea of using such incentives to promote developing countries’ adoption of the values found in core human rights treaties. With the re-renewal of the GSP (and GSP+) programmes to take effect in January 2014, it is fruitful to examine their efficacy and consistency with WTO law. In this article, I argue the GSP+ programme is not only ineffective in obtaining an improvement in human rights conditions for the vast majority of the world’s population, but it is also incompatible with WTO law. A stick-based regime where human rights abuses are linked to trade sanctions is a better way to proceed. After outlining the GSP+ system, and its linkage of human rights and trade, I analyse its efficacy and WTO consistency. Having shown that it is ineffective and contrary to WTO law, I argue that trade sanctions based on a PPM distinction and/or GATT XX(a) may be the appropriate means of linking trade and human rights. The article ends with some concluding remarks on the need for the careful design of such a system.

Intellectual Property and the EU’s Deep Trade Agenda

The EU is considered to be one of the main proponents of what has been called the deep trade agenda—that is, the push for further trade liberalization with an emphasis on the removal of domestic non-tariff regulatory measures affecting trade, as opposed to the traditional focus on the removal of trade barriers at borders. As negotiations on the Doha Development Round have stalled, the EU has attempted to achieve these aims by entering into comprehensive free trade agreements (FTAs) that are not only limited exclusively to tariffs but also extend to non-tariff barriers, including services, intellectual property rights (IPRs), competition, and investment. These FTAs place great emphasis on regulatory convergence as a means to secure greater market openings. The paper examines the EU's current external trade policy in the area of IP, particularly its attempts to promote its own regulatory model for the protection of IP rights through trade agreements. By looking at the IP enforcement provisions of such agreements, the article also examines how the divisive issues that are currently hindering the progress of negotiations at WTO level, including the demands from developing countries to maintain a degree of autonomy in the area of IP regulation as well as the need to balance IP protection with human rights protection, are being dealt with in recent EU FTAs.

Movement of Capital and Trade in Services:Distinguishing Myth from Reality Regarding the GATS and the Liberalization of the Capital Account

This article will analyze the interplay between capital movements and trade
in services as structured in World Trade Organization (WTO) law, and it will
assess the implications of the capital account liberalization for the freedom of
WTO Members to pursue their economic policies. Although the movement
of capital is largely confined to the domain of international financial or monetary
policy, it is regulated by WTO law due to its role in the process of
financial services liberalization, which generally requires liberalized capital
flows. From a legal perspective, the interplay between capital movements
and trade in services requires striking a delicate balance between the right
of market access and the parallel right of economic stability. Indeed, a liberalized
regime for capital movements could pose serious stability problems
during times of crisis. For this reason, it is necessary that Members are able
to derogate from their obligations and adopt emergency measures.
Regulating the movement of capital in the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) requires stretching the regulatory oversight of WTO law
over different aspects of international economic policy. Indeed, capital movements are a fundamental component of the balance of payments and have a
major role in shaping monetary, fiscal, and financial policies. This article will
analyze how the discipline provided by the GATS on capital movements will
affect not only trade in services, but also the Members’ policy space on
monetary and fiscal policy. The article will conclude that while the GATS offers enough policy space for the maintenance of financial stability, it does
not fully take into consideration the need of Members to control capital
movements in order to conduct monetary policies.