New Technology and Researchers’ Access to Court and Tribunal Information: the need for European analysis

We discuss the limitations and rights which may affect the researcher’s access to and use of digital, court and administrative tribunal based information. We suggest that there is a need for a European-wide investigation of the legal framework which affects the researcher who might wish to utilise this form of information. A European-wide context is required because much of the relevant law is European rather than national, but much of the constraints are cultural. It is our thesis that research improves understanding and then improves practice as that understanding becomes part of public debate. If it is difficult to undertake research, then public debate about the court system – its effectiveness, its biases, its strengths – becomes constrained. Access to court records is currently determined on a discretionary basis or on the basis of interpretation of rules of the court where these are challenged in legal proceedings. Anecdotal evidence would suggest that there are significant variations in the extent to which court documents such as pleadings, transcripts, affidavits etc are made generally accessible under court rules or as a result of litigation in different jurisdictions or, indeed, in different courts in the same jurisdiction. Such a lack of clarity can only encourage a chilling of what might otherwise be valuable research. Courts are not, of course, democratic bodies. However, they are part of a democratic system and should, we suggest – both for the public benefit and for their proper operation – be accessible and criticisable by the independent researcher. The extent to which the independent researcher is enabled access is the subject of this article. The rights of access for researchers and the public have been examined in other common law countries but not, to date, in the UK or Europe.

The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights

The European Court of Human Rights has begun to refer to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in order to support its reasoning for interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights in a particular way. But the EU Charter does not yet have any special status in that regard, being treated by the Court as on a par with numerous other documents of international law. The Court’s use of the Charter began in connection with arts 8 and 12 of the Convention (the right to a family life and the right to marry) but in subsequent years it has been extended to many other Articles of the Convention. It is in relation to art.6 (the right to a fair trial) that the Charter’s influence has been most noticeable so far, the Court having changed its position on two important aspects of Article 6 partly because of the wording of the EU Charter. But the influence on art.3 (in relation to the rights of asylum seekers), art.7 (in relation to retroactive penal laws), art.9 (in relation to the right to conscientious objection) and art.11 (in relation to rights of trades unions) has also been significant. The potential for the Charter to have greater influence on the Court’s jurisprudence in years to come remains considerable.