The 4Cs of Disaster Partnering: Communication, Coordination, Cooperation and Collaboration

Public, nonprofit and private organisations respond to large-scale disasters domestically and overseas. Critics of these assistance efforts, as well as those involved, often cite poor interorganisational partnering as an obstacle to successful disaster response. Observers frequently call for ‘more’ and ‘better’ partnering. We found important qualitative distinctions existed within partnering behaviours. We identified four different types of interorganisational partnering activities often referred to interchangeably: communication, cooperation, coordination and collaboration—the Four Cs. We derived definitions of the Four Cs from the partnering literature. We then tested them in a case study of the response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. We suggest that the Four Cs are distinct activities, that organisations are typically strong or weak in one or more for various reasons, and that the four terms represent a continuum of increased interorganisational embeddedness in partnering activities.

Establishing ex ante public construction supply chain guidelines in the public procurement of Schools' estate

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to explore the formative development of construction supply chain guidelines or proposals in a UK region’s schools’ estates procurement process to more effectively address a forthcoming increase in investment.

Design/methodology/approach – The research approach is interpretive. Using an action research approach, repeated semi-structured interviews and focus groups with a range of stakeholders are conducted.

Findings – The current construction supply chain in schools’ estate procurement has many difficulties, not least given the highly fragmented and disconnected nature of the projects. Synergies are being missed and there is little or no continuous improvement. Drawing on these findings, the research iteratively develops a range of proposals and guidelines to address this situation.

Research limitations/implications – This research adds weight to the current focus on pressing for change in the construction industry. It presents potentially valuable insights into the benefits of partnering arrangements and how these might usefully be incorporated into schools’ estate supply chain.

Practical implications – A set of guidelines is developed to guide the public procurement of schools’ estate in a UK region. These guidelines are set within the context of the Modernising and Rethinking Construction agenda.

Originality/value – The action research approach enabled the researchers to gain a unique insight into how public procurement and contractor personnel interact and to establish effective practical guidelines.

The evolution of authoritarian processes: Fostering cooperation in large-scale groups

Authoritarianism, comprising conventionalism, authoritarian submission, and authoritarian aggression, is an important factor underlying prejudice and social discrimination and therefore is typically perceived as socially problematic. In contrast, our work examines adaptive features of authoritarianism. Evolutionary game theoretical considerations (e.g., biased social learning) point to authoritarian psychological processes that establish and foster group life (e.g., high levels of ingroup cooperation). First, the evolution of social learning (particularly conformist and prestige biases) leads to the establishment of local and distinct cultural groups (conventionalism). Second, local cultural rules solve coordination dilemmas by transforming these rules into normative standards against which others are evaluated (authoritarian submission). Third, the common rules within a particular culture or group are reinforced by a tendency to reward norm compliance and punish norm deviations (authoritarian aggression). Implications regarding the deduction of novel research questions as well as dealing with authoritarianism as a social problem are discussed.

Calling in the gap: competition or cooperation in littermates' begging behaviour?

Abstract: Offspring are frequently raised alongside their siblings and are provisioned early in life by adults. Adult provisioning is stimulated by offspring begging, but it is unclear how each offspring should beg, given the begging behaviour of their siblings. It has previously been suggested that siblings may compete directly through begging for a fixed level of provisioning, or that siblings may cooperate in their begging in order to jointly elevate the level of provisioning by adults. We studied the begging behaviour of meerkat Suricata suricatta pups, explored how it changed as the begging behaviour of their littermates altered, and asked how the adults responded to group-level changes in begging. We found conflicting evidence for classic models of competitive and cooperative begging. Pups reared in larger litters begged at higher rates, yet experimentally increasing begging levels within groups caused individual begging rates to decrease. Pups decreased begging rates when close to other begging pups, and pups spaced further apart were fed more. Adults increased their overall level of provisioning as group levels of begging increased, but per capita provisioning decreased. Adults preferred to provision speakers playing back recordings of two pups begging alternately to recordings of the same two pups begging simultaneously. Therefore, we suggest that meerkat pups avoid some of the costs of direct competition imposed by an escalation of begging as other pups beg, by begging in gaps between the bouts of others or avoiding littermates. Such behaviour is also preferred by provisioning adults, thus providing additional benefits to the pups.

Strategic behavior under partial cooperation

We investigate how a group of players might cooperate with each other within the setting of a non-cooperative game. We pursue two notions of partial cooperative equilibria that follow a modification of Nash's best response rationality rather than a core-like approach. Partial cooperative Nash equilibrium treats non-cooperative players and the coalition of cooperators symmetrically, while the notion of partial cooperative leadership equilibrium assumes that the group of cooperators has a first-mover advantage. We prove existence theorems for both types of equilibria. We look at three well-known applications under partial cooperation. In a game of voluntary provision of a public good we show that our two new equilibrium notions of partial cooperation coincide. In a modified Cournot oligopoly, we identify multiple equilibria of each type and show that a non-cooperator may have a higher payoff than a cooperator. In contrast, under partial cooperation in a symmetric Salop City game, a cooperator enjoys a higher return.