Patriotism or Integrity?:Constitutional Community in Divided Societies

Some commentators worry that a plurinational constitutional order can only ever be an inherently unstable modus vivendi. They fear that the accommodation of sub-state nationalism will tend to undermine the viability of constitutional democracies. This article enlists Ronald Dworkin’s theory of ‘law as integrity’ to show how these concerns might be assuaged. My central claim is that the expressive value of integrity can drive a divided society in the direction of an eventual community of principle, even in the absence of a common political identity. I argue that this model of political community is a more plausible prescription for divided societies than the theory that competing nationalisms might be superseded by constitutional patriotism. I go on to explain, however, that integrity has a better chance of realizing this potential if the generally judge-centric focus of Dworkin’s theory is expanded to make greater room for non-judicial interpretative responsibility. Occasional references are made to the example of Northern Ireland to illustrate my points.

Judicial Impartiality and Independence in Divided Societies: An Empirical Analysis of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina

The role of Constitutional Courts in deeply divided societies is complicated by the danger that the salient societal cleavages may influence judicial decision-making and, consequently, undermine judicial independence and impartiality. With reference to the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this article investigates the influence of ethno-nationalism on judicial behaviour and the extent to which variation in judicial tenure amplifies or dampens that influence. Based on a statistical analysis of an original dataset of the Court’s decisions, we find that the judges do in fact divide predictably along ethno-national lines, at least in certain types of cases, and that these divisions cannot be reduced to a residual loyalty to their appointing political parties. Contrary to some theoretical expectations, however, we find that long-term tenure does little to dampen the influence of ethno-nationalism on judicial behaviour. Moreover, our findings suggest that the longer a judge serves on the Court the more ethno-national affiliation seems to influence her decision-making. We conclude by considering how alternative arrangements for the selection and tenure of judges might help to ameliorate this problem.

The Equalization of Effective Communicative Freedom: Democratic Justice in the Constitutional State and Beyond

Jurgen Habermas takes the realization of rights through the democratic self-organization of legal communities to be the normative core of emancipatory politics. In this article I explore the implications of this claim in relation to the requirements of justice. I argue that Habermas's discourse theory of democratic legitimacy presupposes a substantive principle of justice that demands the equalization of effective communicative freedom for all structurally constituted social groups in any constitutional state. This involves the elimination of a range of structural injustices rooted in the complex interrelationships between political, economic and cultural orders. In the final section I sketch briefly the implications of this analysis in the context of ongoing globalization processes. It is suggested that the most effective way to establish a just system of global governance is to equalize effective communicative freedom among nation-states.