Bayesian Dependence Tests for Continuous, Binary and Mixed Continuous-Binary Variables

Tests for dependence of continuous, discrete and mixed continuous-discrete variables are ubiquitous in science. The goal of this paper is to derive Bayesian alternatives to frequentist null hypothesis significance tests for dependence. In particular, we will present three Bayesian tests for dependence of binary, continuous and mixed variables. These tests are nonparametric and based on the Dirichlet Process, which allows us to use the same prior model for all of them. Therefore, the tests are “consistent” among each other, in the sense that the probabilities that variables are dependent computed with these tests are commensurable across the different types of variables being tested. By means of simulations with artificial data, we show the effectiveness of the new tests.

Learning Bayesian networks from data: An information-theory based approach

This paper provides algorithms that use an information-theoretic analysis to learn Bayesian network structures from data. Based on our three-phase learning framework, we develop efficient algorithms that can effectively learn Bayesian networks, requiring only polynomial numbers of conditional independence (CI) tests in typical cases. We provide precise conditions that specify when these algorithms are guaranteed to be correct as well as empirical evidence (from real world applications and simulation tests) that demonstrates that these systems work efficiently and reliably in practice.

Valuing the cultural monuments of Armenia: Bayesian updating of prior beliefs in contingent valuation

The most appropriate way to measure the social benefits of conserving built cultural heritage sites is to ask the beneficiaries of conservation interventions how much they would be willing to pay for them. We use contingent valuation - a survey-based approach that elicits willingness to pay (WTP) directly from individuals - to estimate the benefits of a nationwide conservation of built cultural heritage sites in Armenia. The survey was administered to Armenian nationals living in Armenia, and obtained extensive information about the respondents' perceptions of the current state of conservation of monuments in Armenia, described the current situation, presented a hypothetical conservation program, elicited WTP for it, and queried individuals about what they thought would happen to monument sites in the absence of the government conservation program. We posit that respondents combined the information about the fate of monuments provided by the questionnaire with their prior beliefs, and that WTP for the good, or program, is likely to be affected by these updated beliefs. We propose a Bayesian updating model of prior beliefs, and empirically implement it with the data from our survey. We found that uncertainty about what would happen to monuments in the absence of the program results in lower WTP amounts. © 2008 Pion Ltd and its Licensors.

Rarity, pseudodiagnosticity and Bayesian reasoning

Three experiments investigated the effect of rarity on people's selection and interpretation of data in a variant of the pseudodiagnosticity task. For familiar (Experiment 1) but not for arbitrary (Experiment 3) materials, participants were more likely to select evidence so as to complete a likelihood ratio when the initial evidence they received was a single likelihood concerning a rare feature. This rarity effect with familiar materials was replicated in Experiment 2 where it was shown that participants were relatively insensitive to explicit manipulations of the likely diagnosticity of rare evidence. In contrast to the effects for data selection, there was an effect of rarity on confidence ratings after receipt of a single likelihood for arbitrary but not for familiar materials. It is suggested that selecting diagnostic evidence necessitates explicit consideration of the alternative hypothesis and that consideration of the possible consequences of the evidence for the alternative weakens the rarity effect in confidence ratings. Paradoxically, although rarity effects in evidence selection and confidence ratings are in the spirit of Bayesian reasoning, the effect on confidence ratings appears to rely on participants thinking less about the alternative hypothesis.