Transforming the Irish Presidency: Activist Presidents and Gender Politics, 1990-2011

The election of two energetic women in succession to the office of President of Ireland challenged the notion that the presidency was a long-service reward for retiring politicians. Mary Robinson and Mary McAleese broke the male domination of the office, interpreted its functions in a more dynamic manner, and utilised the ‘soft power’ of the presidency with skill. Yet, as individuals they were very different in political focus, experience and ideological disposition. This article charts their respective backgrounds and discusses the context in which each woman came to the presidency. It explores their vision for the office. Focusing on the potential for harnessing the soft power of the presidency, it argues that Robinson adopted a classical representative view of the office, whereas McAleese chose a facilitatory style of leadership. The article concludes that in their different ways, Robinson and McAleese contributed to reshaping the office, utilising its symbolic potential and soft power to make it a more meaningful and fit-for-purpose political institution for the twenty-first century. © 2012 Political Studies Association of Ireland.

Provisional report. 1990 Season. Gozo Project.

Malone, C.A.T. and S.K.F. Stoddart, 1990. Cambridge

Top incomes under finance-driven capitalism, 1990-2010: power resources and regulatory orders

This article examines the impact of financialisation on the income shares of the top 1% from 1990-2010, through a panel analysis of 14 OECD countries. Drawing together literatures stressing the dependence of income inequality on the structural bargaining power of capital relative to labour, and of the dependence of accumulation on underlying institutionalised modes of state regulation, it shows that financialisation has significantly enhanced top income shares net of underlying controls. Whilst the income shares of the top 1% appear responsive to variables typical of wider studies of personal income inequality, we emphasise distinctive mechanisms of top income growth linked to the rising dominance of financial instruments and actors, facilitated by a historically specific regulatory order. These conditions were key to the emergence of a state of ‘asymmetric bargaining’ which disproportionately enhanced the fortunes of the wealthy. Results thus emphasise the importance of class-biased power resources and underlying regulatory structures, as determinants both of income concentration and of the distribution of economic rewards beyond growth capacity alone.